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FOREWORD

The history of management thought in this country
is a fascinating field of study.

Perhaps its attraction

lies in its reflection of the changing attitudes of society
over the past one hundred y e a r s .
Management's relations with workers, both as in
dividuals and in organized groups comprise a significant
portion of this history.

This study has sought to investi

gate one segment of the evolving management-employee
relationship, that of employee representation plans.
In the first few decades of this century organi
zations were undergoing significant changes.

They were

growing larger and thus taking on more bureaucratic charac
teristics .

Labor unions were also growing, and by the end

of World War I they were considered by many managements to
be a significant threat to their businesses.
Both the growth of businesses and the growth of
unions were factors which created and enhanced the problems
which management had in effectively motivating its work
force.

The response of a number of firms was to create an

employee representation plan.

These plans were designed to

re-establish contact between the top and bottom levels of
the large organization and to make it unnecessary for
workers to affiliate with an outside labor organization.
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This presentation takes the position that these
plans made significant contributions to the development of
personnel administration in the firms which used them.
The description and analysis which follows presents this
point of view in some detail.
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ABSTRACT

Employee representation plans, while usually
acknowledged in the literature of personnel management and
industrial relations, have never been comprehensively
described and analyzed.

A gap has thus existed in this

area of management and labor history.

The purpose of this

research was to fill this gap and to provide new insights
into the contributions of representation plans to the
development of personnel administration in the United
States.

Implications for to d a y ’s management-employee

relations were also sought.
This study first provides a historical overview of
the factors leading to the initiation, growth and develop
ment, and demise of employee representation plans in the
United States.
periods:

The analysis is divided into four time

The pre-World War I era; the period during the

war; the decade of the 1920's; and the final years of
employee representation in the 1930's.

Forces influencing

the plans in each time period are discussed.
A description of the formal design of represen
tation plans is next provided.

This information is supplied

in order to give the reader added historical perspective
and to gain insight into the role which managements saw for
their plans.

An in-depth case analysis of the representation
plan of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey follows.

Data

from both company files and personal interviews allow the
subject to be treated in detail.
The hypothesized contributions of the plan to
management-worker relationships in the above company are
investigated.

These contributions include:

the effect of

the plan upon communication channels; the p l a n ’s impact upon
benefits received by workers and upon grievance processing;
the relationship of the plan to the creation and growth of
the personnel department; organization climate and the
representation plan; the effect of the plan upon later
unionization and development of union leaders.

In each of

these areas a positive relationship is found.
To verify or modify the conclusions of the Standard
Oil Company of New Jersey investigation, a survey of eight
other firms which utilized these plans is then undertaken.
The hypothesized contributions of the plans are again
examined in each of the eight companies.

Substantially

the same conclusions are reached.
Employee representation is thus found to have made
a number of contributions to personnel administration in
the companies which were investigated.

These results are

generalized to other firms which utilized representation.
The rationale for making this generalization is explained
in Chapter I of the study.
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The research adds to the existing knowledge of
management and labor history.

It offers lessons for

current-day managers with regard to their relations with
non-union employees s especially the white collar and pro
fessional groups.

Its lessons apply equally to governmental

employees and to university students.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY
Employee representation p l a n s , sometimes described
as plans of industrial democracy or less flatteringly as
company unions, were for the most part a phenomenon of the
period between the two world wars.

They were seen by some

as practical idealism and an awakening of the new spirit of
cooperation between the employer and his employees.'*'

Others

viewed them simply as devices to circumvent unionization of
2
the work force and as a disguised paternalism.
Employee representation in essence involved some
form of formalized management-worker dialogue, usually
implemented through shop committees composed of representa
tives of management and workers.

Common problems, sugges

tions for changes in work meth o d s , and grievances and
requests of workers were common topics for discussion in
such meetings.

Representatives of both sides commonly voted

on problems to determine their resolution.

Deadlocked

-*-C. B. Seger, "Employee Representation and Personnel
Work in a Large Scale Organization With Many Plants," Pro
ceedings of the Academy of Political Science, IX (January,
1 922),545.
^William Green, "The Challenge of the Union,"
American Federationist, XXXII (March, 1925), 161-164.

issues were resolved by higher management levels or in a few
instances by impartial arbitrators.
The representation systems were in every company
investigated initiated and sponsored by the employer,
although employees were in some cases encouraged to aid in
their design.

These plans were restricted to one firm with

the result that there were no local, regional, or national
employee representation associations as are commonly found
in labor union organizations.
The period of greatest strength for employee repre
sentation was the decade of the 1920's, although the national
labor legislation of the 1930's resulted in the adoption of
plans by some employers who had not previously been inter
ested in them.
Throughout their existence, the representation
systems were bitterly opposed by labor unions.

They were

viewed as designed and operated by the employer in order to
manipulate employees and to keep unionization from occuring
in their firms.

In the 19 3 0's, labor organizations played

an active part in seeking legislation and court rulings
which would eliminate the representation plans.
In 19 38 a decision by the Supreme Court specifically
outlawed employee representation systems.

This effectively

marked the end of their formal functioning in this country.

3

They were ruled to be employer dominated labor organizations
^NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 3 03 U.S.
(1938).

261

and thus in violation of the provisions of the National
ii

Labor Relations A c t .
The Problem
A survey of both current and historical literature
on the subject of employee representation indicates that
there is no comprehensive work on this subject.

Fragmentary

studies were undertaken during the early 1900's, but there
has not been an in-depth study of employee representation
and its influence upon management thought and practice and
upon employee attitudes and behavior.
Present day references to the plans are most fre
quently found in texts dealing with labor economics, labor
history, and personnel management.

They are for the most

part dealt with only briefly in these sources and are
generally regarded as one of a kit of tools used by manage
ment to foster the open shop movement of the 192 0 's and to
5
circumvent labor legislation of the 19 3 0's.
Although there
is much truth in such assertions, a thorough examination of
existing sources of material on the subject reveals a
number of unexplored contributions to present-day personnel
management theory made by employee representation systems.
4Ibid.
^For example, see Phillip Taft, Organized Labor in
American History (New York:
Harper and R o w , 19 64); and
Paul Pigors and Charles A. Meyers, Personnel Administration
(New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1969), Chapter 8.

Purpose of the Study
A thorough historical'analysis of these representa
tion systems should seek to accomplish three goals:

first,

to analyze extraorganizational and intraorganizational factors
which led to the formation, operation, and demise of the
plans; second, to discuss the functioning of the plans, both
in formal design and in actual practice; third, to determine
the impact of employee representation upon employer-employee
relations.

With reference to the third objective, the

following areas are worthy of specific study:
1.

The effect of the plans upon management's
ability to effectively explain its actions.

2.

The effect upon management's ability to better
understand the feelings of workers as a result
of the workers' asking more questions, making
demands, and stating grievances.

3.

The tangible gains received by employees working
under the pl a n s .
A. Wages
B . Hours
C. Working conditions

4.

The influence of the plans upon the creation or
development of departments of personnel.

5.

The impact of the plans upon the organization
climate within the surveyed firms.

6.

The effect upon the ability of labor unions to
organize firms using employee representation
plans.

7.

The development of labor union leaders or nego
tiators from workers' representatives.

The writer sees the study's primary contribution as
one of adding to existing knowledge of the evolving nature
of management-worker relationships, particularly with

5
reference to behavioral assumptions and practices of manage
ment.

Such a study can aid both the academician and the

practitioner in better understanding how their field
developed.

The lessons learned through representation might

also suggest at least partial solutions to personnel problems
confronting management today.
Research Methodology
Research methodology included the collection of
information from both primary and secondary sources.

Secon

dary sources were books and periodicals, most of which were
written during the period in which the representation
systems were in existence.

Although no one source yielded

the sort of comprehensive analysis which this study will
attempt, a significant amount of information was found which
lent itself to synthesis and analysis.
Primary data were collected from the following
sources:
1.

Personal interviews

2.

Written responses to questions

3.

The files of cooperating companies

Only a relatively small number of the firms which
used representation are in existence today.

Twenty firms

^See Appendix B for the questionnaire used for
these interviews and for written responses.

were contacted by mail."'7

Information concerning the design

•

and operation of the plan was requested.

p

These companies

included those which were given publicity in writings of the
representation era and which are still in existence today.
Although the identities of all firms which utilized employee
representation plans may not have been discovered, three
months of extensive secondary research were spent in gather
ing this type of information.

The research indicated that

many of the firms which used employee representation have
since gone out of business or lost their identities through
merger or acquisition.

A look at representation membership

figures (given in Chapter II) indicates that there were
companies which adopted and used plans but apparently
received no publicity.

The literature did indicate that

many of the smaller and lesser-known firms followed the
patterns set by the better publicized plans of the larger
organizations.

In 1926 there were 913 plans reported as

9
functioning in the United States.
7

•

These firms were Standard Oil Company of New Jersey
Standard Oil Company of Ohio; Standard Oil Company of
Indiana; Filene's of Boston; Westinghouse Electric Corpora
tion; Revere Cooper and Brass, Inc.; Dennison Manufacturing
Company; General Electric Company; Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company; Proctor and Gamble Corporation; Eastman Kodak Com
pany; Durham Hosiery Mills; Hart Schaffner, and Marx Company
International Harvester Company; E. I. Du Pont De Nemours S
Company; American Telephone and Telegraph Company; Bethlehem
Steel Corporation; Armco Steel Corporation; United States
Steel Company; Elgin Watch Company.
9See Appendix A for a copy of the letter requesting
this information.
9National Industrial Conference Board, Collective
Bargaining Through Employee Representation (New York:
National Industrial Conference Board, 1933), pp. 8-9.

7
Of the twenty firms contacted, nine responded favor
ably. ^

The other eleven firms either did not have the

information requested or were unwilling to release it from
their files.

Those who gave a favorable response sent copies

of their plans along with, in most cases, other material
from company files which dealt with employee representation.
While no claim is made that either the initial number
of firms contacted or the number of firms that responded is
statistically significant, it is believed that valid conclu
sions can be drawn from the data received concerning the
formal design of representation systems of these y e a r s .
Most of the firms which responded were and are leaders in
their industries.

In the case of the Standard Oil Companies,

Mackenzie King who installed their plans had also constructed
similar representation systems in a number of other firms.
K i n g ’s influence was also felt in firms with which he had no
direct contact.

In addition, a survey of secondary sources

published during the existence of these plans tends to con
firm the conclusions which will be drawn from the primary
data.
The case study method was employed to analyze
Standard Oil of New Jersey’s experience with employee repre
sentation.

To test the validity of the conclusions which

l^The firms which responded favorably included:
Standard Oil of New Jersey; Standard Oil of Indiana; Armco
Steel; Dennison Manufacturing Company; International
Harvester; American Telephone and Telegraph; Bethlehem Steel;
Westinghouse Electric Corporation; Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company.

were drawn, a survey of eight other prominent firms which
had used representation systems was also undertaken.

Two

potential areas of similarity between the Standard Oil of
New Jersey plan and those of the other eight companies were
first investigated.

The presumption was made that if these

points were similar, valid comparisons could be made between
the findings concerning these eight plans and the plan of
Standard Oil of New Jersey.

These two areas of comparison

were the employersf motivations for beginning their plans
and the design and stated purposes of the plans.
The survey did not explore any other company in the
same depth as Standard Oil of New Jersey.

This firm pro

vided the largest volume of primary data of any company
investigated.

A total of eight personal interviews was

granted by retired employees of the company.

A significant

amount of data from the files of the firm's headquarters in
New York City was obtained.

In addition the company's

Baton Rouge refinery allowed the use of the minutes of its
representation meetings.
Personal interviews were conducted in two w a y s .
When possible, in-person interviews were held.
distances, however, limited this approach.

Geographical

Consequently, a

number of interviews were conducted by long distance tele
phone.

Copies of the questions were sent to each inter

viewee in advance of the telephone call in order to allow
him time to collect any information he might have and to
prepare his answers adequately.

In addition to the telephone

interviews, written responses to the questions were asked
for from the respondents.
This study can be properly described as impression
istic in nature because it has largely sought to evaluate
the contributions of employee representation in terms of the
personal impressions of those who worked under the plans.
While the second and third chapters rely primarily on secon
dary sources of information and data from company files, the
fourth and fifth chapters place major emphasis on personal
interviews and represent the heart of the study.
Although there was undoubtedly some bias among those
who were interviewed, it was believed that the number of
individuals who participated are likely to have exposed any
extreme or highly distorted view held by one person.

11

Com

pany records, some of which were at one time confidential,
have provided an added source of validation.
In most instances the interviewees were retired
from the companies being investigated.

This factor should

add to the objectivity of the information collected.

In

addition those interviewed were assured that the investiga
tion was being conducted for academic purposes only and
that if they wished, their names would not be disclosed.
Six persons did ask that their names not be revealed, and
these requests were honored.
■^A total of twenty-four persons were contacted in
the nine companies.

10
A balance was sought between manager and non-manager
interviewees to add further to the objectivity of the in
vestigation.

This objective was not fully achieved, however.

Those individuals associated with the companies' management
numbered eighteen of the twenty-four interviewed.

Twelve of

these eighteen had, however, served in non-management
positions during a portion of their careers.
Scope and Limitations
This study will involve a description and analysis
of employee representation plans during the period from 19 0 0
to 19 37.

It will trace the forces which led to the creation,

operation, and demise of the plans in American industry.
Nine plans will be analyzed in depth, both from the
standpoint of their formal design and their day-to-day
functioning.

Contributions to improved employer-employee

relations will be explored in detail.

The nine companies

included in the survey represent the following industries:
oil, rubber, steel, paper products, communications, farm
implements and heavy machinery, and electrical products.
Limitations of the study include a scarcity of living
individuals who had first-hand experience with representation
and incomplete company records relating to these plans.
Plan of Presentation
Chapter II deals with the economic, social, and
organizational influences upon employee representation in
this country.

A brief discussion of the formal design and

11
operation of representation plans will be provided in
Chapter III.

Chapter IV contains an in-depth study of the

employee representation plan of Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey.

In Chapter V an analysis and comparison of eight

other plans is undertaken.

Chapter VI presents a summary of

the study, the conclusions which are drawn from it, and
implications for current-day personnel relationships.

CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES
UPON EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION PLANS:
AN OVERVIEW
This chapter1 seeks to analyze the reasons for
employee representation’s rise and fall in the United States.
In order to do so, it is necessary to look at both extraorganizational and intraorganizational factors leading to
the development of employee representation.

This analysis

does not attempt a thorough description and evaluation of
management and labor history; it does seek, however, to
discuss and interpret those factors believed to have been
conducive to the development of employee representation.
The following analysis will be divided into four
time periods:

the pre-World War I period from approximately

1865; the war years of 1914 to 1918; the 1920’s; and the
last decade of employee representation, the 1930's.

The

rationale for this division is that there were significant
forces affecting the formation of employee representation
during each of these periods.

Although some of these forces

were overlapping in two or more of the time periods, the
analysis will attempt to show that each time interval had

13
peculiarities of its own in its influence upon representa
tion systems.
The Period Prior to World War I
A study of American history reveals a spectacular
growth of business enterprises from the Civil War to the
beginning of the twentieth century.

"Between 1860 and 1900,

the United States jumped from fourth to first place among
manufacturing nations of the world."'1'.
The United States was essentially an agrarian econ
omy in 1865, and its facilities for production were designed
primarily to service the needs of farmers and their families.
These firms were for the most part small, selling their
finished goods in local markets.

Some sales took place in

more distant markets and were usually handled through
commissioned agents.

p

By 1900, however, the growth of business not only in
terms of output produced but also in terms of size of the
business firm itself was great.
Most of the major industries had become dominated by
a few large enterprises. . . . In other words, the
business economy had become industrial. . . . In the
terms of the economist and sociologist, a significant
sector of American industry had become bureaucratic, in
the sense that business decisions were made within large
hierarchical structures.3
^Frank Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century
(New York:
Knopf, 19 60), p. 5.
^Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Beginnings of 'Big
Business' in American Industry," Business History Review,
XXXIII (Spring, 1959), 2.
3I b i d . , p . 3.

14
Markets for many firms were no longer local since many of
the largest ones had built large national marketing organi
zations.

Moreover, the manufacture and processing of

producers’ goods had grown significantly during the period
from 1865 to 1900.14
Regardless of the forces leading to the expansion
and power of the business organization, the large corporation
was an important force, both socially and economically in
the United States by 19 00.

Its employees, perhaps even more

than its customers and suppliers, were significantly affected
by its power over their lives.
Coincident with the growth of the industrial expan
sion in this country was the flood of immigrants coming
primarily from the European nations.

These individuals,

most of whom were without funds and many of whom could not
speak English, were anxious to obtain employment.
The growing manufacturing firms readily found places
for them, although the attitudes and practices of many

,

employers reflected their lack of interest in the workers as
individuals.

This attitude was common among employers who

saw the workers primarily in terms of factors of production,
or more bluntly put, as interchangeable, general purpose
machine t o o l s .

Most of these individuals were peasants or

agricultural laborers and possessed no special skills.
were best designed in terms of simple, repetitive tasks
**Ibid. , p . 4 .

Jobs
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which could be learned quickly, leading to a minimum train
ing time and a quick replacement of those who could not meet
the employer’s standards.

Because there were many of these

unskilled laborers looking for work, replacements for dis
charged workers were easy to find.
Certainly not all laborers and unskilled workmen in
industry were foreign born.

During this period of immigra

tion from other countries, there was a concurrent movement
of individuals from farms to the cities; many of these
formerly rural workers became laborers in industry.
Evidence does suggest, however, that native-born
industrial workers were upwardly mobile to a much greater
extent than were the immigrants.

In the early 1 9 0 0 's Leitch,

for example, found that only ten percent of the employees
working in the stockyards of Chicago were American citizens
while at the same time twenty-six different nationalities
were working in one Arizona mining camp and thirty-two in
another.^

Another study of the distribution of native and

foreign-born workers stated in 192 0 that "Though the Americans
are in the majority in the professions and the skilled and
industrial trades, they are in the minority in all the
r e s t .”®
The tools of Scientific Management, developed during
this period, were well suited to the design of fragmented,
5I b i d . , p. 84.
^Andre Siegfried, America Comes of Age:
A French
Analysis (New York:Harcourt, Brace, 1929), p . 151.
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repetitive tasks.

Although it is clear that F. W. Taylor

did not intend his system to be used to make wooden men out
n

of the workers,

his concepts of task specialization and

separation of planning from doing nevertheless were aids to
the employer in designing jobs that the unskilled could
perform with practically no training.

"This incentive [for

designing simplified jobs] was all the greater because train
ing immigrants was extremely difficult when many supervisors
could not speak the language of their men."
An early student of United States labor-management
relations observed in 1914 that:
The minute subdivision of industrial production, and
the adaptation of the industrial machine, more than any
other single characteristic, defines American produc
tion. . . . This subdivision of processes demands not
only a minimum of technical knowledge, but also a
passive, stolid labor-class temperament.9
The language problem between management and labor was inten( I
sified after 1900 when a large majority of the immigrants
were composed of southern Europeans with customs, beliefs,
and institutions quite different from those prevailing in
America at that time.

Approximately one million of these

immigrants came to the United States yearly in the decade
^See Frederick W. Taylor, Scientific Management
(Hanover, N . H . : Dartmouth College, 1912), pp. 22-55.
p
Summer H. Slichter, "The Current Labor Policies of
American Industries," Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXVII
(May, 1929), 394.
^Carleton H. Parker, "The Techniques of American
Industry," Atlantic Mon t h l y , CXXV (January, 1920), 13, 17.
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after 1900 .

Although the business leaders of the time did

not directly encourage high levels of immigration, they
apparently were favorable to its continuance.
Wage rates for the unskilled workers were quite low.
The absence of a large number of skilled workmen and the
abundance of available unskilled labor contributed to the
low wage levels.

Workmen were experiencing a decline in

bargaining equality with their employer as compared to preCivil War days.

As the economic power of the employer grew,

the individual bargaining power of the unskilled employee
declined.
Although wages were low for the majority of the
workers from the Civil War until World War I , real wages
from 18 70 until 189 6 did apparently rise slightly.

However,

from 188 9 to 1914 real wages fell ten percent while per
capita production was increasing more than thirty percent.
"It is thus evident that wage-earners not only did not
receive the same share per capita of the increased product
year after year but actually were receiving at the end of
the period slightly less goods than at the beginning.
In 1915 President Wilson's Commission on Industrial
Relations reported that "the very least that a family of
five persons can live upon in anything approaching decency
■^George H. Mayer and Walter 0. Foster, The United
States and the Twentieth Century (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin,
1958) , p . 9"!

11

Edgar S. Furniss, Labor Problems
Mifflin, 1925), p. 102.

(Boston:

Houghton
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is $7 0 0 [per year]."
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It further reported that of the

immigrant families surveyed in an Immigration Commission
**

study, "the figures show conclusively that between one-half
and two-thirds of these families were living below the
standards of decent subsistence, while about one-third were
living in a state which can be described only as abject
"i q

poverty."

Certainly, not all American workers, whether

immigrant or native born, lived in this fashion.

And by

comparison, the American worker enjoyed a much higher stan
dard of living than his European counterpart.

Hugo Munster-

berg, a professor at Harvard and a native of Germany,
observed in 1904 that the typical American laborer was
better off in terms of wages, clothing, housing, and entertainment when compared to his European counterpart.

14

These

differences, of course, were the primary reasons for the
influx of European immigrants, many of whom hoped to work in
industry only long enough to save enough money to buy a farm
for themselves and their families.
The general social and economic conditions from the
Civil War to 1914 can be summarized as a period during which
large scale business developed and grew and a time in which
the work of many was standardized and fragmented into
1 9

United States Commission on Industrial Relations,
Final Report of the Commission on Industrial Relations
(Chicago: Barnard and Miller Printers, 1915), pp. 347-349 .
13Ibid., p. 353.
14

.
Hugo Munsterberg, The Americans (New York:
McClure, Phillips, 1904), p. 319.
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relatively simple, repetitive tasks.

An abundance of un

skilled immigrant labor was available, willing to work for
low wages because of the lack of an acceptable alternative.
Language and cultural barriers separated many of these men
from their employers and those in management.
A gulf came to exist between management and labor.
Not only was the personal intimacy of the small shop lost
in the large enterprise but also barriers between men of
different cultures and interests came about.
Labor policy.

What was the result of these changes in

terms of the labor policy of employers and their managerial
representatives?

Slichter put it perhaps most succintly

when he said it was chiefly nthe practice of driving workers
rather than of developing their cooperation and good w i l l ."
Driving was defined as close supervision in a pressured
atmosphere with force and the threat of discharge as the
primary motivational tools of the supervisor.
The simplicity of this labor policy resulted in no
need for a specialized personnel department.

The foreman

was usually free to hire or fire as he saw fit and exerted
thus great power over the lives of the workers.

It was not

at all uncommon for the foreman to require gifts from his
subordinates if they were to keep their jobs.
Some employers and managers used the technique of
divide and conquer as a means of implementing their policy
■^Slichter, loc. cit.
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of driving.

Men of different nationalities and languages,

some traditionally antagonistic to one another, were
deliberately mixed in work gangs so that there would be
lowered resistance to the pressure techniques of the foreman
or supervisor.
This picture of management’s attitude toward workers
is not intended to be either a complete or a precisely
accurate one.

Instead it is a composite of many of the

abuses which, while not universal, were plentiful enough to
be representative of a large part of industrial practices.
Not all employers behaved in the manner described.

A dis

cussion of their reasons for not doing so and the interest
of some of them in employee representation will follow in a
later segment of this chapter.
It must be stressed that pre-Civil War working con
ditions are not viewed in this presentation as ideal models
which were later forsaken.

Instead the dramatic growth of

business, the heavy influx of foreign farm and unskilled
workers, and the emphasis upon quickly learned, greatly
segmented, repetitive tasks widened the gulf between manager
and worker.
Although the unskilled or common laborer was at a
definite economic and social disadvantage in comparison to
the employer, he did not always accept these conditions
gracefully and without question.
Labor unrest from 18 65 to 1914 was not uncommon.
The Homestead Steel Strike of 189 2, the Pullman Strike of
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1894, and the recurrent strikes of coalminers are indicative
of the labor unrest of the times.

Even though there was a

labor surplus in most of these years and both legislation
and the courts for the most part supported the employer in
his actions against strikers, employee resistance did occur.
Union membership was also growing during most of the period;
by 1914 union membership in the United States reached almost
"I C

2.5 million workers.
By 19 00 some employers were disturbed sufficiently
by union activity to actively organize themselves in
employers' associations.

The primary purpose of such organ

izations at that time was to prevent the spread of unionism
and with it strikes and boycotts.

Among the groups taking

part in such activities were the Dayton Employers' Associa
tion, the Citizen's Industrial Association, and the National
Association of Manufacturers.
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Although unionism and strikes were becoming important
signs of labor resistance during this period, far more
difficult to deal with directly were the practices of workers,
organized and unorganized, of soldiering or restricting out*put.

The writings of the time indicate that work restriction

•^National Industrial Conference Board, The Economics
Almanac (New York:
Crowell, 1956), p. 461.
17

Phillip Taft, Organized Labor in American History
(New York:
Harper and R o w , 1964), p p . 212-213; and
Katherine Coman, The Industrial History of the U . S . (New
York: Macmillan, 1920), p. 358.
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was widespread.

One observer, looking at the industrial

scene of the early twentieth century commented:
The antagonism between [workers’] ideals and the
policies of their employers has become more conscious.
Workers refuse to exert themselves greatly, they repeat
the phrases "take your time," "go easy," "no hurry;"
they take vacations from their jobs when they feel like
it, they are less and less docile and dependable.18
Early representation plans.

Against the background of a

surplus of workers, low wage rates, and the driving philos
ophy of many employers, it seems somewhat strange that some
thing as radical as employee representation would find a
sympathetic ear in businesses of this country.

And, indeed,

the plans which arose were small in number; there were ten
publicized plans operating in 1914.^

Their importance lies,

however, in their reasons for formation and their influence
upon the design and operation of later plans.
The earliest working plan of employee representation
in this country was founded by the William Filene Company,
a Boston department store.

Started in 1898, the Filene

Cooperative Association began as an insurance committee,
later expanding into such areas as disciplinary authority
over employees, determination of store rules, and setting of
penalties for their infraction.

20

•^Durant Drake, America Faces the Future (New York:
Macmillan, 1922), p. 250.
•^Earl J. Miller, "Workmen’s Representation in
Industrial Government," University of Illinois Studies in
the Social Sciences, X (September-December, 1922), 38-42.
20Ibid., p. 38.
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Among the other firms who introduced employee repre
sentation prior to this country’s entry into World War I
were the Nernst Lamp Company of Pittsburgh, the Packard
Piano Company, Hart Schaffner and Marx, and the Colorado
Fuel and Iron Company.
In these and the other firms which experimented with
employee representation, initiation came in every case from
the employer.

Despite the fact that the balance of social

and economic power was on the side of the firm, strikes and
slowdowns cost the employer money, both in quantity and
quality of production.
These two factors, the desire for productive effi
ciency and the fear of strikes and unionization, appear to
be the dominant motives for the introduction of employee
representation prior to World War I.

Although representation

plans were far from being dominant in industry at this time,
they filled nevertheless a need in some firms.

The few

employers who instituted such systems claimed a remarkable
success for their plans, although it is clear that their
approach to industrial problems was considered at the least
somewhat eccentric by other businessmen.

As Cochran has

stated:
Business . . . had been built around the tradition
of leadership, the ideal of the vigorous, strong-willed,
decisive entrepreneur.
Strict obedience to authority
from above and a free hand for the man at the helm was
as much the rule of business as of the army or navy.
Nor was it easy to see how industrial democracy would
function even if it could be instituted. . . . Labor
trouble, therefore, represented merely one aspect of the
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broader conflict between social-democratic theory and
the ideal of free business enterprise.21
Although skepticism of such an approach to industrial
problems was in these pre-war years the majority view, pro
ponents of the plans gained a significant amount of publicity.
Writers of the time, primarily economists,

sociologists and

political theorists, were concerned about industrial strife
and the plight of the many low-income working class citizens.
Although not always favorably disposed to employee represen
tation as it was then designed, most of the writers argued
for some means of improving management-worker relationships.
The means of obtaining such goodwill w a s , in the minds of a
few, through the use of employee representation.
Although there was no single individual who alone
guided the formation of representation councils, three names
stand out as strong influences in the formation of the early
plans.

These men were John Leitch, W. L. Mackenzie King,

and John D. Rockefeller, Jr.

Of the three, John Letich

wrote most extensively on the subject.
Working as a laborer, a manager, and later as a
management consultant, Leitch developed a philosophy of
labor-management relations which he applied in a number of
firms before World War I.

He published two books on the

subject of representation, Industrial Democracy in 1912 and
^ T h o m a s C. Cochran and William Miller, The Age of
Enterprise (New York:
Macmillan, 1942), pp. 247-248.
^ F o r example, see John R. Commons, Industrial Good
will (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1919), p. 18.
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Man-to-Man in 1919.

In his second book he included the

formal framework for an employee representation system which
was found in his first work.

His emphasis in Man-to-Man was

upon case histories of firms with which he had worked as a
labor relations consultant.

In each instance he explained

the prior labor problems of the firm and the later introduc
tion and success of his plan of industrial democracy.
Leitch's book was notable in that it was not only an expla
nation of how employee representation could function in
varying circumstances, but it was also an interesting
description of many of the current labor troubles.

In a

factory which made smoking pipes, he described in the follow
ing manner the attitudes of the unskilled immigrant workers
who made up the labor force:
They were unruly; few cared if the work was good or bad.
They were content to "get by" except for a sprinkling of
older men who had been employed for years and were past
the age when they could venture to seek outside employ
ment. . . . The problem was to get this polyglot crowd
interested in their work, to make them one with the
company, to introduce a spirit of cooperation which
would reflect higher pay for the men and a better pro
duct for the company.
It was a serious problem.23
In all of the companies in which he worked Leitch
introduced four cornerstones in the building of a new labor
policy.

They were justice, cooperation, economy, and

energy.

The capstone of service was then added to these

four.

He defined these concepts in the following manner:

23John Leitch, Man-to-Man:
The Story of Industrial
Democracy (New York: ~ Osborn, 1919) , p. B7~i
~
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We recognize that justice to ourselves necessitates
taking advantage of every opportunity to do the best
that is in us, and each day improve that growing ability.
Differences of opinion shall be freely and fearlessly
expressed, but we shall at all times stand ready to
cooperate with and heartily support the final judgement
m all matters.
Recognizing that economy is time, material, and
energy well spent, we determine to make the best use of
them, and so shall time, material, and energy become our
servants while we become the masters of our destiny.
As energy is the power back of action, and action is
necessary to produce results, we determine to energize
our minds and hands, concentrating our powers upon the
most important work before u s .
We believe that the only sure and sound construction
of success as an individual or an institution depends
upon the quality and quantity of service r e n d e r e d . 2 4
These concepts were introduced one at a time to the workers
over a period of w e e k s .

Each was voted on as a resolution

to be accepted or rejected.
Leitch attempted to see that each concept was put
into practice by the workers before he introduced another.
Once, accepted, the five resolutions were regarded as the
firm's business policy.

Leitch insisted that typewritten

copies of the resolutions be distributed to every worker and
that each man should carry his copy with him at all times.
With the firm's new business and labor policy
accepted by the workers, the formal plan of employee repre
sentation was then constructed.

The representation plans

were modeled after the U.S. government with a house consist
ing of workers' representatives, a senate composed of
management representatives, and a cabinet of top management
^ J o h n Leitch, "The Background of Industrial Democ
racy," Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science,
LXXXV (SeptemberT 1919)”, 212-213.
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officials.

The systems were entitled plans of industrial

democracy or by some of Leitch*s contemporaries, Leitch
plans.
Leitch *s experience led him to believe that indus^trial democracy was equally applicable in companies employing
skilled craftsmen and in firms such as the pipe manufacturer
which relied primarily on unskilled labor.
Perhaps the greatest appeal of his system was Leitch
himself.

In each case which he described, the force of his

own zeal seems to have had a decisive effect in breaking
down the feelings of hostility between management and labor.
He was described by one contemporary writer as an industrial
evangelist who "always strives to convert the management and
men before he installs his plan of industrial democracy.

i9 R

^

Speaking to the men of the Packard Piano Company in 1913,
Leitch showed the apparent desire he had to resolve their
problems:
"The trouble is," I said, "You are working at cross
purposes. . . . It is not anybody's fault--it is every
body's fault.
You are to blame and the company is to
blame, or, if you would like better to put it another
way, you are not to blame and the company is not to
b l a m e . . . . I think I know what the trouble is and I
am here to help you and the company to help themselves.
I shall not ask you to do anything except listen and ask
questions.
If you think I am on the square we will have
more meetings and work this thing o u t . But if you think
I am trying to put one over on you say so.
This is
full discussion of the design and operation of
this and other representation systems will be found in the
following chapter.
^ M i l l e r , o p . c i t . , p. 42.
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your meeting and not mine.
or leave m e . 27

By your vote you can take me

Leitch reported that in a period of five weeks he introduced
the four cornerstones and the capstone of the new labor
policy.

The result was the adoption at the end of the five

weeks of a plan of industrial democracy and a sharing be
tween the company and the workers on an equal basis of any
cost savings achieved in production.

The reported effect

was an end to work slowdowns, inferior quality, and union
agitation.

The men were said to have'''cheered and gone to

work with a will."2®
As previously mentioned, Leitch viewed his primary
task as one of changing the basic attitudes of both manage
ment and worker before attempting the design of a formal
representation system.

His approach was somewhat akin to

the mental revolution which Frederick W. Taylor found so
necessary in the introduction of a system of scientific
management in an organization.
He cited five basic changes that had occurred in
every firm in which he had installed a plan of industrial
democracy:
1.

An increase in production

2.

A decrease in the cost of production

3.

A decrease in the turnover of labor

^ L e i t c h , o p . c i t . , p. 37-38 .
28Ibid., p.

kS.
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4.

A reputation throughout the community as a
desirable place to work in and consequently a
greater ease in hiring men

5.

An immunity from strikes and other labor trou
bles .29

Although he acknowledged that such results sounded almost
too good to be true, research indicates that he was largely
successful in obtaining these goals in the firms with which
he worked.99
Sounding very much like Douglas MacGregor, Leitch
explained that such results were primarily the result of
changed assumptions.
It is simply that we have gotten into the habit of
thinking that sloth and inattention are the natural
attributes of the man who works for hire.
But is is
just as natural for a man to exert the best that is in
him when working in a shop as when playing on a baseball
team.
The real trouble is that we have denied him the
opportunity and the reward for self expression in the
average factory; we have organized with so little atten
tion to the human factor that we have in effect thrown
away brain power and taken only body power.
We have
become so obsessed with the utility of machines that we
have tried to make a machine out of a human being.31
And Leitch1s answer to this dehumanization of the workers
was industrial democracy.
By 1915 John D. Rockefeller, Jr. was in general
agreement with John Leitch’s belief in the need to eliminate
strife and improve efficiency in industry.

His personal

experiences with labor-management conflict had brought home
to him the need for some method of relieving such problems.
29Ibid. , p. 169.
30^iller, loc. c i t .
^L e i t c h , op. c i t . , p. 17 0.
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In the early 1900's Rockefeller and his father had
large interests in the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, a
coal-mining and steel-making firm.

It was during this

time that there was substantial labor unrest in the coal
mines with the fledgling United Mine Workers of America
attempting to unionize the Colorado coal fields.
The companies resisted.all attempts at unionization.
In the forefront of this resistance was the Rockefellercontrolled Colorado Fuel and Iron Company and its president,
J. F. Welborn.

Although John D. Rockefeller, Jr. actually

took little part in the firm's policy decisions regarding
labor, he had gone on record in support of any action taken
by the company's management in Colorado.

32

In the fall of

1913 a strike was called by the United Mine Workers against
the operators of the coal fields in southern Colorado, one
of which was the Rockefeller-controlled firm.

Tension and

animosity was so high on both sides that the governor of
the state requested Welborn to meet with a committee of
aggrieved employees.

Although Welborn met with the' committee,

he refused to make any compromises since he believed that
this might be interpreted as de facto recognition of the
union.

33
Violence flared on both sides, resulting in the

calling of the National Guard by the governor in late 1913.
32Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years (Boston:
Mifflin, 1960), p. 158.

Houghton

33Letter from J. F. Welborn. to Mr. McClement, Decem
ber 4, 1913, in Taft, o p . c i t ., p. 260.
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The leadership of the guard was reported to be strongly
antagonistic toward the strikers31* with the result that when
a boy was believed held in the striking w o r k e r s ’ tent
colony, the guardsmen attacked and burned the tent camp on
April 10, 1914.

Three miners were killed, and two women and

eleven children were smothered to death in one of the burn
ing tents.33
This tragedy came to be known as the "Ludlow
Massacre" and was widely publicized throughout the country.
The fighting was at last put to a stop when the governor
requested President Woodrow Wilson to send in federal
troops.
Although John D. Rockefeller, Jr. took little active
part in the policy decisions of the firm, his ownership
interests in it and his earlier statements of public support
for the management of the firm caused him to receive a
significant amount of adverse publicity.33

Writing in 1916

he revealed his own feelings about the violence that had
o c c urred:
I frankly confess that I felt there was something
fundamentally wrong in a condition of affairs which made
possible the loss of human lives, engendered hatred and
bitterness, and brought suffering and privation upon
hundreds of human beings.
I determined, therefore, that
3U

Paul M. Angle, Crossroads:
1913 (Chicago:
Rand
McNally, 1963), p. '242.
qc
Graham Adams, Jr., Age of Industrial Violence,
1910-15 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 159.
q c

H. S. Ferns and B. Ostry, The Age of Mackenzie
King (London:
William Heinemann, 1955), pp. 191-193.

32
in so far as it lay within my power I would seek some
means of avoiding the possibility of similar conflicts
arising elsewhere or in the future.3 '
Rockefeller’s desire to overcome the strife and the
residual bitterness in the Colorado coal fields led him to
contact with the help of an official of the Rockefeller
Foundation, W. L. Mackenzie King.

King, a former Canadian

Minister of Labor, was a respected student of labor rela
tions and author of his country's Industrial Disputes Act.
He in later years was to become one of Canada’s most dis
tinguished Prime Ministers.
King's first meeting with Rockefeller was in June,
191*4, six months before the Colorado strike was given up by
the miners.

Although a solution to the Colorado problem

was apparently the foremost consideration in Rockefeller's
mind at this meeting,
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the two reached general agreement

that a much broader study of labor management problems,
sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, would be a worth
while task.
By July, King and Rockefeller had reached oral
agreement that King would undertake a study of industrial
relations under the auspices of the Foundation.

King was

emphatic in his desire to be employed by the Foundation and
not by Standard Oil.

He feared "that once associated in any

way with the Rockefeller concern, my future in [Canadian]
q7

John D. Rockefeller, Jr., "Labor and Capital-Partners," Atlantic Monthly, CXVII (January, 1916), 15.
^ F . A. McGregor, The Fall and Rise of Mackenzie
King:
1911-1919 (Toronto:
Macmillan of Toronto, 1962),
p . 97.

33
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politics would be jeopardized."

In August of that year

King was formally appointed by the Foundation to make a
study of industrial relations.
Although King's appointment was for the purpose of
studying industrial relations in general, he saw his first
task as that of helping to solve the existing problems in
Colorado.

He resolved to study the situation in detail.

This did, of course, require a trip to the site of the
trouble.
In March, 1915, he arrived in Colorado and began
talks with the company's management.

Investigating condi

tions of work in the mines, he talked with the miners and
their families.

After much investigation and discussion he

saw some progress in converting the management's previous
hard-line view toward management-worker relations.
the need for many reforms in working conditions.

He saw

He was

further convinced that the company must initiate an "indus
trial constitution, some form of representative government
in which the company's twelve thousand employees would have
a recognized standing when it came to decisions affecting
working— and living--conditions.

The plan of industrial

representation was apparently taking form in his mind.
By September of that year the representation plan
was complete, and King returned to Colorado, this time
^ Ibid ., p . 103 .
^ M c G r e g o r , o p .'c i t ., p. 16 0.
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accompanied by Rockefeller.

The plan soon came to be known

as the Rockefeller Plan, but its author was Mackenzie King.
Although Rockefeller's trip to Colorado was for the
purpose of his explaining the new representation system to
both management and w o r k e r s , he fully realized his lack of
knowledge of industrial relations and his dependence upon
King.

In later years he said:

I was merely K i n g ’s mouthpiece.
I needed education.
No other man did so much for m e . He had vast experience
in industrial relations and I had none.
He had an in
tuitive sense of the right thing to do— whether it was
a man who ought to be talked with or a situation that
ought to be met.^l
This was King's first attempt at designing an
employee representation plan, but evidence exists that it
was well received by both sides.

At a joint meeting of

management and labor representatives Rockefeller, with King
by his side, explained the workings of the plan.

He in

addition suggested a number of needed reforms in working
conditions.

The joint conference supported the plan.

The

workers were then allowed to vote for either acceptance or
rejection, with the result that of the seventy-three per
cent of the workers who voted, eighty-four percent cast their
ballots for acceptance.
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In addition to the formal creation of the plan, a
position of Executive Assistant to the President was created
^ R a y m o n d B. Fosdick, John D. Rockefeller, J r . :
Portrait (New York:
Harper, 1956) , p . 161.
no
McGregor, o p . c i t ., p. 184.
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to deal with problems and issues of industrial relations in
the company.

This position which was a forerunner of the

company’s personnel department was initially held by
Clarence J. Hicks.

His primary duties lay in the adminis

tration of the new representation system.

He, in fact,

succeeded so well that he was later called on to design
plans for many of the Standard Oil Companies in which the
Rockefeller family had stock interests.
Few had illusions as to Rockefeller's primary moti
vation for the formation of the industrial representation
system in the company.

The battle between the firm and the

United Mine Workers had been a bitter one, and the plan was
an obvious attempt to satisfy the workers' desire for
organization.

It further acted as an upward channel of

communication through which workers, through their elected
representatives, could air their grievances with management.
Coupled with the company's action in improving working conh0
ditions for the miners, it was well received.
This plan
continued to function for twenty y e a r s .
The leaders of organized labor were not, however,
enthusiastic about the plan.

Samuel Gompers, then President

of the American Federation of Labor, was adamantly against
such organizations.

Gompers' position was essentially that

no employee representatives were truly free to bargain with
management unless their employee organization was completely
^ A l l a n Nevins, John D. Rockefeller (New York:
Scribner, 1941), II, pp. 673-674.
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independent of the employer .1+14

This issue was to become the

chief argument for the outlawing of all such plans under the
Wagner Act twenty years later.
Mackenzie King's success with the development of
this early plan led to requests for similar help by a number
of other large firms.

During the period from 1915 through

1918 he acted as consultant in labor relations to such firms
as General Electric, Bethlehem Steel, and the International
Harvester Company.

In each of these companies an employee

representation plan was put into effect as the result of
his consultation.
His influence during this period was not limited,
however, to the firms with which he had direct contact.
The representation systems he designed, particularly the
Colorado Plan, were used as models by other firms with
which he had no relationship.
Most of the companies directly and indirectly in
fluenced by King's plans of employee representation sought
to use them as a means to avoid unionism.

The success of

the Colorado Plan was an encouragement to managements who
sought such means to keep unionism from engulfing their
firms.
Mackenzie King did not, however, view employee
representation as a means of subverting unionism.

He saw

^ S a m u e l Gompers, "Rockefeller Organizes and Recog
nizes a 'Union'," American Federationist, XXII (November,
1915), 976-977.
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the Colorado Plan as one step toward better workermanagement relations and pictured union recognition as a
possible later step by the company if conditions warranted.
He insisted, in fact, that no discrimination be made against
union members who were or wished to be employees of the
Colorado Fuel and Iron Company.

His influence was so great

upon Rockefeller that union organizers were allowed to
actively seek members among the company’s employees upon
the company’s property.

Such a practice was never allowed

before the representation plan was put into effect.
Although King returned to Canada in 1919 to re-enter
politics, his mark upon industrial relations in this country
was profound.

He did much to contribute toward better

management-worker relations, showing that by allowing the
worker even a limited voice in the affairs of his work, a
positive benefit could result to both sides.

His influence

upon John D. Rockefeller, Jr.'s view of the proper relation
between labor and capital was also great, especially in the
decade to follow.

Rockefeller's philosophy, strongly in

fluenced by King, was to play a major role in the labor
policies of Standard Oil of New Jersey for many years to
come.
Summary of the pre-war p e r i o d .

The latter part of the nine

teenth century and the early part of the twentieth witnessed
a dramatic change in the size of many business firms and
the relation of employees to these firms.

Growth and
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increased mechanization brought an increase in job segmenta
tion and repetitive tasks.

The heavy influx of unskilled

or semi-skilled immigrant workers was an added stimulus to
the development of easily learned tasks, thus increasing
the interchangeability of workers at minimum training cost.
The techniques of scientific management, developed in the
late 18 0 0 ’s, helped employers to design tasks in this seg
mented manner.
Throughout this period most owners and managers held
to the notion that the employers' authority was absolute,
and the workers should either follow orders or take their
labor elsewhere.

Indeed, this was the basic tenet of nine

teenth century private enterprise.

But while the beliefs

of employers remained for the most part unchanged, the
organizational and economic relationship between capital and
labor was changing dramatically.
As was indicated previously, the firm tended to grow
much larger.

No longer was there a chance for the personal

relationships that might have occurred between the owner
and his employees in a small shop.

Cultural barriers and

differences in language created a further gap between manage
ment and the many immigrant employees of large firms.
Economically, the worker was in a position of in
creasing dependence upon the firm.

With little or no skill,

the individual workman had no real bargaining power.

And

with an abundance of available workmen, the employer could

39
pay low wages and be sure of having enough men to fill any
vacant positions.
Supervisory style was commonly the driving type with
foremen not known for their skill in human relations.
Employees often retaliated with slowdowns or soldiering,
attempts at unionization, and strikes.

The period might be

aptly described as one of labor unrest resulting in the
growing power of unionism.
The fear of unionism and the wish to avoid strikes
led a few employers to experiment, with techniques of employee
representation.

A second motive was the desire to improve

efficiency and output and eliminate or reduce the soldiering
found in many firms.
Although not commonly found in industry before World
War I, employee representation gained a significant amount
of publicity.

Perhaps because it was appealing to the

American public’s basic belief in democracy and fair play,
it was apparently well received, at least in its theoretical
aspects.

Businessmen, however, were for the most part

skeptical.
Of those who contributed most to employee represen
tation in this era the names of John Leitch, W. L. Mackenzie
King, and John D. Rockefeller, Jr. stand out.

While Letich

and King were designers of plans, Rockefeller's influence
lay primarily in placing his name and position in support
of representation systems.

He wrote and spoke out for

giving the worker a greater voice in the work place.

For a
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man of capital to make such statements in the early 1 9 0 0 ’s
was considered by many to be truly amazing, if not danger
ously r a d i c a l . ^
Nevertheless, Rockefeller’s beliefs, strongly in
fluenced by his association with Mackenzie King, did affect
the growth of employee representation in this country, both
within the firms controlled by the Rockefellers and those
outside its sway.
Although many of Rockefeller's,

contemporaries in

big business did not accept the principle of representation
for employees, Rockefeller along with Leitch, King, and
others who were less well known, had forged a path for the
concept of greater democracy in industry and more humane
treatment of workers.

The period to 1917 might properly be

called employee representation's period of infancy.

It

would require America's entry into the War to give it its
next stimulus for growth.
Influences Upon Employee Representation from 1917-1919
Shortly after World War I began in 1914, immigration
to the United States was sharply curtailed.

And even though

this nation remained officially neutral until 1917, industry
received a tremendous boost as a result of war orders from
Allied nations.
^ J u d g e Elbert Gary, President of U.S. Steel,
remained unconvinced as to the wisdom of employee represen
tation even though Rockefeller had personnaly tried to make
him see otherwise.
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These two factors, increased demand for production
and a decrease in the supply of labor from Europe, reduced
the buyer's market for labor which employers in this country
had enjoyed for some time.

This situation was intensified

with the entry of the United States into the war in 1917.
Mobilization led to increased production demands upon in
dustry while thousands of young men were being pulled out
of the labor force for military service.

Moreover, the

avoidance of strikes and slowdowns in industries vital to
the war effort became a national goal.

The unrest and dis

content of labor was not ameliorated, however, and actually
grew.

By the spring of 1918 the number of strikes in

United States industry had risen alarmingly.
As a means of settling the conflicts in industries
vital to war production, President Wilson created the
National War Labor Board.

The Board and its representatives

were to act as impartial arbitrators in industrial disputes.
Throughout its existence the Board recommended the estab
lishment of collective bargaining between labor and manage
ment.

"Collective bargaining was involved in 22 6 cases on

which it ruled, and the board directed that collective
bargaining be followed either with regularly established
unions or with shop committees that had heretofore not
existed.
In essence, the Board gave a company the choice be
tween recognizing a union or establishing a plan of employee
^ T a f t , o p . c i t . , p. 318.
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representation.

As a result many firms who were formerly

not interested in representation systems suddenly saw them
as the lesser of two evils— the other being the firm's
recognition of a trade union.

As a consequence of the

Board's work, about 125 representation plans were formed
during the summer of 1918 and the early part of 1919.

h7

Details of the plans were generally left to be worked
out by the employer and his employees.

In fact some of the

plans constructed and installed by Mackenzie King in 1918
and 1919 were at the request of employers who had been
ordered to form such an arrangement.

The plans he designed

for the Bethlehem Steel Company and for the General Electric
Company were of this nature.
Even though the Board allowed each company to work
out details of its own representation system it nevertheless
supervised the installation and administration.

It also

established certain guidelines for the construction of a
plan.

Secret elections among the employees were required by

the board with one representative chosen for each one
48
hundred employees.
Not all of the plans installed during the war were
at the request of the federal government, however.

In 1918

and 1919 the Standard Oil companies adopted industrial
^ H e n r y Bruere and Grace Pugh, Profitable Personnel
Practice (New York:
Harper, 1929), p. 95.
^ C a r r o l l E. French, The Shop Committee in the
United States (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins, 19 23), p. 2"7.

43
representation plans similar to that of the Colorado system.
At Mackenzie K i n g ’s urging, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. actively
encouraged the formation of these plans.

Happy with the

success of the Colorado experience and influenced by King's
thinking, Rockefeller seemed to feel that some sort of
formal system should be designed to allow the employees to
49
air their grievances and to make requests to management.

Both King and Clarence J. Hicks, an administrator of the
Colorado Plan, were active in designing these representation
50
systems.
Of those representation systems designed and put
into effect at the insistence of the National War Labor
Board, many were discontinued after the war.

A number of

works councils were established in plants which shut down
after the signing of the armistice.

When the plants were

reopened to pursue private business and were free of National
War Labor Board supervision, employee representation was
often abolished.
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However, most of the larger and better

known firms which had established councils before or during
the war maintained them after the fighting ceased.

All of

ng

Interview with William Reymond, retired Employee
Relations Manager of the Baton Rouge Refinery, Standard of
New Jersey, July 14, 1969.
k°Ibid. Hicks visited the Baton Rouge refinery,
then a part of Standard Oil of Louisiana in 1919, to help
with the installation of such a plan.
n

Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Employee
Representation or Works Councils (Washington, D.C.:
Chamber
of Commerce of the United States, 1927), p. 5.

44
those companies mentioned previously in this presentation
continued their p l a n s .
Even though some of the wartime plans were abandoned,
the concept of employee representation in American industry
seemed to have gained not only in numbers, but also in
prestige.

In addition to the direct effect of introducing

workers' councils in firms that had not previously had them,
the National War Labor Board's activities resulted in a
significant amount of publicity for the concept of represen
tation.

The federal government had for the first time

given official sanction to this method of promoting labormanagement harmony and had added its prestige to the legiti
macy of the p l a n s .
Employee representation was slowly becoming estab
lished as a feature of some segments of American industry,
although the decade of the 19 2 0's would be a period of much
greater growth and strength.
The Decade of the 192Q's:

a Dramatic Expansion of Employee

Representation
The end of the war signaled an economic downturn for
industry in this country.

As business activity declined

and those in military service returned to the civilian labor
force, the labor market situation again became favorable to
the employer.

Although prosperity characterized most of

this period, unemployment was fairly high throughout.

From

45
1919 to 1926 the average percentage of unemployed was 9.7,
and the average in the good years of 1923 to 1925 was 7.3.
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With government controls lifted and an excess supply
of workers, one might have predicted the abolishment of
employee representation and other more humanitarian aspects
of labor-management relations.

And as previously indicated,

some representation plans were, in fact, done away with'
after the war.

On the whole, however, the impetus for growth

which occurred during the war was maintained afterward.
Reasons for growth.

What reasons might explain the continued

expansion of employee representation in the early 1920's?
One factor that cannot be ignored was the employers' con
tinued fear of unionism.

Throughout the war period the

numerical strength of labor unions grew.

In 192 0, union

membership stood at five million, or about twelve percent of
that year's total labor force.
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strikes swept the country in 1919.

Moreover, a wave of
Some employers— fearful

of having their own firm organized or in some cases desirous
of eliminating an existing union in their companies--turned
to employee representation as a solution.

Writing in 19 20,

a former official of the National War Labor Board stated
that "A large group of employers are attempting to evade
^ H . b . Butler, Unemployment Problems in the United
States, (International Labour Office Studies and Reports,
Series C, No. 17.
Geneva:
P. S. King, 1931), p. 47.
c q

U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Historical Statistics of the United States:
Colonial Times
to 1957 (Washington, D.C.:
United States Government Print
ing Office, 19 60), p. 97.
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union recognition by the formation of shop committees and
the application of various local schemes of employee representation."
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In the same year Tead and Metcalf expressed

the feelings of many employers:
. . . if I give my workers a voice in controlling
conditions in the shop, there will be no place for out
side organization.
The idea is to anticipate the union
organizer, to create an intraplant collective bargain,
to deal only with my own m e n . ^
Some employers, therefore, saw employee representa
tion as a way of avoiding dealing with a labor union.
Whether they believed what they said or not, employers1
associations, individual employers, and a significant number
of the general population equated labor unions with the
Bolshevism of Soviet Russia.

The nation was shaken by the

Russian revolution and feared that some labor unions of
this country might be hoping for a similar experience here.
The country has been described in 1919 as in the grip of a

*c5. 6
real-> p a n i
Although the American Federation of Labor was
decidedly oriented toward business unionism and was the
strongest labor confederation in the country in 1920, there
were enough headlines made by more radical unionists, both
54

W. Jett Lauck, "Labor and Production," Annals of
the Academy of Political and Social Science, XC (July, 1920),
91-92.
^ O r d w a y Tead and Henry Metcalf, Personnel Admin
istration (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1920), p. 421.
^^See, for example, Preston William Slosson, The
Great Crusade and After:
1914-192 8 (New York:
Macmillan,
1931), Chapter 3.
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inside and outside the federation, to frighten many into
equating trade unionism with revolution.
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The problems of the time led one writer to compose
the following poem critical of union activities in the coal
m ines:
SONNETS OF THE STRIKE58
by Charles Nicholls Webb
I
The Manager is Interviewed
Conditions in our mines are excellent;
Considering, of course, the industry
Is hazardous, at best, I think that we
Lost fewer men by fatal accident
Last season than one half of one per cent
Of those employed; and I will willingly
Go with you throughout any property;
Talk sanitation with you, wages, rent—
The clear, dry voice, the steady, steel-gray eyes,
Icy alike, alike unwavering,
In sudden change took me by swift surprise;
The eyes flashed and the voice took on a ring;
’This Union fights us with the basest lies;
And so, by Heaven, we will crush the thing!'
II
An Employee Takes Action
'Slave of efficiency!' In deep disdain
The agitator sneared and walked away.
'You do not know your God has feet of clay!'
Haranguing loud and shrill like one insane,
He urged the men to strike with might and main.
'Suffer the masters not another day;
Breaking the clouds of serfdom, one small ray
Predicts a sudden ending to their reign.'
5^Freidel, op. c i t . , p. 223 .
58Charles Nicholls Webb, "Sonnets of the Strike,"
Atlantic Monthly, CXXIV (November, 1919), 664-665.
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Patient and still unmoving as a stone,
I listened to him lie and rant and brag
And tell of hardships he had never known;
But when I saw him flaunt a crimson rag
I struck him down--The alien, left alone,
Regretted that h e ’d cursed my country’s flag.
It thus does not seem surprising that some employers made
employee representation a part of their own shop’s American
Plan drive of the 1920 ’s.

It did in a number of cases serve

as a way of avoiding unionism.
A second motivation for the post-war continuance of
representation systems was the wartime success of many of
them in overcoming slowdowns and low quality output.

Under

emergency conditions calling for high levels of productivity,
employees in many firms responded more fully after the introduction of a representation plan.
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Of course some of

the willingness of employees to produce during the war was
no doubt due to appeals to patriotism; the extent to which
this was a factor in increasing production cannot be
isolated.

The fact remains, however, that during the war

the introduction of works councils in a number of firms
resulted in decreased strife and increased productivity.
Thus a number of employers sought to maintain this better
relationship after the war.
Employee representation may be seen, therefore, as
one of the factors which influenced employers to modify the
traditional driving form of worker motivation.
cq

The wartime

Ernest Richmond Burton, Employee Representation
(Baltimore:
Wilkins and Wilkins, 1926V, p . 231^
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experience had shown that employee participation in affairs
which concern them could result in greater interest and
productivity and a greater understanding of the actions
taken by management.

rn

A third important factor, closely related to the
previous two, which influenced continued growth to the plans
was the significant amount of publicity given works councils
after the war.

Books and articles on the subject in the

early 192 0's were numerous.

R1

Companies successfully using

the plans seemed to be more than happy to tell the world of
their experiences with them.
A final and perhaps more illusive impetus to the
continued growth of representation was the public's in
creasing concern for democracy in industry after World War I.
The war had been fought to make the world safe for democracy,
and it began to occur to many that democracy should exist
not only in government bodies but also in some measure in
industry.

The comments of Sam A. Lewisohn, an industrial

executive and Chairman of the Board of the American Manage
ment Association during the 19 20's, reflect this sentiment:
One of the phenomena that is presented in industrial
situations is an irritating sanctimoniousness and
assumption of self-righteousness on the part of those
in power. . . . the result of this notion was that the
worker felt . . . that his dignity and self respect
were not accorded the consideration that they had been
^^This topic will be discussed in Chapters IV and V.
*^The appended bibliography is. believed to be a
comprehensive listing of this literature.
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given in our political system. . . . Employee represen
tation may be compared to limited representative govern
ment .6 2
Lewisohn went on to comment that industrial government in
the form of employee representation could not be expected to
reach the democracy of the political world without sacrific
ing efficiency in industry.

But he, along with others, did

see representation as a means of giving the workers a
degree of control over their working lives.
Although still covering only a small part of total
United States industry, employee representation seemed to
have an assured future by the early 1 9 2 0 fs.

Its growth did

indeed continue throughout most of the decade, reaching a
high point of over one and a half million workers in 4-32
companies covered in 19 28.
The plans and unions.

fiq

Despite the changes in managerial

and social philosophy taking place during this period, it
does appear that the primary factor influencing employee
representation's adoption was the fear of unionization.
Representation was often coupled with the paternalistic
policies of the firm and with the employer’s crusade for the
open shop or American Plan.
Most of the plans contained formal statements which
recognized the acceptance of both union and non-union
®^Sam A. Lewisohn, The New Leadership in Industry
(New York:
Dutton, 1926), p. 125.
®^U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics,
loc. cit.

■
employees.
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For example, the by-laws of the Bethlehem Steel

Company's works council contained the following statement:
Representation hereunder shall in no way discrimi
nate against any employee because of race, sex, or creed,
or abridge or conflict with his or her right to belong
or not to belong to any lawful society, fraternity,
union or other organization.^*4
Companies often publicized such clauses as proof of their
tolerance of union members.

Individual membership in a

union was not, of course, a particularly effective weapon
in securing concessions from management when the firm was
operating as an open shop and did not bargain with the
union.

The clause may be more properly interpreted as allow

ing, if not encouraging, employees not to belong to a union.
The employer could effectively argue that not only
did his firm not discriminate against union members, but
that all of his employees, both union and non-union, had a
1

voice in the affairs of the firm through employee represen
tation.

Since in most firms, an individual was automati

cally a member of the representation plan when he became an
employee, he was automatically given a voice in the policies
of the company.

The open shop was thus encouraged through

the administrative design of a representation system.
A second and closely related benefit of shop commit
tees in keeping out unionism was its use as a vehicle for
the paternalistic employer policies of the decade.

These

benefits which employers could afford to grant due to the
^ B e t h l e h e m Steel Corporation, Plan of Employee Representation at the Bethlehem Plant of Bethlehem Steel Com
pany (Bethlehem, Pa.:
Bethlehem Steel Company, 1935), p. 2.
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general prosperity of the time were often cited as gains
achieved through the shop committee.

An example of such

claims comes from a 1927 publication of Bethlehem Steel.
The company reported that conferences of workers and manage
ment had resulted in gains for employees in such areas as
employment and working conditions, wages, employees’ trans
portation, health and sanitation, pensions and relief,
employee housing, and athletics and recreation.
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It is difficult to determine whether the gains
mentioned by this and other companies were the result of
employee or employer initiation.

Although the company

publications often implied that the workers’ representatives
played a large part in obtaining the benefits which were
granted, it must be noted that paternalism and the granting
of various worker benefits was not limited to firms using
employee representation.
Certainly, the benefits that were obtained through
unilateral employer action were not by definition less help
ful because they were not obtained through true collective
bargaining.

Many firms were quite generous with the benefits

they bestowed upon their employees.

The point is that many

of the wage and fringe benefit increases granted to employees
during this period were primarily the result of unilateral
employer action.

The councils were, however, the vehicle

6^Edward A. Lyman, Bethlehem Steel Plan Aids Company
and Men in Bethlehem Steel Company (Bethlehem, P a . : Bethle
hem Steel Company, 1927), p. 8"T
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through which the benefits were granted with the firm citing
the gains as accomplishments of the plan.

Thus another
66

wedge was entered between the employees and trade unions.

And union membership did decline during most of the
decade.

Although employee representation could not properly

be regarded as the sole cause of this decline,

fi7

it most

certainly was a way of giving the workers a degree of collec
tive participation in some f i r m s .
Before concluding a discussion of this decade, it
should be pointed out that despite the fact that the number
of councils grew throughout most of this period and the
number of employees covered increased, employee representa
tion never included a majority of the labor force.

The

year of representation’s greatest strength was 1928 in which
only about eleven percent of the work force were members of
any sort of employee organization whether trade union or
employee representation plan.
In summary, the period of the 1920’s was character
ized by increasing growth of employee representation plans.
6^The above discussion is not meant to imply that
there were no real contributions by employee representation
to worker-management relations. Such contributions will be
fully discussed in Chapters IV and V.
Included in this
discussion will be evidence that employees did in some com
panies influence the overall benefit package.
6^Phelps sites the following factors as influencing
the decline of unionism during the 192 0 ’s: stable wages,
improved personnel administration, drive for the open shop,
tired labor leadership, and an unfavorable political climate.
Orme W. Phelps, Introduction to Labor Economics (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1967^), pp. 151-153.
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Motivations for the increasing growth of the plans included
employer fear of unionization, a desire for increased morale
and productivity, the wide publicity given to existing plans,
and a general shift in society’s thinking concerning the
proper relationship between management and workers.
Employee representation was a convenient means
through which many employer-initiated benefits were given to
the workers.
nature,

fi8

Since its formal design was of a democratic

it served as a further arguing point for employers

against the need for unionization of their firms.

It,

moreover, was often used as a selling point for the open
shop campaigns of the decade.
Employee representation in this and the succeeding
decade achieved a number of sometimes unexpected benefits
for the workers who worked under it and for many in industry
who did not.
The 1930’s:

Governmental Action, Union Growth, and Employee

Representation
After 1928, employee representation had begun to
decline slightly.

The period from 19 2 8 through 19 32 saw a

membership decrease in representation plans from 1.5 million
to 1.2 million covered workers.
this decline.

fiQ

Two factors accounted for

In the pre-depression period, a number of

68This topic will be discussed in the following
chapter.
^ N a t i o n a l Industrial Conference Board, Collective
Bargaining Through Employee Representation (New York:
National Industrial Conference Board, 1933), p. 17.
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small firms (one hundred employees or less) discontinued
their plans.

The small employer’s motivations for plan dis

continuance are not known, but it may be hypothesized that
both his fear of unionization and his need for some method
to improve contacts with employees were much less than that
of the large employers.

Skill in both the design and

administration of the plans was no doubt often less preva
lent in the smaller organization.

As a result, the plans

in smaller firms were sometimes less than satisfactory in
practice.
The second factor accounting for declining member
ship in representation plans was the general decline in
employment with the onset of the depression.

In addition,

the great excess of applicants over jobs may have influenced
the dropping of some p l a n s .
The coming of the New Deal and the labor legislation
of the early 193 0 ’s reversed this trend.

From a 19 3 2 mem

bership of approximately 1.2 million, employee representation gained in membership by 1935 to 2.5 million workers.
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During the same period union membership rose from 3.1 to
4.2 million workers.
The impetus for growth of both employee representa
tion and unionism came from Section 7 (a) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 193 3.

The language of the Act

■^National Industrial Conference Board, Individual
and Collective Bargaining Under the National Industrial
Recovery Act (New York:
National Industrial Conference Board,
1933), pp. 2 3-24.
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was designed to encourage employee organization and collec71
tive bargaining between management and workers.

Many

firms interpreted its wording to mean that an employee repre
sentation plan would satisfy the requirements of employee
organization and collective bargaining.

An example of such

an interpretation comes from the 19 33 annual report of the
United States Steel Corporation
The Corporation’s subsidaries have whole-heartedly
cooperated in carrying out the spirit and intent of the
Code and the law in respect to ’’collective bargaining"
by and with employees'. At practically all plants
employees have organized under "Employees' Representa
tion Plans," choosing their own representatives to deal
with the employing company in all matters relating to
wages and conditions of employment. These plans have
proven eminently satisfactory in promoting harmony in
industrial relations and are conducive to the best
interests of the employees, the employers, and the
general public."72
It should be noted that U.S. Steel had never been interested
in any form of employee representation prior to the passage
of the National Industrial Recovery Act.
The language of the act read in part . . . (1)
that employees shall have the right to organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coer
cion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designa
tion of such representatives or in self organization or in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; (2) that no
employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as
a. condition of employment to join any company union or to
refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor
organization of his own choosing. . . . National Industrial
Recovery Act, sec. 7 (a), 48 S t a t . 198 (1933).
7^United States Steel Corporation, Annual Re p o r t ,
1933 (New York:
United States Steel Corporation, 1933), p.
4.
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While the National Labor Board (in existence from
August, 1933 to July, 19 34) was established in part to deal
with cases of employer interference in employee organization,
its power was limited and its rulings on this matter were
somewhat imprecise.

The Board used two tests to determine

the legitimacy of a plan:

(1) whether there had been or was

interference, restraint, or coercion, and (2) whether there
had been opportunity for the workers to accept or reject
plans submitted.^
Thus the National Labor Board never held that every
employee representation plan was necessarily dominated by
the employer.

Its interpretations of Section 7 (a) indi

cated that the law did not make company unions illegal as
such.

If the Board found that the employees had a hand in

designing the plan, in freely voting upon its provisions,
and in the election of its representatives, and that the
majority of the employees preferred this form of representa
tion, the Board would certify it as the legitimate agent of
the employees.
If there was a contest between a trade union and an
employee representation plan, the Board would hold an elec
tion to determine which plan the employees preferred.
Certification was then granted by the Board to the winning
organizations.

The Board was limited in its effectiveness,

^3Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown, From the
Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley (Chicago:
University of Chicago
P r e s s , 19 50) , p. 845'.
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however.

Employers could and often did refuse to attend

Labor Board hearings since the Board had no power to sub
poena witnesses or records.

Its calls for representation

elections were often challenged by employers in the courts.
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The experience of the first National Labor Relations Board
(July, 1934-June, 19 35) was much the same.

The result was

the previously mentioned doubling of memJhe£ship in employee
representation plans between 1932 and 1935.

The passage of

the National Labor Relations Act of 19 35 was to reverse this
trend.
The National Labor Relations Act of 193 5 (the Wagner
Act), like the National Industrial Recovery Act, did not
outlaw independent or company unions.
It did, through its
nr
listing of unfair labor practices,
more clearly define
what constituted employer domination of, interference with,
1or coercion of employees in the formation and administration
of employee organizations.

The act also gave a newly

created National Labor Relations Board broader and more
specific powers to investigate and prosecute violators of
the A c t .
During its early investigative work the Board ruled
on a number of representation plans and found them to be in
violation of the Act.

These rulings involved findings that

^ F o r example, see U . S . v. Weirton Steel Company,
10 F.Supp. 55 US (1935).
"^National Labor Relations Act, sec. 8, 49 Stat .
452 (1935), 29 U . S . C ., sec. 151 (1965).
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the representation plans were company dominated labor organ
izations.

Evidence of this domination was usually cited
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under one or more of the following headings:
1.

A majority vote of both management and employee
representatives was necessary for a resolution
to be passed.
Management could thus control the
plan through its voting rights.

2.

The plan could not be amended without management’s
consent.

3.

There was no actual contract for a specified
period between the company and its employees.
Only a constitution of a very general nature
existed.

4.

Employees had no meaningful part in designing
the plan.

5.

Employee representatives could not impartially
represent their constituents since they were
paid by the employer and since the plan was
financed entirely by the employer.

6.

While employees might not have felt coerced under
the plan, subtle coercion existed by definition
under the National Labor Relations Act.
When
ever a plan, as defined by the Act, was financed
by the company, coercion also existed.

Because the lawyers for many of the companies in
volved in such disputes believed that the National Labor
Relations. Act would have the same fate as the National Indus
trial Recovery Act and be declared unconstitutional, they
advised the companies to ignore the rulings of the Board and
allow the courts to settle the matter.

In 1937, the Supreme

Court upheld the constitutionality of the law.
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7 fi
For example, see NLRB v. International Harvester,
2 NLRB 310 (1936); NLRB v. Bethlehem Steel, CA DC (1941),
120 F .2d. 641.

*^NLRB v. Jones S Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1936).

60
A decision by the Supreme Court in 193 8 specifically
outlawed employee representation plans.

The Court ruled

that the National Labor Relations Board had the power not
only to order an employer to cease the domination of a labor
organization, but also to withdraw all recognition of that
organization and to post notices informing the employees of
78
such withdrawal.
Despite the Court's ruling, National Labor Relations
Board findings concerning employer-dominated representation
plans were contested by a few firms into the early 1940's.
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In most cases the National Labor Relations Board's decisions
were sustained by the courts, and employee representation
declined and vanished from the scene by the time the United
States entered World War I I .
In summary, the decade of the 19 3 0's witnessed a
decline, a sudden burst of growth, and then the demise of
employee representation in the United States.

The sudden

interest of many employers in representation systems was
stimulated by the labor legislation of the decade which
sought to encourage unionism among American labor.

Hoping

to satisfy the requirements of the law, many employers
designed employee representation plans as substitutes for
trade and industrial unionism.
^®NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,

30 3 U.S. 261

(1938).
7Q
The employee representation plan of Bethlehem
Steel Company is a good example of continued, although un
successful, resistance to the National Labor Relations Board.
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Representation systems were ruled illegal under the
provisions of the Wagner Act, however, and existing plans
were forced to discontinue their operation.

In a few in

stances , independent unions were formed by employees, but
their numerical importance was not great.
Employee representation was thus effectively ended
in this country by 1941.

Its existence as an institution

was put to an end by the Wagner Act and resultant National
Labor Relations Board and court rulings.

Although subject

to many shortcomings, the plans filled a definite need in
the evolving labor-management relationships in this country.
As further chapters will demonstrate, employee representa
tion is believed to have been a positive stimulus to the
development of more employee-centered management, extending
even beyond the companies who developed and used the repre
sentation systems.

CHAPTER III
A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE FORMAL DESIGN
OF NINE PLANS OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION
With the adoption of an employee representation plan
most firms composed a formal document to guide the manage
ment and employee representatives in their dealings with
each other.

Often called industrial constitutions, these

documents resembled union-management contracts in some ways
but differed from them in important aspects.

This chapter

discusses the formal provisions of the plans of the nine
companies surveyed.
Copies of the representation plan were usually dis
tributed to all employees.

It appears that the plan descrip

tions were in some cases also intended for the consumption
of other firms and the public in general.
The purposes of this chapter are as follows:
1.

To find common characteristics among the plans.

2.

To discover the areas in which non-management
employees were allowed a voice in management’s
decisions.

3.

To determine how much authority was formally
granted to them in the areas in which they were
allowed a voice.

While such an analysis will not necessarily reveal
how the plans functioned in actual operation, it should
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provide a greater understanding of the announced intentions
of the managements which undertook employee representation.
It should also, like the previous chapter, give the reader
a better historical perspective with which to evaluate the
true contributions of the plans.

These contributions will

be discussed in later chapters.
The analysis will be undertaken by discussing in
turn the significant characteristics of the p l a n ’s formal
design followed by conclusions regarding the amount of for
mal authority given to the employees through employee repre
sentation.
Initiation and Adoption of the Plans
In every firm included in the survey the decision
to institute a plan of employee representation was made by
the employer.
In four of the nine firms.surveyed, the employees
were given the opportunity to accept or reject the plan by
secret ballot.

They were not allowed to vote on specific

provisions of the plan, however.

The employees were

required to approve it as it was designed, or reject it,
and, by implication, the concept of employee representation
as well.

The firms surveyed reported an acceptance vote

averaging 85 percent of the voting employees.1
1Three of the four firms which allowed a vote
supplied data on the percentage of employees accepting the
plan.
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The other firms surveyed did not allow a formal
vote.

They instead announced that the plan was in force and

urged employees to elect representatives.

Of course the

employees could register their displeasure with the plan by
refusing to elect anyone.

There is no evidence that such

action was taken in any of the companies surveyed.
The design of the plan was in most cases also in
the hands of the employer alone.

In a few instances repre

sentatives of employees were asked to join with the company’s
management to assist in the construction of the plan.

In

the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, for example, the
president of the firm announced in 1919 plans for the estab
lishment of a representation system in the firm.

Although

the design of the plan was established largely on a uni
lateral basis by the management, the employee representa
tives were allowed to work with management representatives
in the development of a legislative body.

The president

stated that the goal of the management and employee repre
sentatives was to be the following:
. . . to formulate a plan to establish a legislative
body somewhat along the lines of our national federal
Congress, to give representation on matters of indus
trial relations to all Goodyearites over 18 years of age,
who are American citizens, understanding the English
language, who have had six months continuous service or
one y e a r ’s total service with the factory.3
^Seven of the nine plans allowed no formal employee
participation in drafting the plan.
^Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, Bulletin to
Employees (Akron, Ohio:
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company,
1919), p. 26.
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Although no information is available which would
determine how much real voice the employee representatives
had in the development of this one aspect of the company's
representation scheme, the management's strong hand in the
design of the rest of the plan suggests firm guidance in
this aspect also.
A second and somewhat more participative approach
to employee involvement was taken by the Dennison Manufactur
ing Company.

The Dennison plan was launched in 1919 by

posting a notice to all employees that an open-air meeting
would be held to discuss the formation of a works council
and the rules by which it would function.

The employees

were reported to have discussed the matter extensively with
the result that a constitution committee was formed from
among non-management employees, and a plan was developed by
these individuals.14

Management representatives then dis

cussed the provisions with the committee and gave their
approval.
acceptance.

The entire body of employees then voted their
The plan, however, was amended in several ways

about six months later at the suggestion of the management
representatives.®
^Franklin J. Meine, "The Introduction and Develop
ment of the Works Committee in the Dennison Manufacturing
Company," Journal of Personnel Research, III (August, 1924),
133.
Mr. Dennison did- supply the committee members with
publications on employee representation to guide them in
their construction of a plan.
5Ibid., p. 13 5.
^Ernest Richmond Burton, Employee Representation
(Baltimore:
Wilkins and Wilkins, 1926), p. 85.
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Thus the Dennison approach appears to have allowed
the employees more latitude in forming the kind of plan they
desired than any of the other firms surveyed.

But to say

that the employees had complete control over the plan's
design is, of course, an overstatement.

As noted, the

plan's make-up was subject to the approval of management
and was at least indirectly guided in its formation by Henry
Dennison through his supplying the constitutional delegates
with approved reading material in employee representation.
The approach nevertheless involved far more participation
by employees than that taken by any of the other firms
surveyed and may be properly regarded as an unusual means
of designing a plan.
Method of Obtaining Membership in the Plans
With the exception of American Telephone and Tele
graph, an individual automatically became a member of the
representation plan when he became an employee of the firm,
provided he did not hold a managerial or supervisory posii

tion.

He typically obtained voting rights under the plan

after a brief probationary period of thirty to sixty days.

7

In the case of American Telephone and Telegraph,
employees were allowed to decide if they wished to be
members and were required to take the initiative in joining.
The Constitution of the Association of Employees stated
7

•
The Goodyear plan required a waiting period of six
months of continuous service or one year's total service
with the company.
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that "an eligible employee who wishes to become a member of
the Association shall affiliate with the Branch formed among
employees of' his Department and subdivision thereof as
determined by the employee's work and place in the Company's
organization . . .
It is interesting to observe that employers who
utilized these plans argued against compulsory unionism and
for the open shop.

Their own firms, with the exception of

A. T. and T . , were operating under a form of union shop in
that all employees were also members of the representation
plan whether or not they wished to be.
Qualifications of Employee Representatives
The firms'

industrial representation plans were

designed in every case to spell out the qualifications for
an employee to represent his co-workers in meetings with
management.

The qualifications in the Bethlehem Steel Com

pany's plan were typical of those of most firms:
Each employee who has been on the pay rolls of the
Company for a period of at least one year immediately
prior to the first day on which nominations shall be
held, who on that day is twenty-one years of age or
over and who is an American citizen shall be qualified
for nomination and election as an Employees' Represen
tative .
8

American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Constituof Association of Employees (New York:
American Telephone
and Telegraph Company, Long Lines Division, August 3, 1934),
p . 6.
Bethlehem Steel Company, Plan of Employee Represen
tation at the Bethlehem Plant of Bethlehem Steel Company
(Bethlehem, Pa.:
Bethlehem Steel Company, 1935), p. 4.
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The employer appeared in every case to be concerned
primarily with two qualifications:

that the representatives

were his own employees and that they had been on his payroll
for a minimum period of six months to a year.
The requirement that all representatives be employees
of the firm reflected the desire of the employer to avoid
dealing with outside organizations, i.e., labor unions.

The

waiting period was apparently designed to more nearly insure
that employees elected to these posts were relatively stable
individuals who had some knowledge of the company and the
department in which they worked.

It also appeared to have

been an attempt to discourage outside agitators from joining
the firm for the sole purpose of being elected a represen
tative .
Representation Ratios and Method of Election
In every plan surveyed the employees were guaran
teed the right to freely elect their representatives by
secret ballot, usually once a year.

Perhaps because of the

management's fear that the plan might be subject to charges
of company domination, a clause was included which empha
sized the company's lack of involvement in nominations and
elections.

Typical of these clauses was the following

statement of the International Harvester plan:
•^This conclusion is based on personal interviews
with individuals who worked under and administered the
representation plans.
Reference to these.interviews will
be more fully made in the following two chapters.
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Nomination and election of Employee Representatives
shall be by secret ballot. . . . Employees will deposit
their ballots in a locked box carried by a teller
representing the employees, who shall be accompanied by
a timekeeper. . . . When all who desire have voted, the
timekeeper and two employee watchers shall open the
ballot box and count and record the votes, in the pre
sence of the Works Auditor, or person designated by
him.
The number of representatives which the employees
were allowed to elect varied from firm to firm, but was
typically one representative for each one hundred to two
hundred employees.

Some companies used departmental divi

sions and allowed the election of at least one council
member for each department, regardless of its size.

If the

department contained enough employees to merit additional
representatives, they were, of course, permitted.
Management representatives were appointed by the
president or some other top official or officials.

If the

firm had a personnel director, he was usually a member of
the management committee or a neutral observer.

12

The

representation systems surveyed were careful to note that
the number of management representatives could never exceed
the number of employee representatives.

In most instances

the plans stipulated that the management and employee
representatives must be of equal number.

In a few cases

the management committee was permitted to be smaller in
number than the workers' committee.
•^Neil M. Clark, Common Sense in Labor Management,
(New York:
Harper, 1919), pp. 19M--195.
-^This point will be discussed more thoroughly in
later chapters.
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Again the reason for stipulating that at no time
could the number of management members on the works council
exceed the number of employee delegates appeared to be the
fear of charges of company domination.

At the same time,

the requirement in most plans that an equal number of
management and employee representatives were to be present
also presented a measure of security to the firm.

Since in

every company a majority of the council was required to
vote favorably on an issue before it could be passed, the
employee representatives were unable at least initially to
obtain a concession without management's agreement.

13

In

some organizations a two-thirds majority was necessary to
pass a proposal.
Independence of Representatives
Like the issue of employee freedom in electing
delegates, the independence of representatives seems to have
been a sensitive area for employers using representation
plans.

In every plan surveyed, an explicit statement was

made concerning the complete freedom of representatives to
raise issues and speak frankly without fear of employer
retaliation.

The American Telephone and Telegraph agree

ment, for example, stated that "The Company agrees that a
member of the Association shall not be accountable to the
Company for any speech, debate, or performance of duty in
13
This topic will be explored more fully in a later
section of this chapter.
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connection with the constitutional functioning of the Asso
ciation .

The extent to which such a promise was carried

out is, of course, another matter.

It should be noted

that a review of the literature of the time revealed no
obvious violations of the companies' pledge.

Union publi

cations stressed repeatedly the point that no representatives
could be truly free to speak without fear of company repri
sal, but no specific instances were cited in which the
companies actually took action against representatives.
Although it may be argued that reprisal was much too subtle
to be easily discovered or that fear or reprisal kept most
employee representatives from ever raising questions which
were controversial,

15

it does appear that visible violations

of this type of pledge were virtually nonexistent.
Matters Considered by the Councils
The topics to be discussed by the works councils
were usually described in broad terms.

The Standard Oil of

Indiana Joint Committee was to have "jurisdiction over
wages, hours, employment, working conditions, safety and
accidents, sanitation and health, recreation and any other
matters brought before them by representatives of either
^American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Agree
ment Between Long Lines Department, American Telephone and
Telegraph Company and the Association of Employees (New
York:
American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Long Lines
Department, August 3, 1934), p. 1.
1R
The National Labor Relations Board raised this
issue in its decisions against the plans in the 193 0 ’s.
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management o p employees.”-1-^

Most firms did not publish a

record of the frequency with which various subjects were
considered.

Many did post the minutes of the periodic

meetings on company bulletin boards and in company publica
tions .
Bethlehem Steel Corporation did periodically print
in their company newspaper a tally of the frequency with
which issues were raised.

Table I presents the classifica

tion of cases dealt with through employee representation in
1934.
Although wages, hours, and working conditions were
legitimate topics for debate, in every firm surveyed the
method by which these subjects were raised frequently
differed from the approach taken by a labor union.

Adjust

ments were often made on the basis of individual employee
requests through their elected representatives.

Individual

rather than collective requests were quite common under
employee representation.
In arguing for the abolishment of the Bethlehem
plan, the National Labor Relations Board emphasized this
lack of real collective bargaining:
The Plans never bargained collectively— they never
negotiated for such a contract.
They acted only on
such matters as the adjustment of grievances.
You will
find in the record some two hundred types of grievances
dealing with such matters as John Jones said there is
too much sunshine in the window, or John Jones said
1R

Standard Oil Company (Indiana), Industrial Relations Plan (Chicago:
Standard Oil Company of Indiana,
1923) , p 7 4.
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TABLE I
TOPICS DEALT WITH THROUGH EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION
IN BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION, 1934

Topic

Percent

Safety and prevention of accidents

26.4

Hours and working conditions

14.5

Pensions and relief

12.4

Wages, piece work, bonus, and tonnage
schedules

9.0

Health and works sanitation

8.9

Rules, ways and means

7.0

Practice, methods and economy

5.8

Miscellaneous

5.7

Employees Transportation

4.9

Housing, domestic economics, and living
conditions

2.9

Athletics and recreation

1.5

Education and publication

1.0

Source:
p . 4.

Bethlehem Review, February 20, 1935 ,
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there is too much of a screen in front of him. . . .
There have been few attempts to deal with wages on a
general basis or with the eight-hour problem . . .•*•?
Some issues which affected the entire working body
were, however, raised by employee representatives and
resolved to their satisfaction.
such results.'*'®

Early writings indicate

Nevertheless, it does appear that much of

what was initiated by employees could be classified as
grievance handling rather than collective bargaining.
Source of Financing for the Plans
The expenses attendant with the formation and admin
istration of every plan surveyed were borne by the company.
A statement of the employer's intention to back the plan
financially was commonly found in the formal charter or
agreement between the company and the employees.

Such

expenses included paying the regular wages or salaries of
all employee representatives while performing representation
duties and those of any other employee when appearing before
the works council.
In accordance with the bearing of all expenses by
the employer, no membership dues were charged the members.
While this practice eliminated any possibility of financial
burden to the employees, it also meant that the employees
had no treasury from which they might finance any activities
^ Bethlehem Steel Company v. N L R B , CA DC (1941),
120 F .2d. 641.
1R
Joanna Farrell Sturdivant, "Employee Representa
tion Plan of the Durham Hosiery Mills," Social Forces, IV
(March, 1926), 627.
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not wholly approved by the employer.

For example, the right

to strike was never explicitly denied the employees under
these representation systems (although it was never explic
itly granted), but its likelihood was decreased due to a
lack of funds maintained exclusively by the members.
Admittedly, many strikes of this time were strikes for
employer recognition of a union and were not backed by any
strike fund created by the company’s employees.

Neverthe

less, if a union did exist within a firm, it enjoyed a
financial independence that an employee representation plan
could not claim.
Thus while exclusive employer funding relieved the
employees of any financial obligation, it did at the same
time decrease the employees' power over their representa
tion plan.

This characteristic was later attacked by the

National Labor Relations Board as evidence of company domi
nation.

Some firms

(including Bethlehem Steel, for example)

as a result dropped their financial support hoping that
this would satisfy the Board's criterion for an independent
employee organization.

However this was not in the judge

ment of the Board sufficient evidence that the plans were
free of company control.
Procedure for Raising Issues and Resolving Them
The way in which issues could legitimately be
raised by the employee or management representatives was in
part dependent upon the design o_f the representation bodies.
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The plans surveyed were not identical in their design, but
seven of them can be classified into one of two groups:
the Joint Committee structure and the Industrial Democracy
•f
19
form.
The Industrial Democracy form was so named because
it was patterned after the three branches of the United
States Government.

The House of Representatives was com

posed of employee spokesmen.

A Senate was composed of

appointed members of first line and middle management.

A

Cabinet consisted of executive officers of the company with
the president of the firm serving as the chairman or head
of the cabinet.
Bills or proposals were allowed to originate in
either the House or Senate and were required to pass both
houses before they could be submitted to the Cabinet.

The

Cabinet served as an executive body, approving or disapprov
ing proposed legislation and possessing veto power over
submitted bills.

It could also suggest legislation for

origination by either branch of the legislature.

A diagram

of this type of plan is shown in Figure 1 on the next p a g e .
This sort of plan, while perhaps more artistic in its design
than the Committee form, was by far the less popular of the
two approaches.
19

The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company was the only
firm surveyed using the Industrial Democracy format.
Six
firms could be classified under the Joint Committee format.
The Armco and Westinghouse arrangements were such that
their employees had' no legislative power.
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FIGURE 1
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION STRUCTURE
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CABINET COMPANY

MANAGEMENT OF

THE COMPANY
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Subcommittees
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^

n-Bi II

may originate

Subcommittees
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A survey of twenty companies conducted in 19 26
found that 6 percent of the works councils in operation
were of this Democratic form while 94 percent were some
O Q

sort of Committee arrangement.
The committee form, as the name implies, consisted
of joint committees, usually made up of an equal number of
workers and representatives of management.

The major

difference in formal operation of this approach from the
Industrial Democracy format was that both sides discussed
an issue together before voting on it.

The industrial

Democracy approach began with the introduction of a bill by
one house or the other and a commitment to that bill by
the introducing house.
In some of the Committee arrangements a two^-thirds
majority of the management and employee representatives was
adequate to pass a resolution.

In other instances both a

majority of the joint committee and top management were
required to approve every proposal submitted.

21

A diagram

of the committee form is shown in Figure 2 on the next
page.
9n

Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Employee
Representation or Works Councils (Washington, D.C.:
Chamber
of Commerce of the United States, 19 27), p. 5.
21

Of the companies surveyed which used the Joint
Committee system, one required a two-thirds majority of the
management and employee representatives to put a proposal
into effect.
Five firms required both a simple committee
majority and top management approval.
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FIGURE 2
JOINT COMMITTEE EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION STRUCTURE

PRESIDENT OF
COMPANY
or
ARBITRATOR

I

WORKS COMMITTEE
COMPOSED JOINTLY
OFFICERS OF THE
COMPANY

*

OF OFFICERS AND
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<-

WORKERS OF THE
COMPANY

80
Although the design of this approach was somewhat
different from that of the Democratic approach, its sub
stance was substantially the same.

In both cases, represen

tatives of each side raised issues, considered them, voted
on them, and generally, passed them to a higher level of
management (usually the plant manager or the president) for
approval.
In some firms the decision of the top management
official could be appealed.

Of the companies surveyed,

three had some form of arbitration clause in which appeal to
an impartial individual outside the company was allowed.
The clauses in two of these three limited the strength of
appeal, however.

In these firms no case could go to arbi-

tration without the president's approval.

22

Of the other

firms included in the survey, none allowed an appeal to
persons outside the firm.

The decision of the president or

board of directors was fi n a l .
In those plans which permitted outside arbitration,
the employees and their representatives were given a mea
sure of added protection and independence.

However, one

survey made during the period of employee representation
indicated that the right was seldom if ever used.

The

study reported that "in the practical working of these plans,
final settlement by arbitration . . . occurs only in
^^These firms were Bethlehem Steel and International
Harvester.
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exceptional and very infrequent cases.”

23

The firms sur

veyed in this study which allowed arbitration apparently
made little use of the provision.
Only in the Armco and Westinghouse plans were there
no formal legislative or administrative powers given to
employee representatives.

The committees were designed to

perform only in an advisory capacity to management.

While

issues relating to the employment relationship could be
raised by employee representatives, no formal votes were
taken.

Management retained the entire function of decision

making.
Procedure for Amending the Plan
The fact that representation plans did not have a
specific expiration date meant that there was no stated
time at which the .terms of the authority relationships b e 
tween management and the employees could be reconsidered.
In order to alter these relationships, the plan itself
required amendment.
In all but two of the firms which were investigated
a formal procedure for changing the plan was included in
on

its design.

By analyzing these amendment procedures a

greater insight into the employees’ right to influence
their plans may be gained.
^^Earl J. Miller, ’’Workmen’s Representation in In
dustrial Government,” University of Illinois Studies in
the Social Sciences, X (September-December, 1922), 100-101.
2^The firms which had no provision for amendment of
their plans were Armco Steel and Westinghouse.
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A survey of the amendment procedures of these firms
indicated that all required either a simple majority of
both management and employee representatives to approve a
change or a two-thirds majority of both sides.

These pro

visions meant, of course, that the employees could make no
alteration in their plans without the agreement of manage
ment .
Although such joint approval was similar to a
union-management bargaining relationship, the employees
working under employee representation did not possess the
economic power that was and is often characteristic of a
labor union.

Although the employees theoretically had the

right to strike under a representation plan, strike funds
were lacking along with help that employees in other firms
and other employees in the same firm might have given them
under unionized conditions.

Thus the employees had little

real power to obtain any alteration of the representation
system set up by management.

Their only means of obtain

ing amendments was to request that management allow the
changes.

Although data on the frequency and initiation of

amendments is incomplete, it appears that as in the initia
tion and design of the plans the employees played little
active p a r t .
Summary of the Outstanding Features of Plan Design
Employee representation plans in the firms surveyed
were in most instances the creatures of the managements of
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the firms which used them.

In the design stage of the

plans employees were not active participants.

When given

the opportunity to vote at all, the employees were asked
to approve a plan in full or to reject it in its entirety.
An employee became a member of the representation
system in most firms by simply being hired; there was no
way he could elect not to be a member.

He was, however,

prevented from holding office as an employee representative
until he met both an age and a service requirement.

Such

a provision was apparently motivated by the desire to deal
only with employees who had some grasp of the company’s
operations and its problems.
Companies utilizing employee representation guaran
teed the right of secret ballot in representation elections.
No record of violations of this promise by any firm was
uncovered.

Similarly, the independence of representatives

from company retaliation was guaranteed.

No overt viola

tions were found in the literature of the period.
The representation councils considered a number of
topics including health and safety, hours and working con
ditions, wages, and pensions and relief.

On the subjects

of wages and hours, the discussions tended to center on
individual adjustments rather than on company-wide changes.
The plans were wholly financed by the companies
resulting in no membership d u e s , but also in no employee
fund independent of the company.

Organized employee
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activities which required financial backing also required
company approval.
Issues could be raised by either management or
employee representatives at the council meetings.

A

majority vote of both sides was generally required with the
final decision made by top management.

In a few instances

employees were allowed to appeal to an outside arbitrator
if they felt that management's decisions were unfair.
Arbitration was, however, rarely used.
Amendment of the plan was in most instances allowed
if the majority of both management and employee representa- •
tives agreed to the change.

Although union-management

agreements had essentially the same requirement, the
bargaining power of the employee representatives was usually
much less than the representatives of a union.

When

employees wished changes in the plan, they were in essence
petitioning management and were dependent upon their deci
sion .
Conclusions Concerning the Formal Design of the Plans
Employee representation plans were without question
largely the product of company managements and management
consultants.

And as a result, their design reflected

management’s views of the extent to which their employees
should have a voice in the affairs of the company.
The representation systems were designed to allow
some employee participation in determining solutions to
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labor-management questions, but as the preceding analysis
indicates, management built safeguards into the plans to
protect their own freedom to act as they saw fit.

The

plans were primarily a combination appeal and suggestion
system to management.

The effectiveness of these two func

tions was largely a question of management good faith and
to a lesser extent, employee interest.

Only an analysis of

plans in operation could reveal such information.
This explanation of the limitations upon employee
authority under the plan is not intended to imply that
representation systems were of little value.

As the follow

ing chapters will demonstrate, employee representation was
a positive force in the development of personnel administra
tion in this country.

The analysis of the formal design

of the plans, nevertheless, has revealed the role which
managements apparently saw for their employees under
employee representation.

'

CHAPTER IV
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION AND THE STANDARD OIL
COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY
In order to fully understand the employee represen
tation plan of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, it will
be necessary to look briefly at the company's personnel
policies prior to the installation of the plan.

In so

doing a brief history of the formation of the company from
its parent organization, the Standard Oil Trust, will be
included, with a discussion of the parent's influence on
personnel relationships.
The Standard Oil Trust was formed in 18 8 2 by an
association of forty-one companies, most of which were
either wholly owned or principally owned by the investors
who contributed their stocks to the Trust.

The guiding

hand of its operation was John D. Rockefeller.

The Trust,

which was later reorganized as a holding company operation
was a vertically integrated and sprawling operation which
by the time it was ordered dissolved by the Supreme Court
was operating in all states and a number of foreign coun
tries.

Its eventual goal was to incorporate a separate
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Standard Oil Company in each of the states with control
vested in the parent organization.'*'
In 1911, however, the holding company was ruled a
monopoly by the Supreme Court and was ordered broken up into a number of completely separate operating companies.
A number of these companies retained the Standard Oil
designation.

Included among these was the Standard Oil
3
Company of New Jersey.

Early Personnel Policies of Standard Oil of New Jersey
(1911-1915)
The attitudes of the company toward its employees
did not emerge newly formed with its creation in 1911.
They were in large measure a carry-over from the preceding
years of the T r u s t ’s operation.

The T r u s t ’s early policies

toward both management and non-management employees are
thus believed to be valuable indications of the New Jersey
company’s personnel approach.
Although data concerning the Trust's treatment of
employees is fragmentary in these early years, John D.
•^For a thorough discussion of the operations of the
Trust and of John D. Rockefeller, see Allan Ne v i n s , John D .
Rockefeller (New York:
Scribner, 1959); and Ida M. Tarbell,
The History of the Standard Oil Company (New York:
M a c m i l lan, 190*41.
^Standard Oil Company (New J e r s e y ) : A Brief
History (New York:
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey,
1960), p. 12.
q
Other companies retaining the name included
Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of Indiana,
Standard Oil of Kentucky, and Standard Oil of Ohio.
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Rockefeller in 19 01 stated that the company "has sought for
the best superintendents and workmen and paid the best
wages.,,1+

He further said that the company’s policy was one

of permanent work and good wages for those employed by the
company.^
Public pronouncements were apparently often backed
up by action.

Researchers who investigated the pay scales

for Standard refinery workers in 18 89 concluded that wages
were as high or higher than those in any other company in
fi

the oil business during those early y e a r s .

Cost of living

increases were also granted periodically in the years from
1890 to 1911.7
Other early employee benefits included stabilization
of employment, reluctance to employ child labor, pensions
for long^-service employees , and payment of medical expenses
for some workers injured on the job.

While such actions

seem only routine today, they were truly extraordinary at
the turn of the century.

Management was, of course, free

to grant or withhold benefits as it saw fit.

The concept

^John D. Rockefeller, "Policy, Methods,' and Aims of
the Standard Oil Company," The Engineering Magazine,
January, 1901, p. 75 2.
5Ibid., p. 763.
^Ralph W. and Muriel E. Hidy, Pioneering in Big
Business (New York: Harper, 1955), p. 5 91.
7Ibid., p. 593.
O

George Gibb and Evelyn H. Knowlton, The Resurgent
Years (.New York:
Harper, 1956), pp. 138-139 .
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of an employee voice in the determination of w a g e s , h o u r s ,
and working conditions was no more acceptable to Standard's
leadership than to most.
The tradition that the New Jersey company had in
herited thus might be best described as one of benevolent
autocracy toward its employees.

While progressive in many

aspects in its labor relations, the company held in those
early years to its policy of unilateral determination of
wages, benefits, and working conditions in the refineries,
pipeline operations, and marketing divisions.
Despite the company's generally benevolent attitude
toward its labor force, working conditions in the refineries
were considered by many employees to be unsatisfactory
during those early years.

By 1915 the dissatisfaction was

shown by a strike of the workers in the Bayonne refinery.
The major issue centered around the workers' unhappiness
with their rates of pay, the hours they were required to
work, their physical surroundings, and treatment by super
visory personnel.
With regard to hours, one observer who talked to
the strikers wrote that a refinery employee would often
work 168 hours in two weeks, with one twenty-four hour
g

shift when the night shift was changed to the day shift.
An employee of the Bayonne refinery during those times later
described his own situation in the following way:
^Amos Pinchot, "Why Violence in Bayonne?" Harpe r 's
Weekly, LXI (August 7, 1915), 126.
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I worked a good many years the whole twenty-four
hours and I remember working every Sunday. . . . I
remember working up to five o'clock in the evening,
from seven, and at five I unhitched the horse and took
him out and put a fresh horse in, and then I would con
tinue working on until seven in the morning.
They
never thought of working a poor horse twenty-four hours,
but they never considered the human b e i n g . ^
Working conditions, while beginning to improve by
the turn of the century, were often poor in the refineries.
Safety equipment was infrequently found although goggles
for workmen and electric lights were provided by about 1900.
Washrooms were rarely found in the refineries.

Refinery

workmen were accustomed to drawing their wash-up water from
a condenser into a bucket, carrying the bucket to the
boilerhouse, and warming the water with steam before wash
ing.

In a letter to the New York Times, a striking

worker insisted that the heat in many departments was often
intolerable.

He further maintained that the workers in

these departments were often forced to drink warm water if
they drank any at all.

12

Supervision in the refineries was described by some
as not only frequently inept, but often vicious.

One of

the workers' demands during the strike stated, "We request
humane treatment at the hands of the foremen and superiors
•-^Burton Kline, "Speeches at a Standard Oil Meeting
of Employees' and Company's Representatives," Industrial
Management, LX (July, 1920), 4.
•^The Lamp: 7 5th Anniversary of Jersey Standard
(New York:
Standard Oil Company,' New Jersey, 1957), p. 18.
12"prom a Bayonne Striker," New York T i m e s , July 26,
1915, p. 8.
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in place of the brutal kicking and punching we now receive
without provocation.”

13

Whether or not this charge was

representative of foreman-worker relations, it did demon
strate that many workers felt strong antagonism toward
first-line supervision.

An interview with one former

employee who was a wage earner in the Bayonne refinery
during this time confirmed that relations between supervi
sors and rank-and-file employees were generally poor.'*'1*
Wages were another major grievance of the striking
workers.

Although Standard’s policy was to pay prevailing

wages or better to its employees, one observer stated that
the workers were underpaid and lived in greater poverty and
squalor than even the workers of the fertilizer companies
of the a r e a . ^

Wage rates, as noted previously, had been

comparable with other companies in the industry.

A com-'

parison with average wage rates in manufacturing is diffi
cult because of fragmentary data available from Standard
Oil of New Jersey.

However a partial comparison follows:

-*-3Stuart Chase, A Generation of Industrial Peace
(New York:. Standard Oil Company, New Jersey, 1946), p. 4.
•^Confidential communication with a retired employee
of Standard Oil of New Jersey who worked in both non
management and management positions during his career with
the company.
December 10, 1969.
] C

,

^Pinchot, loc. cit.
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Average Annual Earning
(Wage Earners)
Year

All Manufacturing-^

1915
1916
1917
1918

Standard Oil of New J e r s e y ^

$568
651
774
980

$ 970
1199
1429
1572

It thus appears that the workers did enjoy a substantial
pay advantage, at least in terms of averages, over workers
in other areas of manufacturing.

Nevertheless, the Bayonne

employees demanded higher wages as a condition for return
ing to work.
The strike was a bloody one; both sides incurred
casualties.

The company had hired armed guards to protect

its property from the strikers, but newspaper reports stated
that the guards roamed the streets and shot into the houses
of strikers.

18

Much gunfire was exchanged between the

antagonists despite the efforts of law-enforcement officers.
The strike was ended twelve days after it began with no
concessions made by the company.

Throughout the strike the

company maintained that it would consider the requests of
the workers only when they had returned to work and peace
was restored.
^^United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States,
Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C.:
United States
Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 91.
^ S t a n d a r d Oil of New Jersey, History of Employee
Relations File, 1925,
Standard Spurns Strike Mediation," New York
T i m e s , July 25, 1915, p. 10.
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The company did grant some concessions to the work
ers after the strike was over.
percent in the refineries.

Wages were increased by 10

Later that year the eight hour

day was also instituted so that a normal work week consisted
of a forty-eight hour, six day week.

A three-shift system

replaced the two-shift scheme that had previously been used.
These changes affected 7 500 refinery employees.-1-9
Despite the company’s response to some of the
wishes of its employees or perhaps because of its respon
siveness, another strike occurred at the Bayonne refinery
in the following year.

Again the clamor was for improve

ments in wages and working conditions, and again the strike
was ended with no definite promises made by the company.
In spite of the company’s action to improve wage
rates again, there was evidence that the directors and top
management of Standard Oil of New Jersey were questioning
their own relationships and policies with regard to the
rank-and-file-worker.

The company had grown large with a

resultant administrative distance between the policy-making
groups and the level at which the policies were executed.
There was almost no contact between the top and bottom
levels of the organization’s hierarchy.

In 1916 John D.

Rockefeller, Jr. wrote that the growth of the organization
of industry had proceeded faster than the adjustment of the
■^Standard Oil and the Eight-Hour Day,” Outlook,
III (September 15, 1915), 109-110.

interrelations of men engaged in industry.

on

Rockefeller

was reported by this time to have been concerned with the
need for management to set up some machinery for allowing
the workers to air their grievances and to have a voice in
the affairs of the company.

21

The adverse experiences Rockefeller had had with
the labor problems of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company
and their apparent solution through the installation of a
plan of employee representation led him to believe that a
similar solution to Standard Oil of New Jersey's labor
troubles might be found.

Rockefeller thus suggested to

A. C. Bedford, then chairman of the Board of Standard Oil,
that a plan similar to the one in Colorado be considered as
a solution of the labor problems being experienced in
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.

22

As a result Clarence J. Hicks, an assistant to
W. L. Mackenzie King in the installation of the Colorado
plan and its administrator once it had been installed, was
invited by Bedford to come to New Jersey and survey labor
relations in the Standard refineries.

This he did, and in

1917 he recommended the installation of an employee
John D. Rockefeller, "Labor and Capital--Partners,
Atlantic M o n t h l y , CXVII (January, 1916), 14.
^ I n t e r v i e w with William Reymond, retired Employee
Relations Manager of the Baton Rouge refinery, Standard Oil
of New Jersey, July 14, 1969.
22ciarence J. Hicks, My Life in Industrial Rela
tions (New York:
Harper, 1941)", p. 46".
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representation plan similar in design to the one which was
being used m

Colorado.

9Q

The plan was accepted by the company’s board of
d irectors, and Hicks was given the position of Executive
Assistant to the Chairman of the Board.

It was his task to

explain the. plan to the Employees and to install and admin
ister it.21+
Hicks traveled to each of the refineries of Standard
Oil and explained the plan to the employees.

In each of

the refineries the plan was accepted by a large majority of
those voting.2^

In Baton Rouge the boilermakers had gone

out on strike shortly before Hicks' visit.

Upon his

arrival at the refinery, he asked to speak to the striking
workers.

His presentation resulted in their acceptance of

the plan and the withdrawal of their support from the
strike leaders.

9 fi

Although the design of the plan follows the outline
of the plans discussed in the previous chapter, a brief
discussion of its formal construction will follow.

Employee

representatives were elected from each department with one
representative for each one hundred employees and a minimum
of one representative per department.

Representatives'

2^Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years
Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 166-167.
^ H i c k s , op. c i t . , p. 54.
25Ibid., p. 54.
2 ^Reymond, op. c i t .

(Boston:
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terms of office lasted one year, and there were no restric
tions on the number of terms they could serve.

Management’s

representatives were selected by top management.

There

were to be an equal number of management and employee
representatives at each meeting.
Meetings were held a minimum of once each two
months.

These were called works conference or joint con

ference meetings.

Special meetings could be called by

either side at any time.

In addition, annual meetings,

called general conferences, were held with representatives
from the refineries and top management personnel and m e m 
bers of the board of directors in attendance.

These

general conferences were apparently designed not for the
discussion of grievances or the raising of issues, but
primarily for the purpose of increasing the contact be
tween personnel at the top and bottom levels of the organiza
tion.
At works conferences, a representative from the
personnel department usually acted as chairman and was
officially neutral.

Although he was designated by manage

ment as a conciliator between the two sides, one personnel
representative was told by his superior to take the side
of the employees in any dispute with management.

27

The

personnel department was formed in each of the company’s

27Ibid.
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plants in 1919 at the time of the representation plan's
beginning.
Issues were to be settled by a majority vote of
employee and management representatives.

This procedure

was often ignored due to the informality of many of the
meetings held at the refinery level.

The representatives

would often agree without any formal vote being taken.

28

Issues were raised by the employee representatives
as the result of suggestions and complaints made by workmen
in the departments they represented.

Employee representa

tives were free to raise any issue relating to wages, hours,
working conditions, and any other matter affecting employ
ees.

Management stressed the point that workers need fear

no displeasure or retaliation as the result of any state
ment or request made through the plan.

Interviews indicate

no recollection of any case in which management violated
this pledge.
If an employee became involved in a dispute with
his supervisor, he was first required to attempt to settle
it with the supervisor, either personally or with the help
of his departmental employee representative.

If this

attempt was unsuccessful, the matter could be appealed to
higher management and then be brought before the works
conference for settlement.

Employee grievances which were

not settled by the conference could, like any other
unresolved matter, then be appealed to the refinery's top
2®Confidential communication, op. c i t .
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management.

Decisions at this level could in turn be

appealed to the company's board of directors whose judge
ments were final and binding on all matters.

No opportunity

was given for appeal to an outside arbitrator.

Those inter

viewed could recall only a few instances of appeal to the
refinery’s top management or to the company's board of
directors.

Nearly all matters were settled at the works

conference level.
In addition to joint meetings between management
and employee representatives, informal meetings among
employee representatives were occasionally held.

Although

Standard Oil did not permit such meetings to be held on
company time, it did not discourage representatives from
discussing issues among themselves on their own time.
The plan's operation was financed entirely by the
employer.

Employees automatically became members after a

waiting period of six months.

No dues were charged the

membership, and meetings were held at company expense.
Elections were also held on company time with both a
management and employee representative present at both the
balloting and the counting of votes.
Although the plan contained no formal provision
allowing the employees to strike, there was no specific
statement forbidding this action.
occur during the life of the plan.

In fact, no strike did
It might be noted, how

ever, that the employees had no strike fund available since

99
they paid no dues, and there was no independent employee
29
treasury.
The plan provided for its amendment through joint
agreement between management and workers’ representatives.
It was never amended as far as the eight retired employees
who were interviewed could re c a l l .

One individual sug

gested that this lack of change resulted from the relative
informality of the plan and the flexibility of both sides
in dealing with one another.

30

The plan functioned continuously from its inception
in 1918 until 19 37 when the National Labor Relations Act
was declared constitutional by the Supreme Court.

At this

time the company's lawyers advised top management that the
representation plan fell under the A c t ’s definition of a
company dominated labor organization.

The company withdrew

its support from the plan and advised its employees to form
new labor organizations which met the requirements of the
Act.
The company’s employees were said to be generally
upset and frustrated when the law required the abandonment
q i

of the plan.

Although generalizations such as these are

difficult to verify, in each refinery independent unions
9Q

This topic was discussed in more detail in the
previous chapter.
3^Confidential communication, Standard Oil of New
Jersey, op. c i t .
33-Reymond, op. cit.
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were established.

Resembling the representation system in

many w a y s , the unions in most instances elected former
employee representatives as their first officers.
The eight retired employees who were interviewed
were unanimous in the belief that the plan was an important
contributor to labor peace both during its existence and
in the period of independent unionism which has followed.
One individual stated that the plan contributed to an
effective working relationship between management and labor
so that both could feel that they were a part of an inte
grated team.

He felt that these were the types of relation

ships that actually existed in most departments of the
~.
.
32
refineries.
The analysis of Standard Oil of New Jersey’s repre
sentation plan has until this point been primarily descrip
tive in nature.

The discussion has centered upon personnel

policies of the firm prior to the plan's introduction,
their influence upon the installation and design of the
plan, and finally, the plan's actual installation and
operation.
The effects of the plan upon the organization will
next be investigated.

It has been assumed, as was pointed

out in the first chapter, that employee representation made
a number of positive contributions to worker-management
^2Interview with M, C. Hagen, former Employee Rela
tions Manager of the Bayonne, New Jersey refinery and now
with Industrial Relations Counselors of New York, December
30, 1969.
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relationships.

It is the purpose of this section to deter

mine the extent of these contributions to Standard Oil of
New Jersey.
The Representation Plan and Channels of Communication
Adequate communication with subordinates i s , of
course, a necessity for management if it is to convince the
workers of the wisdom of its actions.

As Barnard has stated,

"The first executive function is to develop and maintain a
system of communication."

33

That the top management of

Standard Oil of New Jersey had become aware of their lack
of real success in achieving adequate communication with
rank-and-file employees was cited in an earlier part of
this chapter.

M. C. Hagen pointed out with reference to

this problem that management felt that it was treating the
work force fairly; however, decisions for wage increases,
improvements in working conditions, and benefit liberaliza
tions were unilateral.

He stated that no one bothered to
q ji

ask the workers what they wanted.

The strikes of 1915

and 1916 indicated that workers did have wants that manage
ment had ignored.
One of the primary reasons for instituting the
employee representation system w a s , according to management
representatives, the desire to establish the contact which
was lacking between the work force and management.
33Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive
(.Cambridge.: Harvard University Press, 1938),-p. 226.
^ H a g e n , op. c i t .
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As mentioned previously, John D. Rockefeller, Jr.
was concerned enough about this problem to suggest to the
company’s management that a form of closer contact between
management and the labor force be attempted.

Employee

representation was the means by which this contact would be
achieved.

Clarence J; Hicks stated at the first meeting of

management and employee representatives,

"The Representation

Plan inaugurated at the election last Wednesday provides a
method of preserving direct contact between the management
and their employees."^
While the existence of available communication
channels is not, of course, proof that understanding among
organizational levels must result, their establishment
nevertheless may be regarded as a prerequisite for this
understanding.

"Communication is the bottleneck through

which effective management ideas must pass, so it often is
q c

a key managerial problem."

The effectiveness of the

communication which was transmitted through these channels
will be evaluated in later sections of this chapter.
The question remains as to whether the plan did in
fact increase to any significant extent the volume and
clarity of communication from policy-making levels of
^ C l a r e n c e J. Hicks, Address at Standard Oil of New
Jersey's first representation meeting, New York City, April
1, 1918.
Standard Oil of New Jersey, History of Employee
Relations F i l e , 1918.
^ K e i t h Davis, "Success of Chain-of-Command Oral
Communication In a Manufacturing Management Group," Academy
of Management Journal, XI (December, 1968), 380.
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management to the rank-and-file worker.

A partial answer

to this question can be obtained by looking at the p l a n ’s
effect upon the number of downward channels of communication
in the organization.
Prior to the installation of the representation
system, the supervisor was used almost exclusively to pass
37
information from higher management to operating employees.
This method of communicating with workers is the usual
technique in any large bureaucratic organization.

It is

still today one of the foremost techniques of passing infor
mation to operating employees.
In terms of keeping the employees informed of the
actions of management, however, this approach was not par
ticularly successful in the early years of the company's
operation.

First of all, supervisory personnel were not

used to any significant extent to transmit information to
operating employees.

This was due in part to the lack of

any clearly defined policy of sharing information with
lower level personnel.

38

While orders concerning expected

performance goals were passed through the hierarchy and
while announcements of pay increases and other benefits
were also transmitted downward, attempts to explain the
reasoning behind management actions were largely missing.
Thus the supervisor himself was often without knowledge of
3^Interview with Richard Lackey, retired Employee
Relations Director, Bayway, New Jersey refinery, January 7,
1970.
H
38Confidential communicatidn, op. c i t .

104
why the company did what it did, and he was unable to
explain such actions to his subordinates even if he wished
to do so.
Secondly, the company maintained almost no controls
over the supervisory staff in terms of labor relations
policy.

One retired employee stated that before the plan,

each yard supervisor hired and fired employees, so that a
worker could be fired in one department today and work in
another tomorrow.

Each foreman could fire an employee at
qg

the slightest provocation.

In such a situation he was

not likely to press his superiors for greater guidance in
labor relations.
The weaknesses of the chain of command as a channel
of communication were, therefore, twofold:

the management

failed to pass any significant amount of explanatory infor
mation to operating employees, and it applied little if
any control on its supervisory personnel to determine the
way they represented the company to the workers.
It is interesting to note that these weaknesses
could have been corrected largely through strengthening
the existing channel.

This in fact was done in later years.

It must, however, be remembered that this was 1918.

Com

paratively little understanding of effective organizational
communication techniques existed, and attempts to improve
39Interview with Harry D. Field, refinery worker in
the Bayonne refinery during the years of the plan's opera
tion, January 14, 1970.
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labor-management relations were largely experimental.

The

management of Standard Oil was looking for a means to
improve its relationship with its employees, and when
employee representation appeared, it was quickly adopted as
the possible way to achieve this improvement.

The result

was to largely bypass supervisory personnel and obtain a
direct link between management and operating employees.
The creation of downward channels.

More specifically, what

new channels of communication were added to the existing
ones as a result of employee representation?

The first and

most obvious were the employee representatives themselves.
The representatives provided a point of connection between
company management and the individual worker.

They in

effect bypassed the supervisor as an information channel, .
reporting directly to their constituents what took place in
the representation meetings.
In addition to the meetings between employee and
management representatives at the refinery level, yearly
meetings were held at which representatives met with
corporate top management to exchange ideas and information.
In these meetings corporate officials sought to explain to
the employee representatives the reasoning behind many of
the policy decisions of the company.

4-0

The refinery and corporate levels of management
had, therefore, established a means of getting the company
^ I n t e r v i e w with Clement A. Hurley, retired refin
ery worker and later supervisor in the Bayonne p l a n t ,
January 20, 1970.
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point of view across to the average workers.

The employee

representative was the means by which the message was to be
communicated.
While direct contact between management and employee
representatives resulted in an added communication channel
in the organization, it was not the only one created by the
representation plan.

Although somewhat of a duplication of

the previous channel, the printing and distribution of the
minutes of the representation meetings to employees can be
properly regarded as another method of communication
created by the plan.
The minutes were printed at company expense and
were distributed to every employee in the refinery who was
a part of the representation plan.

Plant management also

received copies of the proceedings of these meetings.^
Although the events which occured in the meetings
were to be explained to workers by their employee represen
tatives, the formal minutes provided a second means by
which management could attempt to explain its thoughts and
actions to those at the operating level.

In this way a

form of insurance was provided against the possible in
ability or unwillingness of an employee representative to
adequately explain the rationale behind management’s
^ S t a n d a r d Oil of New Jersey, History of Employee
Relations File, 1922.
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decisions.

The employees could read the minutes of the

meetings and find out what was said and by whom.

U9

.

Employees were also exposed to another printed form
of communication as a result of the same motivations which
initiated the representation plan.
in 1918 was entitled The L a m p .

This publication started

It was and is today the

company’s official magazine distributed to employees and
stockholders.
The Lamp cannot be said to have been created as .a
result of the representation system since it could have
been initiated without a representation plan.

It was, how

ever, the result of the management's desire to obtain
closer contact with the work force and to explain its
decisions to them.

In 1918 W. C. Teagle, then president of

Standard Oil of New Jersey, explained to the first assembled
group of employee representatives that the purposes of
the new publication were to help each individual and
department keep in touch with the rest of the company and
to establish a unity of purpose among all employees of the
firm.
With essentially the same general objective as the
representation plan, it is not surprising that the magazine
functioned in a manner complementary to it.

The journal

^ I n t e r v i e w with Willard G. McAndrew, refinery
worker, employee representative and later supervisor in the
Baton Rouge refinery, now retired, January 28, 1970.
11^W. C. Teagle, Address at Standard Oil of New
J e r s e y’s first representation meeting, New York City, April
1, 1918.
Standard Oil of New Jersey, History of Employee
Relations File, 1918.
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frequently contained articles concerning the progress of
the company, its generosity to employees in terms of wages,
hours, and benefits, and the reasons behind management
ii i±
.
decisions.
Excerpts from representation meetings were
also published when believed by management to be especially
45
important.
Three new channels of downward communication were
thus a direct or indirect result of the representation plan.
The employee representatives were a means by which plant
and corporate management could reach production employees.
Distribution of the minutes of representation meetings was
a second method of delivering this information to employees.
Finally, The Lamp, initiated by management at the time of
the p l a n ’s beginning, worked together with the representa
tion system to give management's point of view to the
workers.
In retrospect, these added methods of communicating
with workers do not appear particularly revolutionary.

It

must be remembered, however, that in 1918 they were signif
icant additions to the recoupling of top and bottom organ
izational levels.
^ S e e , for example, Clarence J. Hicks, "Confidence
Between Management and Men," The L a m p , IX (April, 19 27),
23-26; George H. Jones, "Loyalty a Priceless Asset," The
L a m p , IX (April, 1927), 30-32; "The Company and Its
Workers," The Lamp, XIX (April, 19 37), 2-4.
Current issues
reflect a. similar content.
^Hagen, op. cit.
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The creation of the new communication channels did
not in itself assure that they would be used by management
and, if used, that they would be effective.

Did management

utilize the representation meetings as sounding boards for
its points of view and did it encourage employee represen
tatives to explain these points of view to their constit
uents?

Evidence indicates that the answer to both questions

is y e s .
M a n a g e m e n t s usage of the channels.

From the first repre

sentation meeting in 1918 management representatives
appeared to be anxious to convince employees that the
company was both wise and generous.

At the second meeting

of employee and management representatives in 1918, Clarence
J. Hicks drove home the point of company generosity to
those representing the New Jersey refineries:
The wage increase has been considered and adopted,
and it seems to me it is your great privilege and your
great responsibility to go back to those employees and
speedily get the word to them that we have a wage scale
that we are proud of, and it is time we settled down
to business . . . you employee representatives can do
very much to allay any unfounded discontent or rest
lessness that may exist on the part of the employees,
and I think you will agree with me that your message
as you go back tomorrow morning is "Boys, the Company
has done its part and now it is time for us to do
o u r s ."46
At the plant level, an analysis of the minutes of
the representation meetings through the years reveals
^ C l a r e n c e J. Hicks, Address at Standard Oil of
New Jersey's second representation meeting, August 9, 1918.
Standard Oil of New Jersey, History of Employee Relations
F i l e , 1918.
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similar statements by management members.

One example is

given from a meeting in the Baton Rouge refinery.

The

following comments were made by Mr. Callaghan, a long-time
management representative at the refinery, speaking to the
employee representatives:
The Company promises and
gives you asafe place to
work in.
That is one of the
things that the Company
gives you that you cannot buy, and still you hear very
little about it. . . . Here every man has the right to
know why he was discharged, and if he was unjustly
treated,
the matter will be straightened out in a con
ference.
. . . In return for
all these things that the
company gives you, they expect loyalty— loyalty not
for eight hours— not while you are going to and from
work--but in every minute of the twenty-four h o u r s ;
and they expect this from every one of the employees. '
In terms of volume of communication, the minutes of
the meetings through the years indicated that management
representatives utilized these meetings as regular sounding
boards for company viewpoints.

A study of the records of

meetings at the Baton Rouge refinery for the years 192 9 to
1937 shows an average frequency of one meeting every two
months.
UO
each.

Length of meetings averaged two and one-half hours
Thus management had the opportunity to dispense

company points of view on various subjects and apparently
did so quite frequently.

How effectively employee repre

sentatives explained management's position to the employees
should next be explored.
^ " M i n u t e s of Joint Conference, July 16, 192 9,"
Baton Rouge refinery, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey,
1929.
^ " M i n u t e s of Joint Conferences, 1929-1937," Baton
Rouge refinery, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.
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Of the eight ex-employees interviewed on this sub
ject, both management and non-management employees felt
that the representatives did a generally satisfactory job
of explaining to their constituents those matters which were
discussed in representation meetings.

Although the repre

sentatives were not said to have taken management's point
of view in all cases, they were believed by the eight men
interviewed to have been fair and to have explained to the
men why management took a certain position.
The distribution of the minutes themselves acted as
a second means of reaching the individual worker.

How

widely read these minutes were is of chief concern in an
analysis of their effectiveness as a downward communication
channel.

Again, the eight individuals who were interviewed

believed that worker interest in these meetings was usually
fairly high and the minutes were widely read.

One example

of the importance of the minutes to employees was given by
the former Employee Relations Director of the Bayonne, New
Jersey refinery.

He stated that employee representatives

would make a special effort to speak out on an issue so
that those employees they represented would see that they
had been active in the meetings.

He also pointed out that

often a representative would speak up when the issue he
was discussing had already been settled because of the inuq
terest in the subject of those he represented.
One
^ H a g e n , op. c i t .
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non-management employee interviewed did indicate that
employees were more likely to read the minutes of those
meetings which dealt with issues of immediate interest to
them and their department.

50

Thus both the creation and use of new downward
channels of communication were the result of the represen
tation plan.

Of equal if not greater importance was the

creation of upward channels through which workers could
reach higher levels of management with suggestions, appeals,
and requests.
The creation of upward channels.

As in the transmission of

information from top to bottom of the organization, commun
ication upward was allowed to follow only one channel
prior to the installation of the employee representation
plan.

If the employee wished to appeal a decision or make

a request, he was forced to do this through his departmental
supervisor.
Interestingly enough, Standard Oil of New Jersey
had had for some time a tradition of the right of appeal of
any decision to higher authorities in the company.

It

prided itself in this approach to the exercise of author
ity.^

It was, however, a fact of organizational life that

the effectiveness of the appeal process was dependent upon
5^Interview with L. M. McGraw, retired refinery
worker and employee representative in the Baton Rouge
refinery, January 20, 197 0.
^-*-Gibb and Knowlton, o p . c i t . , p. 570 .
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the individual superior.

An unsympathetic supervisor would

often dismiss an employee before his appeal could ever
co
reach plant management.
Since the supervisor had the right to hire and fire
and since the company exercised almost no restraint upon
the supervisor’s authority in these areas, the employee had
in reality no effective right of appeal.

Regardless of

higher-level management’s intent to consider the wishes of
its workers when making decisions (which by 1915 it claimed
that it wished to d o ) , ^ it could not effectively know
what problems the workers were facing or felt they were
facing in their jobs except through the supervisor.

Again,

there is no evidence to suggest that management attempted
in any serious way to determine the feelings of employees
through their supervisors or to encourage supervisory
personnel to lend an understanding ear to the problems of
their subordinates.

While the upward channel of communica

tion existed, it was apparently infrequently used in any
effective sense.
The Bayonne strikes of 1915 and 1916 were, as in
dicated previously, caused by the workers’ feelings of
frustration concerning unsatisfied needs coupled with no
way to get management's attention in order to explain these
52I b i d ., p. 571.
^ " S h e r i f f Arrests 30 Strike Guards," New York
T i m e s , July 26, 1915, p. 1.

114
needs.

The strikes were thus the w o r k e r s ' only way to

obtain this attention.
That top management was beginning to recognize the
need for closer contact with workers after two violent
strikes has been pointed out previously.

The employee

representation plan was designed to provide employees with
a non-destructive method o f obtaining management's attention in the area of requests and grievances.
A formal appeal procedure for employee grievances
was constructed with the creation of the representation
plan.

The appeal procedure first required that the

aggrieved employee consult with his supervisor.

If no

satisfactory result was obtained, he could appeal to the
superintendent of his department.

The next step in the

procedure was to bring the matter before the representation
council, at which time the management and employee repre
sentatives would consider the matter and vote to either
affirm or deny the grievance.

A unanimous decision would

end the appeal procedure, but if the decision was not
unanimous and the employee was still unsatisfied, the
grievance could be brought before the president with his
decision as final.

54

Although it should be noted that the appeal system
included as its first step the requirement that the
^ Industrial Representation Experience of Standard
Oil Company (New Jersey;, April 1, 1918 to August 1, 1919
(New York:
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 1919),
p . 15.
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aggrieved employee attempt to settle the issue with his
supervisor, it should also be observed that there were
several checks on the supervisor's power.

First of all,

the employee was allowed to have his departmental represen
tative on hand when confronting the supervisor.

Or, as an

alternative, he could ask his representative to talk with
the supervisor about the matter without the necessity of
the aggrieved employee being present.

The representative

could adopt a persuasive role to encourage the supervisor
to relent if he felt that the employee had a legitimate
grievance.
Secondly, an employee could appeal the supervisor’s
ruling to higher levels of management and then if still un
satisfied, to the conference of management and employee
representatives in the plant.

Finally, a dissatisfied

worker could appeal to the company's president a decision
at the conference level which was not unanimous.
Perhaps the greatest safeguard in this formalized
appeal procedure was the great reduction in the supervisor's
power of dismissal.

The plan published a list of offenses

for which an employee could be dismissed upon first viola
tion.

In no other instance could a worker be removed

without the concurrence of the newly formed Employment
Department (later renamed the Employee Relations Department).
And even if the Employment Department agreed that the
employee should be dismissed, he nevertheless had the right
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to carry his grievance through the designated appeal pro
cedures .
In an analysis of appeal systems, Scott has observed
that they are a systematic violation of the scalar principle
of classical organization t h e o r y . ^

Scott, however, justi

fies this violation of classical theory in terms of the
improvement in overall coordination within the firm which
results from the use of an appeal system.

He states that

the principles of uniform treatment and individual treat
ment take precedence over unity of command and exclusive
CC

reliance upon the scalar chain in large organizations.
Perhaps intuitively, the management of Standard
Oil of New Jersey sensed in 1918 that overall coordination
could be improved by allowing workers a chance to appeal
decisions of their superiors to higher levels in the organ
ization.

And as a result of the representation plan, the

employees of Standard Oil of New Jersey had a guaranteed
means of reaching higher levels of management with their
grievances.

Although no arbitration procedures were estabcn

lished in the company’s plan,

the operating employee was

given much more protection than he had prior to the p l a n ’s
installation.

One retired employee felt that before the

^^William G. Scott, The Management of Conflict
(Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 196 5) , p . 101.
56Ibid., p. 105.
5^As indicated in Chapter III, some companies’
plans did have them.
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p l a n ’s institution in 1918, the employees were subject to
the whims of each supervisor who were regarded as lords of
each area involv e d . "
In addition to the right to air grievances, the
workers were given machinery for the making of requests
and suggestions to management.

This procedure, of course,

involved the elected employee representatives, meeting in
regular and special sessions.

The plan made provision for

these meetings by stating that elected employee representa
tives would meet regularly with representatives of manage
ment to discuss and decide upon all matters of joint
interest, such as wages, hours, and working conditions.99
The employees could raise almost any question with their
representative and have it brought to management’s attention.

rn

One employee representative stated the relationship

in the following manner:

’’You d o n ’t have to be dubious

about going down [to your employee representative] and ask
ing for your rights.

You have the channel through which

you can do it.”9'*'
" F i e l d , pp. c i t .
5^Industrial Representation Experience of Standard
Oil Company (New Jersey), April 1, 1918 to August 1, 1919,
o p . c i t ., p. 14.
r

n
uHurley, op. c i t .

^ Industrial Representation Experience of Standard
Oil Company (New Jersey) in its Refineries (New York:
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, June, 1921), p. 15.
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Employee usage of the channels.

Two somewhat overlapping

channels of upward communication were thus opened by the
employee representation plan.

These were the grievance

procedure and the right to make requests and suggestions
through the elected representatives.

As with the downward

channels, their frequency of usage must also be analyzed.
Ideally, it would be desirable to compare the flow of
grievances before and after the plan's installation and to
observe the amount of grievances submitted.

Unfortunately,

no company records could be found which indicate how many
grievances were received by management prior to the plan's
operation.
One confidential report submitted to top management
in 19 2 8 by a special management committee investigating the
company's plan did, however, briefly deal with this subject.
The report outlined the frequency of usage of the appeals
procedure in the following manner:
Conditions during the period of the war had culmi
nated in the Bayonne strikes of 1915 and 1916, and
relations between employees and some supervisory
officials were still characterized by suspicion and
ill will.
It was natural, therefore, that in the early
days of the representation plan a steady stream of
grievances and complaints was poured into the confer
ences.
From this condition there has been a gradual
evolution until in most of the refineries in 1928 the
bulk of the grievance cases were being settled between
representatives and foremen.62
fi 9

"Industrial Representation Plan of Standard Oil
Company (New Jersey):
Report of an Inquiry Conducted Under
the Direction of the Special Conference Committee," History
of Employee Relations F i l e , October 9, 1928, pp. 17-18.
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The report went on the state that grievances and requests
had throughout the history of the plan been carried upon
occasion to the higher officials of the company.

fi3

With reference to the flow of grievances upward
before the plan's inception, it has earlier been stated
that few if any such communications ever reached higher
levels of management.
observation.

Those interviewed confirmed this

All eight indicated that the number of griev

ances and requests by employees were substantial after the
plan's initiation and that the channels of upward communi
cation continued to be used frequently throughout the life
of the plan.
An analysis of the minutes of the representation
meetings provides further evidence of the willingness of
workers to register their grievances with management.
Throughout the history of the plan, employee grievances
and requests were brought before management representa^tives.

fiu

The effectiveness with which employees influenced

management through the processing of grievances will be
discussed in a later section of this chapter.
Thus as with downward communication, upward commun
ication in the company's refineries was stimulated by the
63Ib id., p. 19.
^ Industrial Representation Experience of Standard
Oil Company (New Jersey), April 1, 1918 to August 1, 1919,
op. c i t .; Eleventh Annual Joint Conference of Industrial
Representation Plan (New York;
Standard Oil of New Jersey,
May 3 , 1928); Minutes of Joint Conferences, 1929-30, Baton
Rouge refinery, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.
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employee representation plan.

The flow of communications

in both directions was not in itself proof that either side
understood the other any better.

Such an interpretation

can only come from investigating changes in attitudes
resulting from this closer contact.

Accordingly, the real

impact of the new communication channels will be explored
in the section which discusses economic benefits and griev
ance processing and in the discussion concerning organiza
tion climate.

A discussion of the impact of the plan upon

economic benefits obtained and upon the effectiveness of
grievance processing follows next.
The Effect of the Plan Upon Economic Benefits and Grievance
Processing
Perhaps the aspect of employee representation which
obtained the most publicity was the improvement in economic
i

conditions attributed to the plan's operation.

The actual

impact of the plan upon economic gains should therefore be
analyzed.
Throughout the history of the employee representa
tion plan, the employees of Standard Oil of New Jersey
experienced improvements in their economic status and w o r k 
ing conditions.

The task here is to determine how signifi

cant a part the plan played in the granting of these
benefits to the workers.
It is tempting to quickly conclude that the plan
had no real role in the determination of benefits and that
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it was simply a vehicle through which they were granted
after being unilaterally determined by management.
Some evidence suggests the truth of this statement.
In 1915, three years before the plan was introduced, the
company decided that its refinery workers should work an
eight hour rather than a nine hour day.

No loss of earn

ings to the workers resulted from the reduction of working
hours.

In that same year wages of refinery workers were

raised significantly.

R fi

We should, however, remember that 1915 was the year
of the first major strike at the Bayonne refinery.

These

concessions, while not being granted at the time of the
strike, came shortly after the workers returned to their
jobs.

In any case the benefits were unilaterally granted

by management.
It can also be noted that at the time the represen
tation plan was established, wage increases were given
along with the institution of a number of fringe benefits
mentioned previously.

One journal article describing a

portion of the benefits obtained by Standard Oil of New
J e r s e y ’s employees emphasized that they were granted by
the c ompany’s directors.

R fi

The benefits were obviously

unilaterally determined, having no direct relationship to
the representation plan.
"Eight Hour Day for 10,000 Standard Oil Workmen,"
S u rvey, XXXV (October 16, 1915), 59.
XXXVI

66tiThose Who Can Afford Welfare Work," W o r l d ’s W o r k ,
(June, 1918), 131-132.
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Six of the eight individuals interviewed expressed
the belief that many economic concessions made during the
p l a n ’s existence would have eventually been granted by the
company even without the representation

p

l

a

n

.

Statements

of the six stressed that the company’s policy was always to
keep its wage rates at or above the levels of other firms
even if there had been no plan.

They did, however, indi

cate that without the representation plan, the benefits
might not have been granted as soon as they were or in the
amounts in which they were

g i v e n .

66

The major wage and benefit increases, while largely
decided upon by management, nevertheless appear to have
been influenced in many cases by worker requests.

While

some of these requests were denied, they apparently made
management aware that some compensation adjustments should
be made.

fiq
An example of this influence can be cited from the

minutes of the Baton Rouge representation meetings.

During

two successive conferences in 19 36, the employee represen
tatives pressed for a 5 percent increase in regular wage
rates.

Management resisted, using numerous arguments.

In

^ R e y m o n d , o p . c i t . Confidential communication,
op. c i t .; Hagen, o p . e x t .; Lackey, op. c i t .; McAndrew, o p .
c i t .; Mc G r a w , o p . c i t .
68I b i d .
69lndustrial Representation Plan of Standard Oil
Company (New Jersey):
Report of an Inquiry Conducted Under
the Direction of the Special Conference Committee, op. c i t . ,
p . 10.
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the following conference, management representatives
announced at the beginning of the meeting that the company
had reevaluated its position and would grant the increase.
Management representatives also agreed to make adjustments
in a number of individual job rates which employee repre
sentatives believed to be out of

l i n e .
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Interviews largely

confirm the conclusion that employee representatives influ
enced both the timing of the granting of wages and benefits
and the design of the compensation package even though
their influence upon the long-term level of compensation
was not great.
The plan had a much more direct influence upon the
granting of comparatively minor concessions by management
to individuals and departments who usually wished some
adjustment in working conditions such as a change in light
ing, heating, or the arrangement of work flow, or the
correction of the actions of a superior.

Transcripts of

the meetings are filled with such requests.

Although no

tabulation of decisions was made concerning these requests,
it does appear that many of them were decided in favor of
the worker or workers making them.

Table II on page 124

is given as an example of the kind of concessions asked
for.

It comprises approximately 14 percent of the griev

ances and requests processed during the year.

When

7 0"Minutes
Joint Conference, June 18, 1936;”
"Minutes of Joint Conference, August 17, 1936;" "Minutes of
Joint Conference, October 26, 1936," Baton Rouge refinery,
Standard Oil of New Jersey, 19 36.
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TABLE II
SAMPLE OF EMPLOYEE GRIEVANCES AND REQUESTS DISCUSSED IN
REPRESENTATION MEETINGS OF THE BATON ROUGE REFINERY,
JULY 25, 1929 TO JULY 16, 1930

Request or Grievance

Action Taken

Dangerous steam pipe in a
departmental restroom.

Agreement by management to
have it covered.

Unjust dismissal of a
laborer.

Grievance denied by manage
ment.
Explanation
provided.

Delay in company transpor
tation to town for
employees working over
time .

Grievance denied by manage
ment.
Explanation
provided.

Request for rearrangement
of pay periods to allow
employees a payday imme
diately before Christmas.

Granted by management.

Poor food served by company
lunch wagons.

Improvements promised.

Poor fixtures in one
department’s restroom.

Improvements promised.

Request for hats and coats
provided at company
expense for employees who
had to work outside in
bad weather.

Denied by management.
Explanation provided.
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TABLE II (continued)

Request or Grievance

Action Taken

Lack of employee training
in how to use gas masks
provided for emergencies.

Agreement by management to
provide the training.

Request for flags to be
given to those depart
ments which had accidentfree m o n t h s .

Granted, by management.

Request that pay office be
moved to prevent employees
from waiting outside in
bad weather for paychecks.

Granted by management.

Request that the plant
operate on daylight saving
time in order to give
employees more daylight
hours after work.

Decision postponed by
management for further
study.

Source:
Minutes of representation meetings (Files
of the Baton Rouge Refinery, Standard Oil of New Jersey,
1929-1930).
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grievances and requests were denied, management spokesmen
went to great lengths to explain their reasoning and often
succeeded in persuading employee representatives to vote
with them in denying the adjustment.
It should be noted that by 19 29 the majority of
individual grievances were said to have been resolved among
the supervisor, the employee representative, and the
aggrieved employee.

71

The grievances and requests presented

in Table II were primarily those questions involving large
numbers of employees which could not be settled without the
approval of the plant’s management.
While the willingness of management to adjust many
grievances and requests in favor of the workers is not a
perfect measure of improvement in their ability to under
stand workers’ needs and desires, it does provide strong
indications that this was the case.

Certainly the fear of

unionism and labor unrest was no doubt at least in part a
motivator of company representatives’ willingness to settle
grievances and requests in the workers' favor, but the very
fact that management now had a feedback mechanism from the
level of the work force undoubtedly influenced their
thinking about workers and their problems.
It therefore seems correct to conclude that
although the plan was given more credit by official company
statements than it deserved for its influence upon
"^Hagen, op. c i t . ; McAndrew, o p . c i t .; Field, o p .
cit.
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increases in wages and benefits, it nevertheless did have
some effect upon them.

To the extent that the representa

tion system made management aware of the specific benefits
that workers were most interested in, it did influence
when major concessions were granted and in what configu
ration.

In addition, relatively minor adjustments in

working conditions and the correction of grievances were
directly affected by the plan throughout its existence.
The plan at the same time encouraged a standardiza
tion of labor policies and a recentralization of personnel
administration into the hands of higher levels of management
and away from the supervisory work force.
Impact of the Plan Upon the Formation and Growth of the
Personnel Department
Prior to the institution of Standard of New J e r s e y ’s
»
employee representation plan, the company had no centralized
personnel department in any of its refineries.

As was in

dicated previously, employment was largely in the hands of
the supervisor as was transfer, discipline, and discharge.
As formerly mentioned, the Joint Agreement which
established the plan also created a central Employment
Department in each refinery.

The head of this department

was directly subordinate to the general manager of the
refinery and functioned with relatively little supervision
from corporate headquarters.
72Hagen, op. c i t .

79

In an informal way, however,

128
Clarence J. Hicks, Assistant to the President, and the
counterpart of today's corporate personnel director, exer
cised control over the employment managers in the New
Jersey refineries through monthly meetings in which problems
were discussed and suggestions for their solution were
m a d e .73
Even, though there is evidence that they encountered
some resistance from top levels of plant management and
from the supervisory group,71+ these employment managers
apparently did exert influence upon labor policies and
practices in the refineries.

As one former Employee Rela

tions Director (the department's title was later changed
to Employee Relations) put i t , the department had a marked
effect upon the relations between employees and manage
ment.^^

A refinery worker also observed that the department

•

7 fi

stabilized employment and employee relations.

••

Specifi

cally, the duties of this new department as described in
the Joint Agreement were in the areas of selection, transfer, counseling, discipline, and discharge.

77

In each of these areas the supervisor's powers
were accordingly reduced.

The most dramatic limitations

73Ibid.
71+Ibid.
73Lackey, o p . cit.
73Field, o p . c i t .
77Industrial Representation Experience of Standard
Oil Company (New Jersey), April 1, 1918 to August 1, 1919,
o p . c i t ., pp. 15-16.
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were in the areas of discipline and discharge.

Whenever a

foreman formally warned an employee that he had committed
an offense for which a repetition could result in suspension
or dismissal, the foreman was required to forward a copy of
78
that notification to the Employment Department.
With regard to the commission of an offense in
cluded in the list of those for which an employee could be
dismissed or suspended without a previous warning, foremen
were required to report the case fully to the Employment
Department.

The Joint Agreement stated that the department,

after investigation, could approve the proposed discharge
or suspension, or arrange to transfer the employee, or, if
the facts warranted, discharge him after securing the
79
approval of the Superintendent of the W o r k s .

Thus the

process of suspension or discharge became more involved
and more carefully deliberated before action was taken.
Additionally, the affected employee could appeal the
decision through the grievance procedure which had been

r.

established in conjunction with the representation plan.
The Employment Department was soon given additional
duties to perform.

Training in the refineries had in pre

plan days been left in the hands of the foremen and through
them to the more experienced workers in the departments.
Within a year after the beginning of the representation
78I b i d ., p. 16.
79I b i d ., p. 17.
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plan, the department was given the responsibility for
directing training which was described as an unsystematic
affair up to this time.

80

Although on-the-job instruction

remained as the primary technique of training, the Employ
ment Department was charged with determining who would do
the training, how training would be done, and seeing that
the trainers had time to train and took the time to train.

81

Fringe benefits were greatly expanded at the time
the plan was begun.

The company granted retirement annui

ties to long service employees and accident and sickness
benefits.

Although the accounting department was first

given the task of administering the benefits, this activity
was also transferred to the Employment Department shortly
after the plan began.

89

Another department which lost one of its functions
to the newly created Employment Department was Engineering.
Prior to the p l a n ’s existence and the Department’s creation,
safety in the plants was administered by one or more persons
who reported to the Director of Engineering.

This function

was also transferred shortly after the department was
established.

This was a function thought to belong most

properly with those who were most concerned with the personnel of the organization.

88

pn

° Hagen, op. c i t .
81Ibid.
8^Reymond, op. c i t .
83Ibid.
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In analyzing the duties and powers of the newly
created Employment Department, it is apparent that it
derived many of its functions from what were formerly those
of the foreman.

It was given the authority to select, to

supervise training, to transfer, to suspend, and with top
management approval, to discharge.

Thus much of what the

Employment Department had gained had been lost by the fore
man .
In addition, the Department had obtained tasks
formerly assigned to Engineering and Accounting.

Both had

given up some of their personnel functions to Employment.
What were management’s purposes in the creation of
such a department, and how did they relate to employee
representation?

It must first be noted that during the

early 1 9 0 0 ’s personnel departments were being established
in a few companies in this country.

Eilbirt has traced

their beginning to two divergent forces:

the introduction

of Scientific Management and the existence of welfare work
in many large organizations.
Could it be assumed, therefore, that the company
would have created a personnel department even if it had
not established an employee representation plan?

An answer

to this question is speculative, but it seems reasonable to
assume that one might have been created during those early
years without the influence of employee representation.
8l*Henry Eilbirt, ’’The Development of Personnel
Management in the United States," Business History Review,
XXXIII (Autumn, 1959), 363.
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How then was the creation of the department related
to employee representation at Standard Oil of New Jersey?
It was earlier pointed out that the establishment of the
department was a part of the same Joint Agreement which
created the employee representation plan.

The department

was utilized as part of the appeal procedure for employees,
and the Employment Manager also served as a neutral third
party at the representation meetings.

He acted as a source

of information and advice for both sides.

85

These func

tions do not, however, explain any direct influence of
employee representation upon the creation of a personnel
department.

There is no evidence to indicate that the plan

could not have functioned without a personnel department.
Although the department's formation cannot be said
to have been caused by employee representation, it can be
said that its formation was definitely related to the plan.
The desire of the company to implement its policy of fair
and consistent treatment for all employees which was set
forth in the Joint Agreement appears to have motivated the
creation of an Employment Department.

This department was

designed to insure that employees were treated impartially
and in accordance with the promises made under the representation plan and other areas of the Joint Agreement.

86

^ H a g e n , op. c i t .
fi fi

•

Lackey, o p . cit.; Confidential communication,
o p . c i t .; Field, op. c i t .
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The management had created a means whereby the
employees could register their complaints through their
representatives when unfair conditions arose.

It created

the personnel department to see that conditions leading to
grievances were infrequent.

The plan itself had led to the

need for some sort of organizational policeman to amelio
rate conditions which might lead to a flooding of the up
ward channels of communication with complaints.

Thus not

only did the personnel department administer many of the
benefits developed under the plan, it also gained sub
stantial control of hiring practices, transfers, training,
discipline, dismissal, and safety practices.
Management had placed restraints upon itself through
the institution of the representation plan.

The personnel

department was the administrator of these restraints.

In

an analysis of such self-imposed limitations, Vollmer has
pointed out that they are a "result of organization needs
for coordination, specialization, and personnel regulation."
He further states that "the nature of the self-restraint
imposed as a result of the process of bureaucratization may
be expressed most generally in the principle of equal treat
ment for all employees."88

Vollmer maintains that as an

organization grows and takes on more of the characteristics
Q*]
0/Howard M. Vollmer, Employee Rights and the Employ
ment Relationship (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
The University
of California Press, 1960), p. 17.
8 8Ib id., p . 18.
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of bureaucracy, it must at the same time impose certain
restraints upon itself in order to rationalize and humanize
its personnel relations.

The employee representation plan

of Standard Oil of New Jersey and the creation of a person
nel department appear to have been attempts to do exactly
this.
Employee Representation’s Influence Upon Organization
Climate
Perhaps the most illusive factor to measure in an
organization is the overall climate of feeling among
employees.

Although organization climate has been defined

many ways, two definitions have been selected from current
writings on the subject.

One writer has defined the con

cept in the following manner:
By climate we mean those characteristics that
distinguish the organization from other organizations
and that influence the behavior of people in the
organization.
It is in effect what we react to--the
whole context of stimulation and confusion where we
w o r k .8 9
A second definition stresses the importance of
executive behavior upon the climate of the organization:
Company climate is the total impact of the company's
policies, executive philosophies and attitudes, deci
sions, history, objectives, and prevailing values and
sentiments.
The leadership of top executives creates
the company climate.
Company climates vary greatly,
ranging all the way from those reflecting sound

York:

99B, Von Haller Gilmer, Industrial Psychology (New
McGraw-Hill, 19 66), p. 57.
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employee relations to those inhibiting effective
employee relations.90
More briefly, climate might be defined as the organization’s
personality, or customary way of responding to its internal
and external environment.
One researcher has sought to measure this person
ality in terms of the following variables:
1.

The effectiveness of the organization’s commun
ication system.

2.

The degree of employees’ participation in
solving problems affecting them.

3.

The way in which the organization deals with
conflict.

4.

The leadership style of supervisors and mana
gerial personnel.

5.

The level and'trend of turnover and absenteeism
in the organization.91

It is with these variables that the company's organization
climate will be measured both before and after the intro
duction of the representation plan.
Adequacy of communication.

Earlier portions of this

chapter have shown that prior to the introduction of the
representation plan, the communication system between
management and operating workers was poor.

The labor dis

turbances of 1915 and 1916 were greatly influenced by this
®^Robert B. Buchele, "Company Climate and the
Effectiveness of Personnel Management," Personnel, XXXI
(January, 1955), p. 289.
^ T h e s e variables were suggested by Rensis Likert,
New Patterns of Management (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1961),
Chapters 1-8.
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inadequacy of communication.

With the creation of the plan

new channels of communication were opened and were fre
quently used, both upward from the rank-and-file workers
and downward from management.

The use of these channels

influenced attitudes and actions on both sides.
With regard to the importance of the free flow of
information, Likert has stated that good communication is
a requirement for the successful functioning of an organi
zation.

Good communication and high performance go together.

A healthier organization was in part the result of the new
communication channels and the stimulation necessary for
their use.

Again it should be emphasized that the mere

existence of communication channels does not insure that
they have altered the attitudes of the organization member
ship.

Their lack of existence does, however, add to the

chances that understanding will not occur.
Employee Participation.

Closely related to adequate commun

ication is employee participation in the affairs of the
firm or perhaps in more accurate te r m s , the degree of per
ceived employee participation.

While participation does

not necessarily lead to higher morale and productivity, a
92
number of studies have found such a relationship.
92

Lester Coch and R. P. French, "Overcoming Resis
tance to Change," Human Relations, I (1948), p. 512.
This
article is famous as one of the early explorations into the
subject of participation.
For more current research
studies, see Richard Beckhard, "An Organizational Improve
ment Program in a Decentralized Organization," The Journal
of Applied Behavioral Science, II (January-March, 19 66),

137
Although numerous writers have emphasized the impor
tance of true employee participation in decision making
rather than pseudo participation used for manipulative
purposes, March and Simon have pointed out that felt par
ticipation in decisions is the critical factor.

"Thus

actual influence over the specific decision being made is
of less importance to the individual than acknowledgment of
his influential p o s i t i o n ^
This approach to participation makes the task of
evaluating any resulting beneficial effects much easier.
From a motivational standpoint, it is thus not as important
whether employees had any really significant part in the
making of decisions, but instead whether they believed that
they had an influence.
It has been previously indicated that the company’s
representation plan allowed for employee requests, griev
ances , and suggestions to be registered through elected
employee representatives.

And like most of the other

representation plans of industry the final decision on
most matters usually rested with management.

The degree to

pp. 3-25; and Robert H. Guest, Organizational Change:
Effect of Successful Leadership (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, 1962), Chapter 7.
93
James March and Herbert Simon, Organizations
(New York:
John Wiley, 1958), p. 54.

The
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which employees could in reality participate in decisions
was thus greatly limited by the design of the plan.

94

The criterion adopted is, however, the degree of
felt participation by employees and the resultant effect
upon organization climate.

All eight ex-employees who were

interviewed perceived a great increase in the participation
of rank-and-file workers in decisions affecting them.

For

example, one interviewee commented that participation and
involvement by employees were significant effects of the
p l a n ’s installation.

95

Another individual stated that

after the plan was put into effect, the employees felt that
they had a voice in the affairs of the company which
affected t h e m . ^
The area of job enrichment, however, was not
affected by employee representation.

None of the eight

individuals interviewed could recall any instances of in
creases in planning or controlling responsibilities as a
result of the representation plan.

No information from

company files gave any indication that job enlargement was
one of the goals of the representation plan.

Participation

was thus limited to the operation of the plan itself.
Participation allowed for some degree of satis
faction of the higher level egoistic and self-actualization
^ S e e Chapter III for a more complete discussion of
this topic.
^ H a g e n , op. c i t .
q

c

Hurley, o p . c i t .
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needs and in effect helped to ameliorate the w o r k e r ’s
demands for higher organizational position and status.
Since the vast majority of refinery workers could never
expect to be promoted into supervisory or other managerial
positions, service in the representation plan allowed not
only a measure of recognition, but also a chance to use
more of the abilities which they possessed.

In the first

year of Standard Oil of New Jersey’s plan, and observer
commented on this advantage in the following manner:
. . . a sense of those differences in station [be
tween workmen and management] has entered into the
social unrest we have had to contend with. . . . The
worker has grown tired of being nothing but a worker.
But something now has been found at least to soften
the sharper edges of these differences in station.
There is the highest value of all in this new touch of
democracy in industry. S'7
It should be observed that this advantage to the
worker has also been attributed to labor union membership.
In the case of labor union membership, however, some of the
employees’ loyalty is the organizational price of this
benefit.

At least in theory, employee representation not

only gave employees greater recognition through partici
pation, but also strengthened their loyalty to the business
organization.

Throughout the history of the plan, Standard

Oil of New Jersey’s management stressed this aspect of
representation.

Clarence J. Hicks, the founder of the plan,

was fond of referring to employer-employee relationships as
collective dealing rather than collective bargaining and
^ K l i n e , o p . c i t ., p. 8.
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of stressing the importance of the unity of interests of
all those who were employed by the company.98

All eight of

those interviewed agreed that the plan's purpose was to
bring the managerial and non-managerial employees closer
together and to place an emphasis upon unity of interests.
It did appear to have largely achieved this goal at Standard
Oil of New Jersey.
Effect upon conflict.

It would be naive to assume that

employee representation eliminated all conflict between
management and labor.

And in fact the removal of all con

flict would not be regarded as a characteristic of a
healthy organization.

It is the way in which conflict is

handled which determines its effect upon the organization.
Likert has stated that bitter, unresolved conflict may
damage an organization.

Where conflict is dealt with

openly and constructively, the organization has a much
greater chance for progress.
Certainly the plan provided a means whereby
employees could openly express their wishes and fears to
management.

Earlier discussions of the plan as a channel

of communication indicated that workers felt fairly free
to state their opinions.

The question was asked those

interviewed whether the employees or their representatives
might have been afraid of reprisals for voicing complaints.
98Clarence J. Hicks, My Life in Industrial Relations,
o p . c i t ., p. 88-89.
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None of the eight individuals felt that there were any
prejudicial actions taken by management as a result of
employee activities under the plan.

For example, one

former employee stated that if management was prejudiced,
it was prejudiced in favor of the dissident employee.

The

management was said to have taken great pains to treat such
a person fairly in order that no one could say the company
dealt with its critics unjustly.

99

A non-management

employee agreed with this assessment.
there were no reprisals.

He stated that

In cases where some foreman or

department head attempted such action, the employee repre
sentative of that department could and often did report it
to a higher level of management.

Such freedom effectively

discouraged any attempt at reprisals.
Conflict did arise in the representation meetings.
The minutes of the meetings indicate that throughout the
years of the plan disagreements were not uncommon.

One

employee representative went on record before the top
management of the company in expressing his dissatisfaction
with certain aspects of the representation system.

After

praising the plan in general he made the following criti
cal comments:
At one time it was considered an honor to be
elected a representative to the plan; today it is
taken in some departments as more of a joke. . . . The
employees are granted something for which they have
^Hagen,

pp. c i t .

lOOField, op. c i t .
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asked and what happens?
Some of those who have change
of the administration and interpretation of that pro
vision surround it with every technicality that can
sound to the disadvantage of the employee.101
The validity of this representative’s criticisms cannot be
ascertained.

What is most significant is that he was

willing to make such statements before members of the
corporation's top management.
Although no evidence could be found which indicated
if management took action to investigate the above criti
cism , minutes of the representation meetings indicate that
it was standard procedure for any complaint which was
voiced to be looked into.

Solutions were sought which were

satisfactory to both sides.-^2

it appears, therefore, that

although management did not always please the workers with
its decisions, it nevertheless did seek to correct what
were believed to be injustices and when it did not take
action, to explain why the action was not taken.

Conflict

was apparently more likely to be brought into the open and
dealt with more constructively after the plan's intro
duction .
Supervisory relationships.

Perhaps as much as any other

factor, the supervisory force had generated bitterness and
unresolved conflict prior to the p l a n ’s introduction.

What

lOlThomas 0"Brien, Address at Joint Conference,
Standard Oil of New Jersey, New York City, 192 9. Standard
Oil of New Jersey, History of Employee Relations File, 1929.
lO^Hagen, op. c i t .
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then was the effect upon supervisory-subordinate relation
ships of the introduction and operation of the represen
tation plan?
We have already noted that the power of the
supervisor was limited by the institution of the plan and
by attendant personnel policies put into effect at the same
time.^^

As a channel of communication the plan bypassed

him in both upward and downward flows.

His power to h i r e ,

dismiss, and transfer was strongly limited as was his right
to discipline his subordinates.

He was no longer free to

set his own labor policy.
The result of these limitations was an improved
working relationship between the supervisor and his sub
ordinates .

Those who expressed an opinion on this

subject indicated that the primary reason for initial
improvements was fear on the part of the supervisor that
arbitrary actions by him would result in discipline for
the supervisor.
The question must be asked whether there was an
underlying hostility between supervisors and their subordi
nates based upon the possible resentment by the supervisors
103

For a discussion of the changing status of the
supervisor in industry over the past half century, see
Delbert C. Miller, "Supervisors:
Evolution of an Organi
zational Role," in Robert Dubin, Leadership and Productivity
(San Francisco:
Chandler, 1965), pp. 104-132.
lc^Field, op. cit.; Reymond, o p . c i t .; Hurley,
o p . c i t .; McAndrew, o p . c i t .; McGraw, op. c i t .
105Ibid.
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of the loss of some of their power.

Those working for the

company at the time of the p l a n ’s installation indicated
that there was a definite period of adjustment for a number
of supervisors who resented the reduction in their authority
and power.^06

Resentment subsided in most cases after the

plan had operated for a short while.

In the Bayonne

refinery a small percentage of the supervisors had to be
replaced because they could not accept these new relation
ships with their subordinates.
Although an analysis of the minutes of represen
tation meetings reveals some grievances filed by employee
representatives concerning the actions of supervisors, it
is impossible to determine if these were the result of
supervisory hostility generated by the representation plan.
A realistic generalization appears to be that
supervisor-subordinate relationships were improved, at
least in terms of the reduction of the number of arbitrary
actions available to the company's supervision.

As the

years passed, the supervisor became more competent in
handling his employees effectively.

Those in Employee

Relations did their best to improve his skills and put
i A n

more of this responsibility on him.
106Ibid.
l ^ F i e l d , op. c i t .
-^^Hagen, op. c i t .
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Absenteeism and turnover.

Throughout the decade of the

1920's and 1930’s, absenteeism and turnover rates were
apparently declining.

Although the relationship between

representation and the level of absenteeism and turnover is
difficult to determine conclusively, there, nevertheless,
appears to have been a link between them.
Early records of turnover and absenteeism in the
Standard of New Jersey refineries have apparently been
destroyed, if in fact they ever existed in any formalized
manner.

109

Conclusions concerning the effect of the plan

upon these two factors can only be tentatively drawn.
Of the eight individuals who were interviewed, all
expressed the opinion that the plan was at least a factor
in the gradual reduction of absenteeism and turnover in the
plants.

None could cite any statistics to verify this con

clusion.
One individual cited the creation of the personnel
department as a stabilizing factor.

Pointing out that

supervisors could dismiss their subordinates at will prior
to the plan's existence, the interviewee stated that many
arbitrary dismissals were averted after the department's
creation.As

discussed earlier, the personnel depart

ment was actively involved in the functions of discipline
^Executives in the company's home office and in
three of its refineries doubt that these early figures were
ever a part of the firm's records.
H ^ F i e l d , op. c i t .
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and discharge.

This activity resulted in less power for

the supervisor and a greater standardization of the circum
stances under which an employee could be released from
employment.
A note of caution must be injected regarding the
causes of reduction in turnover and absenteeism.

While

employee representation is believed to have been a factor
in their reduction, it must be noted that other variables
could and probably did influence these trends.

For example,

at the time of the plan's installation the company
unilaterally granted important economic concessions to the
workers.

A pension plan, wage increases, and health and

welfare benefits were given to the workers by management.
These concessions probably had a significant positive
effect upon the reduction of absenteeism and turnover in
dependently of the institution of the representation plan.
No doubt later concessions would have continued to have
some favorable effect upon absenteeism and turnover even if
no representation system had been established.
Moreover, refinery employment has had a history of
stability.

Standard Oil of New Jersey’s operations were

and are characterized by long-term growth with few cyclical
swings that would encourage employees to seek more stable
employment.
It is therefore impossible to separate in any con
clusive way these and other possible influences from the
effect of employee representation.

If the findings of the
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other segments of this chapter are valid, one would con
clude that the majority of the workers would be less prone
to leave the company or to be chronically absent.

Because

of the p l a n ’s influence upon communication and upon the
formation and operation of the personnel department, with
the resultant rationalization of personnel policies, it
seems reasonable to conclude that employee representation
did contribute to failing levels of turnover and absentee
ism.

In addition, representation's impact upon the other

measures of organization climate appears to have been a
positive factor which influenced these two variables.
Summary.

In terms of the variables being used for the

measurement of organization climate, it appears that an
improvement occurred after the introduction of the plan.
There is no way to prove that employee representation
caused this improvement.

The evidence suggests, however,

that the plan was an important factor in this change in
organization climate.
Influence of Representation Upon the Willingness of the
Working Force to Accept Unionization
Although representation appeared to be a positive
factor in employer-employee relationships in Standard Oil
of New Jersey, the plan was abandoned in 1937 as a company
dominated union as defined by the National Labor Relations
Act.

The workers were, according to statements made in

The Lamp, unhappy with this abandonment.

A letter addressed

14 8
to the company’s president signed by five refinery workers
from the Bayonne, Bayway, and Eagle refineries claimed to
represent the feelings of their refineries’ employees and
was printed in the April, 1937, issue of The L a m p .

The

essence of its message was contained in the following
paragraph.
The position of our employees and the elected
representatives is that we wish to fight to the last
ditch for the continuation of our plan which has func
tioned so successfully for the last twenty years. . . .
In our dealings with the management during the years of
operation of our plan, there has always existed a very
amicable relationship and we wish assurance as to its
continuance.H i
The eight individuals interviewed expressed similar
opinions of the workers’ feelings toward the discontinuance
of the plan.

One of those interviewed stated that the

workers were upset, not really knowing which way to turn
after the plan was abandoned.

Another commented that

there was no question that the plan was popular and that
the employees were sorry to see it go.

113

Whether all

employees in reality were sorry to see the plan discontinued
cannot be determined.

The actions taken after its abandon

ment do, however, indicate that they would have preferred
to keep it in force.
Soon after the plan's demise, each of the refineries
formed unaffiliated plant-wide un i o n s .
ill

In most instances

"Over'the President’s Desk," The L a m p , XIX
(April, 1937), 4.
■^■^Hagen, op. c i t .
•L-^McAndrew, o p . c i t .
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these new unions elected as their first officers the same
individuals who had previously served as employee represen
tatives.

The unions were as much like the representation

plan as the law would allow.
Thus employee representation made it both easier
and more difficult to organize the work force.

The workers

were definitely in favor of collective action in their
relationships with management.

They were also on the whole

apparently satisfied with their treatment by the company.
They therefore wanted to maintain some form of labor organi
zation but at the same time were not attracted by the
militant spirit of the national unions of the 19 3 0 ’s.
Although management was officially neutral during
the workers’ selection of a union, they were pleased that
unaffiliated unions were chosen.

These unions were formed

without the interference of management, and their similar
ity to the representation plan made management feel that
good relationships would continue.

115

It is difficult to say what management’s attitude
toward unionization would have been had there never been a
representation plan.

The plan did accustom the management

to dealing collectively with the workers.

It also strongly

influenced the formation of the independent unions which
■'••^Reymond, op. c i t .
Hagen, o p . c i t .
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were much more acceptable to management than affiliation
with a national union would have been.
The extent of managerial identification with these
independent unions was revealed in a chance remark made by
a retired member of the company's management.

In discussing

a representation election in 1960 between the unaffiliated
union at the Baton Rouge refinery and a Teamster's union
local, he stated that, "We had a tough fight, but we won."

lip

His reference to "we" was the unaffiliated union.
The Employee Representation Plan of Standard Oil Company of
New Jersey in Summary
An analysis of the plan of employee representation
in Standard Oil of New Jersey has led to the conclusion
that it contributed significantly to the development of
personnel administration within this company.

The plan

influenced the development and usage of new formal channels
of communication between management and the work force.
Through these channels employees filed grievances and made
requests for improvements in wages, hours, and working con
ditions.

Using the channels for transmitting information

to the operating employees, management explained their
position on numerous matters of concern to the work force.
Evidence was presented which indicated that both sides were
fairly successful in influencing the attitudes and actions
of the other through this communication.
I *1 C

Reymond, o p . c i t .
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Benefits granted by management were affected by the
requests of the operating employees.

The impact of these

requests was primarily in terms of the timing and configu
ration of the benefits received.

Grievances were also

frequently settled in favor of the workers.

Management in

turn influenced the attitudes of the work force by explain
ing their position even when they could not grant a specific
grievance or request.
The formation of the company's personnel department
was encouraged by the establishment of the plan.

Its pri

mary task was a standardization and rationalization of
personnel policies.

These policies were formerly estab

lished by each superior with resulting variations from
department to department.

The existing variations of

personnel practices were unacceptable under the represen
tation plan, and the personnel department was established
to put an end to these variations and as a result, to help
keep the promises management made through the plan.
Organization climate was improved after the intro
duction of the representation system.

Improvements in

effective communication, employee participation, the manner
in which conflict was dealt with, interpersonal relation
ships between supervisors and their subordinates, and the
level of turnover and absenteeism were all apparently
positively influenced by the representation plan.
Employee attitudes toward unionization were affected
by the plan.

The employees were accustomed to dealing with
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management on a collective basis, and when the represen
tation plan was ruled illegal by national labor legislation,
unaffiliated unions were formed in each of the company's
refineries.

The employees were said to have favored the

unaffiliated unions because of their general satisfaction
with the former representation plan and their feeling that
these past relationships could best be approximated by
forming unions as similar to the representation plan as the
law would allow.
In analyzing the employee representation system of
this company and its success, it must of course be observed
that the company was and is a part of a rich and successful
industry.

This industry has not been faced with serious

seasonal or cyclical downswings, but has instead seen
steady growth in demand for its products.
Steady growth has allowed the company to be in
creasingly generous toward its employees and to give them
greater employment security.

An employee representation

plan in such an environment had a greater chance of success
than did one in a less stable industry with less overall
growth.
On the other hand, it can be observed that employee
relations were not satisfactory in the company prior to
the installation of the plan.

As has been previously noted,

the representation plan served as the vehicle through which
the advantages the company enjoyed were utilized more
effectively to improve management-worker relationships.
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Standard Oil of New Jersey had developed a means
whereby labor peace was achieved relatively successfully.
The plan it developed had a significant impact upon person
nel practices in the firm, putting into effect many of the
recommendations that were to be made in later years by
social scientists concerned with the healthy organization.117
It is interesting to note that Robert Blake, the
developer of the Managerial Grid concept,

118

worked for

Standard Oil of New Jersey for a number of years.

During

these years he developed many of the ideas which he later
formalized.

The company had been practicing many of the

concepts which he is now teaching.1^
While not a cure-all for organization problems,
employee representation appears to have made a significant
contribution to the development of modern-day personnel
management at Standard Oil of New Jersey.

117

Previous references to Rensis Likert’s New
Patterns of Management provide examples of the company’s
progress in this area.
118

Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, The Manage
rial Grid (Houston, Texas:
Gulf Publishing Company, 1964).
119

Hagen, op. c it.

CHAPTER V
AN ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF EIGHT PLANS OF
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY
With a survey of eight firms which utilized employee
representation, this chapter seeks to further investigate
the conclusions of the previous chapter.
Again it should be emphasized that this study does
not attempt statistical verification of its conclusions.
It does, however, presume that by analyzing representative
organizations,■*• conclusions can be drawn concerning the con
tributions of representation systems.
The firms to be discussed in this chapter are:
Standard Oil Company of Indiana, Armco Steel Company,
Dennison Manufacturing Company, International Harvester
Company, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Bethlehem
Steel Corporation, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, and
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company.
None of these organizations provided the amount of
in-depth information obtained from Standard Oil Company of
New Jersey.

Company records on this subject were much less

complete, and fewer people were available for interviews
■i
'
Chapter I explains the rationale for the survey of
the eight firms surveyed.
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in any one company.

Consequently, no firm could be analyzed

to the extent of Standard of New Jersey.

Nevertheless, a

significant volume of data was obtained from these firms
which allowed a comparison between their plans and that of
Standard Oil of New Jersey.
Methodology was essentially the same in this and the
previous chapter.

Primary reliance was placed upon personal

interviews and upon information from company f i l e s .

Upon

occasion, data from secondary sources were also utilized.
In the selection of these eight firms, a comparison
of two points of potential similarity was first made.

These

two areas were:
1.

Employer motivations for beginning the plan.

2.

The formal design of the plan.

These two areas were chosen because they indicate each
company’s attitude toward the proper role of employee
representation.

The formal design of the plan gives some

evidence of the company's view of how limited employee par
ticipation should be.

Similarly, employer motivations for

beginning the plan suggest the intended function of the
representation system.
If the plans are found to be largely similar in
these respects, it can be said that they have been selected
from the same universe, i.e., they can be validly compared
in terms of the hypothesized areas of contributions to
personnel administration.

The end result should be a
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verification or modification of the conclusions of the pre
vious chapter.
Accordingly, a discussion of the two areas listed
above will next be undertaken.

This discussion will p r o 

vide both historical information concerning the eight
companies and illustrations of their plans' similarities to
that of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.
Motivations of Employers for Introducing the Plans
An investigation of the motives of employers for
beginning the plans was undertaken to determine if similar
forces had influenced the p l a n s ’ formation.
centered around two employer motivations:

Findings
a desire to

establish closer contact between management and the hourly
worker and the wish to forestall the threat of possible
unionization of employees.

These reasons were of course

often interlocking.
In the Dennison Manufacturing Company, three r e a 
sons were given by the management for the formation in 1919
of the Dennison Employee Committee:
1.

To promote harmonious relations between the
company and its employees.

2.

To help in the rapid solution of employee
grievances.

3.

To improve working conditions in the company.

^Dennison Manufacturing Company, Constitution of
the Employees’ Co-operative Plan (Framingham, Mass.:
Dennison Manufacturing Company, 1919), p. 1.

o
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No company would formally state that it feared unionization
and was taking action to prevent it.

No evidence could,

however, be found which indicated that the company felt
threatened by a labor union or that employee unrest existed
in the firm.
Dennison's plan was said to have been started by
Henry Dennison, the president of the firm, because no labor
union existed which was interested in the cause of semi
skilled workers, especially if they were women.^

A retired

employee representative stated that management wanted an
effective means of direct contact with individual employees
when it established the Dennison Employee Committee.^

This

same opinion was expressed by two other retired Dennison

5

employees.

All interviewees, then, expressed the view that
management wanted a more effective means of reaching the
rank-and-file employees, and none indicated that the threat
of unionism was present or that there was significant labor
unrest in the firm.

Henry Dennison was a pioneer in many

progressive causes, and this characteristic may explain his
3Interview with John Garvey, retired Production
Manager of the company, February 27, 1970.
^Interview with John Curtis, retired photo-engraver
with the company, March 3, 1970.
^Those interviewed included:
Curtis Damon, retired
Superintendent, Printing Division, February 24, 197 0;
Charles J. Richards, retired paper cutter, March 4, 1970.
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attitude toward the need for employee representation in the
6

company.

In the case of Armco Steel, the company’s official
statement on representation also expressed concern for the
need to establish closer contact between management and
labor.

7

Its plan was put into effect in December of 1920,

approximately one year after the nation-wide steel strike
called by the National Committee for Organizing the Iron
O
and Steel Workers (AFL).
Although no information obtained
from the company or from the one interview with a managerial
representative9 indicates that the strike of 1919 had any
influence upon the firm in its decision to begin a represen
tation plan, it is not unreasonable to assume that the
labor unrest in the industry had some effect upon this
course of a c t i o n . ^
Bethlehem Steel, like Armco, was affected by the
1919 steel strike.

As a result of a 1918 War Labor Board

9See for example, Henry S. Dennison, Organization
Engineering (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1931).
7Armco Steel Company, Armco Advisory Committees
(Middletown, Ohio: Armco Steel Company, December 1, 1928),

p. 1.
8Phillip Taft, Organized Labor in American History
(New York:
Harper and R o w , 1964), p. 3 55.
9Interview with J. R. Sexton, Manager, Industrial
Relations, Armco Steel General Offices, March 2, 1970.
l^Taft reports that the 1919 strike had some effect
upon all the major plants in the steel industry.
Taft,
o p . c i t ., p. 358.
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ruling, a plan of employee representation was already functioning in the firm.

11

However, in 1919 a strike committee

headed by William Z. Foster, a union organizer, attempted
to negotiate with the company's management.

The company

declined to bargain, and the strike did not result in a
walkout of any significant number of men.

12

Bethlehem continued its representation plan after
the war with some structural modifications.

The company's

stated purpose was to grant employees a voice in the deter
mination of working conditions and to establish a means
through which grievances could be processed.

A retired

employee agreed that these were the two major purposes of
the plan.

One other employee who had experience with the

company's plan agreed with this view.'*'1*
Like Bethlehem Steel, International Harvester's
stated objectives in installing its plan were to provide an
effective means of contact between employees and the
■^Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Special Conference
Committee, Bethlehem Plan of Employee Representation
(Bethlehem, Pa.:
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, April 29,
1929), p. 3.
19

Ibid., pp. 4-5.
Taft reports that the strike
collapsed in every steel firm by January of 1920.
Taft,
o p . c i t . ,■ pp. 3 5 8-35,9.
*1 q

Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Representation of
Employees in Plants of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation
(Bethlehem, Pa.:
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, October,
1920), p. 3.
14Interview with W. L. Trumbauer, retired member of
management, March 11, 197 0; Interview with E. W. Engerer,
retired member of management, March 17, 197 0.
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management and to allow the employees a voice in matters
affecting them.

In this instance, however, there was

apparently no pressure upon the company for unionization.
A retired hourly employee stated that during the time of
the plan's formation there was no real union movement among
15
the company's employees.

One other retired employee of

International Harvester was interviewed.

He too was unaware

of any threat of unionization at the time of the plan's
formation.
In the case of Westinghouse, an attempt at union
ization led to the establishment of a representation plan.
A strike was called in 1914- but was unsuccessful, and
management decided to form a representation plan before
more disruptions occurred.

The plan's stated purpose was

to establish effective communication between the hourly
paid workers and top management.

17

Although there was not direct threat of unionization
at the time of the introduction of Standard Oil of Indiana's
plan in 1919, the company's official history notes that
"post war readjustments and the serious industrial unrest
^Confidential communication with a retired machine
operator of the firm, February 3, 1970.
•^Confidential communication with a retired product
inspector, February 10, 1970.
■^Confidential communication with a retired member
of the company's personnel department, March 2, 1970;
Interview with Harry Hillman, retired Director, Wage and
Salary and Employee Benefits Administration, March 5, 1970;
Interview with Harold W. Arlin, retired Manager, Industrial
Relations, March 5, 197 0.
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throughout the world rendered more imperative than ever the
adoption of the plan suggested.”

18

Such a statement seems

relevant to all companies whose plans began during this
period.

A retired non-management employee of the company

agreed that the company was reacting to the possibility of
future union organization.

19

The other two firms surveyed also stated their
reasons for their p l a n s ' adoption in terms of the need for
more contact between the top and bottom levels of the
organization.

Goodyear’s statement was simply that the

plan was intended to maintain communication and good
nn

relations between the company and its employees.
The current personnel manager of the company's
Akron plants pointed out that in 1910, Goodyear employed
2,50 0 people in Akron.
20,000.

By 1919 this number had grown to

Because of the company’s rapid growth management

had lost effective contact with its employees and thus
instituted the representation plan to aid in the reestablish21
ment of this contact.
•^Paul H. Giddens, Standard Oil Company (Indiana);•
Oil Pioneer of the Middle West (New York:
Appleton-CenturyC rofts, 1955), pT 336.
-^Confidential communication with a retired Still
man and later personnel clerk, February 12, 1970.
This was
the only interview obtained from Standard Oil of Indiana
personnel.
^ " I n d ustrial Representation Plan," The Wingfoot
C l a n , 1919, p. 3.
^ I n t e r v i e w with K. L. Reynolds, Personnel Manager,
Akron Plants, March 12, 1970.
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American Telephone and Telegraph’s plan was simi
larly designed "to provide regular facilities for the
exchange of views and suggestions between [employees] and
the Management and thus to secure a spirit of mutual
cooperation and confidence."

22

A current member of manage

ment agreed that the plan was designed primarily as a means
of better communication between the hourly employees and
management.

He could recall no immediate threat of union

ization to the company at the time of the plan's institution
in 1919.23
In summary, the plans of the eight companies sur
veyed appear to have been inaugurated by similar managerial
motivations.

Management in every instance recognized at

least in formal policy statements that an improvement in
the quantity and quality of communication was a necessary
prerequisite to the elimination of employee grievances and
the consideration of employee requests.

It was also

necessary before management had any hope of getting its
point of view across to the rank-and-file worker.
In four of the eight companies surveyed, the fear
of unionism was discovered to be a direct influence upon
22American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Consti
tution of Association of Employees (New York:
American
Telephone and Telegraph Company, Long Lines Division, August
3, 1934), p. 1.
2^Confidential communication with an Assistant
Vice President of American Telephone and Telegraph Company,
March 2, 197 0. This was the only interview obtained from
American Telephone and Telegraph personnel.
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the formation of the plans.

Apparently, the danger of

union organization and labor unrest made these companies
aware of their lack of success in dealing with the employees
prior to their p l a n ’s installation.
Although the other four firms in the survey did not
experience a direct threat of unionization, they were never
theless a part of the social and economic environment of
the time.

Chapter II has indicated that four factors in

this environment encouraged employee representation immedi
ately after World War I .

These factors included labor

unrest in the country and employers'

fear of unionism, the

significant amount of publicity given representation plans
after the war, the demonstrated effectiveness of employee
representation in improving efficiency in wartime operations,
and a general concern of society for more democracy in
industry.
It seems reasonable that these factors had some
effect upon the eight firms in making them aware of the
need to correct deficiencies in employer-employee relations.
The plans were, as in the case of Standard Oil of New
Jersey, designed to correct these weaknesses.

Thus in terms

of employer motivations for beginning the plans, all eight
basically were similar in nature to Standard Oil of New
Jersey.

Patterns of Plan Design
Although Chapter III extensively analyzed the m a k e 
up of the plans, a brief comparison of their characteristics
will be made.

The purpose of this comparison is to deter

mine the degree of similarity of the design of these eight
plans to that of Standard Oil of New Jersey.
Because Chapter III has discussed these character
istics in detail, only a summary is provided at this point.
Table III allows each of the plans to be compared in terms
of previously discussed aspects of plan design.
A study of the table indicates a great similarity
among formal aspects of the plans.

In terms of the roles

intended for both management and non-management employees,
all eight plans and that of Standard Oil of New Jersey
were essentially alike.
Rationale for Comparison
Because of the basic

similarities of

to the Standard Oil of New Jersey system,

the eight plans

it appears rea

sonable to compare each of them to this company in terms of
the hypothesized contributions of employee representation.
As mentioned previously, the

attempt will be made to verify

or modify the conclusions of

the previous chapter.

The great similarities of these eight plans and
the plan of Standard Oil of New Jersey also leads to the
conclusion that they were typical of representation systems
of the 19 20’s and 1 9 3 0 ’s.

Conclusions drawn from the

TABLE III
POINTS OF COMPARISON OF NINE PLANS OF
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION
Standard
of
New Jersey
Employee Partici
pation in Design

None

Automatic
Membership

Yes

Dennison
Manufacturing
Company

Goodyear

Bethlehem
Steel

Significant

Limited

None

Yes

Yes

Yes

Elected by
employee
secret ballot

Elected by
employee
secret ballot

Elected by
employee
secret ballot

Elected by
employee
secret ballot

Method of Selecting
Management Repre
sentatives

Appointed by
management

Appointed by
management

Appointed by
management

Appointed by
management

Structure of Repre
sentation System

Joint
Committee

Joint
Committee

Industrial
Democracy

Joint
Committee

Financing
Arrangement s

Financed
entirely by
the company

Financed
entirely by
the company

Financed
entirely by
the company

Financed
entirely by
the company

Provisions for
Plan Amendment

Two-thirds
Majority of
Both Sides

Two-thirds
Majority of
Both Sides

Two-thirds
Majority of
Both Sides

Two-thirds
Majority of
Both Sides
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Method of Selecting
Employee Repre
sentatives

TABLE III (continued)

Westinghouse

Standard
of
Indiana

Armco

International
Harvester

American
Telephone 8
Telegraph

Employee Partici
pation in Design

None

None

None

None

None

Automatic
Membership

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Method of Select
ing Employee
Representatives

Elected by
employee
secret
ballot

Elected by
employee
secret
ballot

Elected by
employee
secret
ballot

Elected by
employee
secret
ballot

Elected by
employee
secret
ballot

Method of Select
ing Management
Representatives

Appointed
by
management

Appointed
by
management

Appointed
by
management

Appointed
by
management

Appointed
by
management

Structure of
Representation
System

Advisory
only

Joint
Committee

Advisory
only

Joint
Committee

Joint
Committee

Financing
Arrangements

Financed
entirely by
the company

Financed
entirely by
the company

Financed
entirely by
the company

Financed
entirely by
the company

Financed
entirely by
the company

Provisions for
Plan Amendment

No formal
amendment
procedure

Two-thirds
Majority of
Both Sides

No formal
amendment
procedure

Simple
Majority of
Both Sides

Two-thirds
Majority of
Both Sides
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analysis of these plans and from secondary sources can
therefore be generalized to employee representation in
American industry.
The Plans and Downward Communication Channels
As in the previous chapter, a discussion of the
p l a n ’s effects upon communication channels will be under
taken.

First, it should be stated that the mere existence

and usage of such channels offers no assurance of greater
empathy of either side toward the other.

However, the

absence of available means of transmitting messages from
one organizational level to another leaves little chance of
understanding and support.

Channels of communication are

prerequisites for an appreciation of the points of view of
others.

This discussion shall therefore begin with an

analysis of the plan's creation of downward channels and
their frequency of usage.

Then the effects of these factors

will be analyzed.
In an earlier portion of this chapter, it was noted
that all eight of the firms surveyed sensed their lack of
success in getting the company's message across to the
working force.

Like Standard Oil of New Jersey, an admin

istrative gap had arisen between top management and the
operating employees.
Each of the eight companies was investigated to
determine the reasons for such a gap.

In all eight of the

companies surveyed, those who had knowledge of this problem
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agreed in substance as to its causes.
were isolated.

Three primary factors

The absence of a clearly stated labor

policy by the company was identified as a determining fac
tor.

The operating employees had no real knowledge of what

top management expected from them nor of what was thought
of their performance.
To fill this administrative vacuum created by top
management's lack of direction, the supervisor largely set
his own labor policies.

He did not in every department

behave arbitrarily, but his relative autonomy allowed him
to do so if he wished.

Thus labor policy varied from

department to department depending on the knowledge and
wisdom of the individual supervisor.
Moreover, the supervisors in these companies were
not effectively urged by top management to communicate with
their subordinates concerning the reasons for'a course of
action.

Many supervisors followed the rather blunt approach

of "do as I say or get out."^1*' Of course even if a super
visor wished to explain the reasons behind top management's
decisions, he was often powerless to do so since he too
was usually provided with only the decision in its final
,
25
form.
^Garvey, o p . cit.
2^The following individuals provided the above in
formation concerning the ineffectiveness of downward
communication in the eight organizations:
John Garvey,
Dennison Manufacturing Company, o p . c i t .; W. L. Trumbauer,
Bethlehem Steel, o p . c i t .; Confidential communication,
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As in the case of Standard Oil of New Jersey, the
causes of the absence of downward communication were there
fore :
1.

Little or no attempt by top management to reach
the work force.

2.

Little consistency in the labor policy of the
firm as interpreted by the first line super
visor.

3.

Little encouragement by top management for the
supervisor to explain the reasons for either
his own or his superior’s actions.

It is not surprising that the operative employee had little
understanding of why management chose a certain course of
action.

It is also not surprising that he would often

interpret these actions as arbitrary whether or not they
were intended as such.
The eight companies’ responses to this problem were
essentially the same as that of Standard Oil of New Jersey.
They established an alternate channel of communication to
the chain of command in the form of an employee represen
tation plan.

Although the command channel might have been

strengthened in order to improve communications, these
companies, like Standard Oil of New Jersey, chose to bypass
it in favor of direct contact between top management and
American Telephone and Telegraph, op. c i t .; Confidential
communication, Standard Oil of Indiana, op. c i t . ; Confi
dential communications with two individuals, International
Harvester, o p . cit.; J. R. Sexton, Armco Steel, o p . c i t .;
Harry A. Hillman, Harold A. Arlin, Confidential communi
cation, Westinghouse, o p . cit.; K. L. Reynolds, Confidential
communication, Goodyear, op. c i t .
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representatives of the workers.

26

Also it appears that be

cause of their lack of knowledge concerning effective
communication techniques, these firms chose to experiment
with representation as a means of drawing the production
employees closer to top management.

In so doing, the

supervisor was largely bypassed in the process.
Two new downward channels were created by the
representation plans.

The first of these were the periodic

meetings between management and employee representatives.
Representatives were exposed to management’s points of view
and then in turn explained these views to their constit
uents.

In addition, all eight of the firms published the

minutes of the representation meetings and either posted
them in prominent places or distributed copies of them to
each employee.

27

A second method for reaching the rank-and-

file employee was therefore developed as the result of
employee representation’s introduction.
Although the existence of communication channels are
a prerequisite for their usage, their existence tells
nothing about the quantity of communication passing through
the channels.

None of the companies surveyed were lacking

oc
Employee suggestion systems and opinion polls may
be cited as modern-day examples of bypassing in business
organizations.
2^Goodyear distributed copies of the minutes to
management and employee representatives.
Employees were
free to request to see these copies.
Each representative
was also free to pass his copy among his constituents.
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in the desire and willingness to explain their viewpoints
to the rank-and-file employees.

In each instance, the

companies utilized the representation meetings as a means
of presenting official company positions to the workers'
representatives.

This was a major objective of the plans.

The frequency of meetings varied among the firms, but they
averaged once every two months with subcommittees meeting
more often.

Special meetings of the full committee could

be called at any time.

Thus management did have the oppor

tunity to present its viewpoints on various subjects and
was quite willing to do so.
More crucial, however, than the creation of down
ward communication channels and management's willingness to
use them was the effect of these messages upon the thinking
of the work force.

This effect will be explored in later

sections of this chapter dealing with the topics of economic
benefits received under the plans, the effectiveness of
employee grievance processing, and the effect of the plans
upon organizational climate.
It should be concluded that while the formation of
new downward communication channels did not insure that
workers would understand management's position, their
opening did form the precondition for this understanding.
Equally important was management's understanding of the
labor force's wishes.
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The Plans and Upward Communication
Prior to the adoption of the representation plans
employee attempts to voice grievances and make requests in
the eight firms were largely ineffective.

In the Dennison

Manufacturing Company those interviewed agreed that manage
ment had no real understanding of workers’ wishes and
desires prior to representation.

28

There was little chance

for the workers to reach top management through the chain
of command.

The supervisor controlled the information that

was passed to higher management and thus had the opportunity
to screen out information with which he did not agree.

Nor

was the supervisor in any effective way encouraged to
listen to the complaints of his subordinates and to counsel
with them.

Therefore there was no effective appeal pro-

cedure available to the hourly employee.

29

Those interviewed in the other seven companies
expressed similar points of view.

Because it would be

excessively tedious to quote those interviewed in each
company, it will be said that all who had knowledge of
these early years agreed with varying degrees of emphasis
that the operative employee had little chance to effectively
make his feelings known to top management.

30

^ G a r v e y , o p . c i t . ; Curtis, o p . c i t . ; Damon, o p .
c i t .; Richards, o p . c i t .
29
Garvey, op. c i t .
^In f o r m a t i o n on this topic was provided by those
individuals cited in footnote 25.
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With the introduction of the representation plans,
a new channel of upward communication was opened.

Again,

the mere presence of the channel was insufficient to
guarantee its effectiveness.

Its existence did, however,

give employees the chance to influence top management, and
this was a chance which they had not had before, except
through such action as a strike or other work disruption.
In each of the companies surveyed the employees could
appeal the actions of their superior and make requests and
suggestions through their employee representatives.
Grievance processing in five of the eight firms was
similar to Standard Oil of New Jersey.

31

The aggrieved

employee was required to attempt to resolve the question
with his supervisor, often in the presence of the depart
mental employee representative.

Failing to resolve the

question here, the plea would be taken to one or more
organizational levels above the supervisor.

Then if no

resolution occurred, the matter was brought before the
management and employee representatives at their next
meeting.

A majority vote here settled the issue.

If a tie

vote resulted, the president of the firm made the final
decision in the matter.
In this method of grievance processing, the organi
zational chain of command, including the supervisor, was
^ T h e s e five firms were:
Standard Oil of Indiana;
Dennison Manufacturing Company; Goodyear; Bethlehem Steel;
International Harvester.
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involved.

The representation committee was brought into

the matter only when line supervision was unable to success
fully settle the matter.

It should also be pointed out

that the formal establishment of grievance processing was
the result of the formation of the representation plans.
The fact that an employee could take his case to the repre
sentation committee if he was not satisfied with manage
m e n t ’s actions increased the likelihood that management
would conscientiously process the employee complaint.
In only one company did the representation committee
enter the grievance process on a formal basis immediately.
American Telephone and Telegraph’s plan provided for the
filing of a grievance with the Executive Committee, a sub
committee of the full representation body.

These committee

men, composed of non-management employees, had the right to
accept or reject a grievance.

If they felt the grievance

was just, they would discuss the matter with the employee’s
superior and attempt to arrive at a settlement.

Either

they or the aggrieved employee could appeal the decision to
the entire representation body which would then vote on the
matter.

Again the decision could be appealed to the top
qo

level of the organization.
In the Westinghouse and Armco plans, the represen
tatives had no formal administrative or legislative power.
^ A m e r i c a n Telephone and Telegraph Company, Consti
tution of Association of Employees, op. cit., pp. 21-23.
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Their function was for informational purposes.

Thus there

was no formal procedure for bringing an issue before the
committees and no formal vote on the worthiness of a griev
ance.

These plans did not require that an employee who was

dissatisfied with an action of his superior first take up
the matter with that superior.

Instead, he could immedi

ately issue a complaint to his departmental representative
for presentation to management.

Management then took

whatever action it thought appropriate.33
In all eight plans a means of reaching management
for the purpose of filing grievances was obtained.

Five of

the eight plans made the chain of command a part of the
grievance processing procedure.
As with the filing of grievances, the plan provided
employees with an opportunity to make requests and sugI
gestions to management.
In all eight of the companies
employees were allowed to raise questions in such areas as
wages, hours, and working conditions.

Their representatives

brought these issues before the entire committee of workers
and management at their regular meetings.
The representation plan thus established a method
through which rank-and-file employees could be heard by
management.

While the effectiveness of this channel is not

33Armco Steel Company, Armco Advisory Committees,
op. c i t ., pp. 1-2; Confidential communication, Westinghouse,
o p . c i t . ; Hillman, o p . c i t .; Arlin, op. c i t .
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evaluated here, its creation did allow the potential for
fuller and freer upward communication in the firm.
R epresentations Influence Upon Economic Benefits and
Grievance Processing
The effectiveness of the upward channel can be
measured in part by the influence it had upon management's
economic decisions.

Equally important was the ability of

management to persuade workers of the wisdom of not grant
ing a specific benefit.
Since no records of the representation meetings
were available in any of the firms surveyed, analysis of
these influences was limited largely to the opinions of
those who were interviewed.

Upon occasion, information was

also obtained from company records.
In all of the firms surveyed, those interviewed
expressed the belief that the representation plan had some
effect on the granting of benefits by management.

34-

It is

interesting to note that out of a total of twelve indi
viduals who had an opinion of this subject, nine believed
that the majority of these benefits would have eventually
been granted by management even if a representation plan
^ T h e respondent from American Telephone and
Telegraph believed that this effect was very slight and
that benefits were almost exclusively decided upon by
management alone.
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had not existed.

35

Emphasis was placed upon the timing of

the granting of a particular benefit and the configuration
of the benefit package.

Both of these factors were impor

tant to those workers affected by such changes.
In the Dennison Manufacturing Company the opinion
of a retired production manager was that benefits would
have been granted but "only as the labor market dictated."

36

A former division superintendent stated that the plan gave
management a chance to find out what the workers wanted
rather than simply supplying benefits which might or might
not be foremost in their minds.

37

The problem of layoffs

w a s , for example, reported to have greatly concerned a
large percentage of the Dennison employees during the 19 2 0 ’s.
In 1928 the employee representatives succeeded in persuad
ing management to put aside a fund of one hundred thousand
dollars for payment of benefits to those workers on layoff.
The fund was, however, exhausted in the depression year of
1930.38
q c

These individuals were:
Confidential communication,
Westinghouse, o p . c i t . ; Hillman, o p . c i t .; Confidential
communication, Goodyear, o p . c i t .; Reynolds, o p . c i t .;
Garvey, o p . c i t .; Damon, o p . c i t .; Confidential communi
cation, International Harvester, o p . c i t .; Confidential
communication, International Harvester, o p . c i t .; Confiden
tial communication, American Telephone and Telegraph, o p .
cit.
38Garvey, op. c i t .
3^Damon, op. c i t .
38Ibid.
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In the case of Westinghouse, a retired management
member stated that the plan resulted in management's
granting some wage and hour improvements sooner than they
otherwise would.

This was believed to be the result of

management’s better understanding of what the working force
wanted in terms of economic benefits.33

The company’s

former director of wage and salary benefits felt that
although Westinghouse would have maintained a position of
leadership in the area of compensation and working con
ditions , the representation plan had some effect upon the
overall composition of the economic package.

Wage rate

changes for various occupational groups were cited as being
most influenced by the plan.

40

A second measurement of the effectiveness of upward
communication was the success which employees had in
registering individual grievances with management.

With

regard to grievance processing, fifteen of the sixteen
interviewed agreed that management had for the first time
an effective method by which they could hear the complaints
of the hourly employees.11'*' None of the eight firms had
had a grievance procedure prior to the establishment of
their representation plans.

The same individuals expressed

3C o n f idential communication, Westinghouse, o p . c i t .
"^Arlin, o p . cit.
^ O n l y the respondent from American Telephone and
Telegraph felt that his company's plan had no meaningful
effect upon the settling of grievances.
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their belief that the plan resulted in a significant number
n o

of employee grievances being affirmed by management.
Published data concerning economic concessions and
grievance processing during these years was largely un
available in the eight firms surveyed.

Moreover, when such

data were available, they were presented as if all benefits
obtained were the result of employee requests made through
the representation plans.

Experience with the Standard Oil

of New Jersey plan and the comments of those in the eight
companies surveyed indicate that such claims for economic
concessions were unrealistic.

Nevertheless, a sample of

the topics discussed and their disposition offers some clue
as to the influence of employees and their representatives
upon the benefits granted and grievances upheld under
employee representation.
Table IV is a listing of the issues dealt with under
employee representation at the Bethlehem Steel Corporation’s
plant from October, 1918, to June, 19 33.

It appears from a

study of this chart that approximately two-thirds of the
issues raised in the representation meetings were decided
in favor of the employees.

Missing in this presentation

is the percentage of these requests which were individual
grievances.

Such information is not available.

Table V provides a partial record of the activities
of Standard Oil of Indiana’s representation committee,
42Ibid.

TABLE IV
ISSUES RAISED AND RESOLVED UNDER BETHLEHEM STEEL'S
PLAN OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION,
OCTOBER, 1918, TO JUNE, 1933

Subject

In Employees 1
Favor

Disposition
In Company’s
With
drawn
Favor

Compromis e

Total

Employment and working conditions

809

225

87

184

1,305

Wages, piecework, and hours

515

303

77

251

1,146

Safety and prevention of
accidents

775

49

38

74

936-

Practice, methods, and economy

344

53

32

55

484

Health and works sanitation

346

23

36

48

453

Employees transportation

305

56

34

36

431

Pensions and relief

464

77

21

39

601

Housing, domestic economies,
and living conditions

165

35

17

32

249

Education and publications

27

3

9

8

47

Athletics and recreation

37

4

9

5

55

Rules, ways and means

87

15

14

25

141

Miscellaneous

58

6

1

5

70

3,902

849

375

762

5,918

Total

180

Source:
"Employee Representation in Bethlehem, 1918-1933," Bethlehem R eview,
September 25, 1933, p. 2.
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called the Joint General Committee.

Of the issues dealt with

from 1919 through 1928, 87.2 percent were approved in full
or in part by the committee.
In the Dennison Manufacturing Company a discussion
of the accomplishments of the Works Committee was published
for the year 1920.

The following gains were cited by the

committee for that year:
1.

Institution of an employee profit sharing

plan.

2.

The establishment of an unemployment fund
company employees.

for

3.

4.

The establishment of a housing fund from which
employees could borrow money at a low rate of
interest.
A general increase in wages.

5.

Longer wash-up time for employees.

6.

Approval .of a plan of physical examinations for
new employees.

7.

Improvement in physical surroundings for workers.

8.

Improvement in lunchroom equipment and in
and drinks served.^3

food

No mention was made of grievance processing during the year
1920.
These examples indicate that regardless of the
source of the suggestions, employee gains were realized under
the representation plans.

Relating these examples to the

statements of those interviewed results in the conclusion
U3

Franklyn Meine, "The Introduction and Development
of the Works Committee in the Dennison Manufacturing Com
pany," Journal of Personnel Research, III (August, 19 24),
pp. 169-172.
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TABLE V
TOPICS DEALT WITH UNDER THE EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION PLAN OF STANDARD OIL
OF INDIANA, 1919 THROUGH 1928

Subject

Number of Cases Dealt With

Wages

621

Working Conditions

524

Conciliation

208

Total

1,393

Source:
pp.

26-27.

Stanolind Record, August,

1928,
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that management granted a number of benefits through the
representation plan, some of which were influenced by the
requests of employees and their representatives.

Grievances

were apparently often decided in favor of the employees.
Equally important in this evaluation is the extent
to which management was able to persuade the workers of the
wisdom of company actions, especially in those instances when
the company chose not to grant a specific request or affirm
an employee's grievance.
Evidence of management’s success in this area can
only be of an indirect nature.

Those interviewed were asked

if the plan in their firm increased the working force’s
knowledge and appreciation of management's problems and
points of view.

Fifteen of the sixteen persons interviewed

answered this question in the affirmative .^*4

Employees

were exposed to the company’s problems and its viewpoints
and were often persuaded that its position on a matter was
Lf5

correct.
One amusing incident at Goodyear involves an example
of the company's desire to persuade its worker represen
tatives that a request for a wage increase was inappropriate
at that time.

The firm’s factory manager, Paul Litchfield,

appeared before the assembly of worker and management
^ T h e respondent from American Telephone and
Telegraph doubted that his company's plan increased under
standing in any significant way.
^Richards, op. c i t .
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representatives to explain the company's position with
regard to a wage increase.

For illustrative purposes,

Litchfield used a set of charts and graphs which showed the
relationship between the current cost of living and wages
being paid by the firm.

The line which represented wages

terminated at a slightly higher point than the line repre
senting cost of living.

At the conclusion of the presen

tation, one employee representative stood up and reportedly
said, "Mr. Litchfield, that was a great speech— but the
only thing I can figure out from it is that we came within
Jl g

one-half inch of getting a raise."

The employee repre

sentatives were said to have accepted the company’s reason
ing for denying the request.
This example and the previous statements are not
intended to imply that the employee representatives and
the working force were in every case convinced of manage
ment's wisdom.

Those interviewed nevertheless did believe

that employees better understood management’s point of view
as a result of the representation meetings even when they
did not agree with it.
A second indication of management's persuasiveness
was the volume of strike activity during the plan's
operation.

While other forces had an influence upon the

l+6Hugh Allen, The House of Goodyear (Cleveland:
Corday and Gross, 1949), p . 228.
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employees' willingness to strike,

Ll 7

the employees'

satis

faction with their economic situation nevertheless in
fluenced their willingness to walk off the job.
In only two of the companies surveyed did a strike
ever take place during the life of the representation
plans.

48

Although the absence of a strike does not prove

that employees were in every way content with their economic
situation, it does indicate that they were not so dis
satisfied that they were willing to walk off the job.
Table VI presents strike activity nationally during the
period from 1920 to 1938.
The employees' feelings toward the abandonment of
representation offers a third measure of the plans' success.
Employee attitudes in this area were the product of many
forces, only two of which were economic conditions and
grievance processing within their firms.

Nevertheless,

strong dissatisfaction with compensation policies and
grievance procedures should have been reflected in a desire
to see the representation plans replaced or in some way
changed.
Only two of those interviewed felt that the major
ity of employees in their firms were glad to see the plans
^ A s mentioned previously, employee representation
plans had no independent treasury, nor were they affiliated
with any regional or national associations.
^®These firms were Bethlehem Steel and Goodyear.
The circumstances of these strikes will be discussed in
following paragraphs.
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TABLE VI
WORK STOPPAGES IN AMERICAN
INDUSTRY, 1920-1938

Percent of Employed
Wage Earners

Year

Total Stoppages

1938

2772

2.8

1937

4740

7.2

1936

2172

3.1

1935

2014

5.2

1934

1856

7.2

1933

1695

6.3

1932

841

1.8

1931

810

1.6

1930

637

0.8

1929

921

1.2

1928

604

1.3

1927

707

1.4

1926

1035

N.A.*

1925

1301

N.A.

1924

1249

N.A.

1923

1553

N.A.

1922

1112

N.A.

1921

2385

N.A.

1920

3411

N.A.

*N.A. = Not Available
Source:
U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical
Colonial Times to 1957.
Statistics of the United States:
Bureau
of
the
Census , 1960), p . 99.
(Washington, D.C.:
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g o .1*9

The respondent from American Telephone and Telegraph

and one interviewee from Westinghouse expressed these feel
ings.

All others believed that the plans had general

employee support until the time of their dissolution.
,A verification of these opinions could ideally be
made by presenting the results of an election contest be
tween each company’s representation plan and one or more
outside labor unions.

Unfortunately, no such election was

held in any of the eight companies surveyed.

Whether these

companies would have permitted such a contest is a subject
for speculation.

The National Labor Relations Board did

not, however, order such an election in any one of these
firms.

The Board viewed the representation plans as company

dominated labor organizations and therefore not eligible
for employee consideration.
Other evidence does offer some support to the
majority opinion of the interviewees.

In three of the

firms, independent unions were formed after the represen
tation plans were a b a n d oned.^

These unions were as simi

lar to the plans as the law would allow.

The employees of

these companies chose to deal with management without
affiliation with a national union.
119Confidential communication, American Telephone
and Telegraph, o p . c i t .; Hillman, o p . c i t .; Confidential
communication with a Standard Oil of Indiana employee
revealed no opinion on this subject.
^9These firms were:
Standard Oil of Indiana, Armco
Steel; Dennison Manufacturing Company.
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Two companies did experience strikes during the
organizing drives of the 19 3 0 's.

In February of 193 6

Goodyear was struck by the United Rubber Workers of America
in an attempt to gain union recognition.

Newspaper accounts

estimated that twenty percent of the company's workers participated actively in the strike.

51

The five-week walkout

was unsuccessful, and the striking workers were reinstated
without prejudice.

52

The company's representation plan

continued until April of 19 37 when the constitutionality of
the National Labor Relations Act was upheld by the Supreme
Court.

The plan was then abandoned, and the company was

organized by the United Rubber Workers.
A strike called by the Steel Worker's Organizing
Committee occurred at the Bethlehem Steel Company in 1936.
The company's management reportedly would not negotiate
with the union because of its lack of backing by the
employees of the f i r m . ^

The firm reported in 19 3 6 that

9 6.1 percent of the eligible employees participated in
elections of employee representatives.

54

Although this

election was not conducted between the representation plan
^ " G o o d y e a r Strike Ended by Accord," New York T i m e s ,
March 22, 1936, p. 11.
^ " G o o d y e a r Workers Back," New York Times, March 23,
1936, p. 40.
^ T a f t , o p . c i t . , pp. 519-520 .
^ " 9 6 . 1 % Vote in Employees Elections," Bethlehem
Review, July 3, 1936, p. 2.
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and an outside union, the employees could have registered
dissatisfaction with the plan by not voting.

The vast

majority obviously did not choose to do this.
From the above three areas of investigation it
seems reasonable to conclude that the managements of seven
of the eight firms enjoyed some measure of success in con
vincing the workers that the companies’ decisions were in
the best interests of both the firm and the employees.
There is no substantial evidence that would point to a con
trary conclusion.
Employee Representation and the Companies' Personnel
Departments
It may be recalled from the previous chapter that
with the introduction of Standard Oil of New J e r s e y ’s
representation plan, the company's personnel department was
also established.

A similar situation was found to be true

in two of the eight firms surveyed.

55

At Standard Oil of Indiana the department was
viewed as the vehicle through which the objectives of the
rc

representation plan were to be achieved.

This new

Department of Industrial Relations was made responsible for
the operation of the representation plan and for insuring
that all employees would be treated justly.

At each plant

C C

These firms were Standard Oil of Indiana and
International Harvester.
^ G i d d e n s , o p . c i t . , p. 337.
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an Assistant Director of Industrial Relations was appointed
and was directly accountable to the Director of Industrial
Relations.

Duties performed by the department included

employment, safety, health and welfare, workmen’s compensation, statistics, and publication.

57

Standard Oil of Indiana’s Director of Industrial
Relations acted as neither a representative of labor nor
management at the representation meetings, but instead was
moderator of the meeting,

seeking to aid in the compromise

of disputes and to provide factual information for decision
co

making when either side requested it.
Many of the duties of the new department were taken
from the supervisors in each of the plants.

Selection had

previously been in the hands of the supervisor.

After the

department absorbed this function, the supervisor retained
only the right to accept or reject an applicant selected by
those in Industrial Relations.

59

Similarly, his right to discipline and discharge
was reduced by the representation p l a n ’s formation with
these powers given to the Industrial Relations Department.
A list of offenses for which an employee might be suspended
or discharged without further notice was published.

57Ibid.
^Confidential communication, Standard Oil of
Indiana, op. c i t .
59Ibid.

For
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any other offense, an employee could not be suspended or
discharged without a clear warning and a repetition of the
violation.

If an employee felt that he had been disciplined

unfairly by his supervisor, he had the formal right to
appeal to first his departmental superintendent and then to
the Assistant Director of Industrial Relations.

60

The personnel department did not take a signifi
cantly active role in the representation meetings, and the
plan could have functioned without the department's
existence.

But as in the case of Standard Oil of New

Jersey, the Industrial Relations Director and his assis
tants in each of the plants were appointed to see that the
promises made under the representation plan were kept.
Now that a formal grievance procedure existed, it was up
to those in the personnel department to see that the need
for grievance processing was infrequent.

Thus while

employee representation did not require the existence of
a personnel department, it definitely was a major reason
for its formation in Standard Oil of Indiana.
The International Harvester experience was similar
to that of Standard Oil of Indiana.

Upon the adoption of

the representation plan, a new Department of Industrial
Relations was formed.

The department was "charged with

the duty of giving special attention to all matters
^G iddens, o p . cit., p. 339 .
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pertaining to labor policies and the well-being of employees."

fi1

Again the department was given some of the duties

which supervisors had previously performed.

Selection of

personnel subject to supervisory approval, transfer of
employees, and discipline and discharge were significant
duties of this new department.

62

As was the case in

Standard Oil of Indiana the personnel manager was one of
the steps in the grievance procedure.

Thus an employee

who felt he had been unjustly disciplined could appeal to
higher levels of management, one of the steps in this
appeal procedure being the personnel manager.
The personnel department in this firm was apparently
formed for reasons similar to those in Standard Oil of
Indiana and Standard Oil of New Jersey.

While employee

representation could have no doubt functioned without the
department, it was nevertheless formed to rationalize and
stabilize personnel policies so that the promises made
under the plan could more readily be carried out.
While the personnel departments of both Standard
Oil of Indiana and International Harvester might have been
formed without the existence of employee representation,
the plans encouraged their formation by emphasizing the
need for standardized and rational labor policies.
R1
•
International Harvester Corporation, Harvester
Industrial Council Plan (Chicago:
International Harvester
Corporation, 1919), p . 2.
^Confidential communication, International
Harvester, op. cit.
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Unlike the above two firms, the other six companies
surveyed already had personnel departments at the time of
their p l a n s ’ formation.

In each of these firms, the

personnel department was involved in the functioning of the
representation system.
In Goodyear the company's Labor Department was
formed in 1912, six years before the Industrial Council was
begun.

With the initiation of the representation plan the

Labor Department’s duties were increased and its stature
was said to have grown throughout the company.

fiQ

Specif

ically, its new duties included the administration of
benefits obtained through the plan, the processing of
employee grievances under the plan's grievance procedure,
and the appointment of the department's head as the pre64
siding officer over the representation meetings.
The
department was functioning in the area of employee selection
even before the plan's existence.

Its duties in the area

of discipline' and discharge were, however, increased due to
its role in the grievance procedure.

The department in

essence had to approve a disciplinary action or a discharge
if a grievance on these matters was filed.

65

In the Dennison Manufacturing Company, the personnel
department had been in existence since 1917. ' The primary
fi3

Reynolds, op. c i t .

64Ibid.
65I b i d .
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impact upon the department was again in the area of griev
ance handling.

The personnel department was the first step

in the grievance procedure beyong the supervisor, and
departmental representatives were given the task of investi
gating each grievance, collecting information, and making
a decision as to whether the grievance would be denied or
upheld.

66

Prior to the existence of the representation

plan the supervisor had almost complete autonomy in the
areas of discipline and discharge.

67

Similar responses were obtained from represen
tatives of three of the other firms which were surveyed.
Although in none of these firms did the representation
plan result in the formation of a personnel department,
the companiesT plans increased the duties of the department
and added to its organizational importance.

68

The increase

of duties centered around such areas as the administration
of benefits obtained through the plan, grievance handling,
and presiding over the representation meetings.

69

Only

in the case of American Telephone and Telegraph was the
plan thought to have had no significant influence upon the
functioning of the personnel department.

The principal

88Garvey, op. c i t .
fi7

Curtis, op. c i t .

88Hillman, o p . c i t .; Arlin, o p . c i t .; Confidential
communication, Westinghouse, o p . c i t .; Trumbauer, Bethlehem
Steel, op. c i t . ; Sexton, Armco Steel, op. cit.
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impact on this company was said to be only increased
clerical work and record keeping.
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In summary, it appears that representation had a
significant effect upon the personnel departments of seven
of the eight companies surveyed.

In two of these firms the

departments were formed at the time the representation plan
began.

In these two firms the personnel departments were

apparently formed to fulfill the promises made under the
representation plan.

A large portion of these promises

involved the stabilization of the companies' labor policies
and thus the intention to treat employees fairly and
equally.

Through their activities in selection, transfer,

discipline and discharge, health and safety, and benefit
administration the departments were significant contribu
tors to the accomplishment of the representation plans'
objectives.
In the other six firms, personnel departments were
in existence prior to the beginning of their employee
representation plans.

In five of these six companies the

plans resulted in a significant elaboration of duties of
these departments.

These duties again centered around the

need for a greater standardization and rationalization of
personnel policies.

In one of the firms no significant

effect upon the personnel department's duties was found.
70

Confidential communication, American Telephone
and Telegraph, op. c i t .
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Employee Representation’s Impact Upon Organization Climate
The concept of organization climate was defined in
some detail in Chapter IV.

In brief, the term can be

described as the organization’s personality, or customary
way of responding to its internal and external environment.
As in the previous chapter, climate will be mea
sured in terms of the variables developed by Rensis Li k e r t .
These include:

effectiveness of the organization's commun

ication system; degree of employees' participation in
solving organizational problems affecting them; the way in
which the organization deals with conflict; leadership
style of supervisors and managerial personnel; and the
level and trend of turnover and absenteeism in the organi
zation.
Communicat'ion systems.

It was noted previously that prior

to representation, the effectiveness of vertical communi
cation channels within the eight firms was rather slight.
The eight organizations were lacking both in terms of the
availability of adequate channels and the effective use of
those channels.
The institution of employee representation did
provide a new means of contact between the hourly employees
and top management.
directions was great.

The volume of cummunication in both
It was also previously pointed out

that both sides apparently did influence the other's
attitudes.

Both the wisdom of management's decisions and
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the legitimacy of workers’ demands were more readily
acknowledged after the plan was in operation.

This effect

was the real test of the significance of the channels.

In

only one firm was there no important impact in this area.
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T h u s , seven of these eight firms were favorably influenced
through the development of more effective communication
systems.
Employee participation.

Closely related to effective

communication in the organization is the degree to which
employees participated in the decision making processes of
their f i r m s .

While participation and high productivity

are not necessarily in a cause and effect relationship to
one another, participation has been found to favorably
effect productivity in a number of research studies.
Without question, the previous discussion demon
strates that the hourly employees had a much greater voice
in decision making than existed prior to the representation
plans' creation.

It should be remembered, however, that

the degree to which employees could participate in
decisions affecting them was significantly affected by the
formal design of the plans.

In every one of the eight

plans the companies limited employee involvement in
decision making to the making of suggestions and requests.
•^Confidential communication, American Telephone
and Telegraph Company, op. c i t .

198
In none of the plans were the employees allowed any decision
making autonomy.
Even though employee participation was limited by
the design of the p l a n s , worker influence upon management
was nevertheless much greater than in pre-plan days.

In

terms of both economic gains and grievance processing,
management’s actions were affected by the workers and
their representatives.
In none of the companies surveyed did the represen
tation plans lead to any enrichment of hourly employees’
jobs.

No increases in planning or controlling responsi

bilities was reported.

Employee participation under

representation was thus limited to influencing economic
benefits and to securing impartial treatment for the rankand-file worker.
Interviews and company records do not reveal that
either operating employees or management ever considered
representation as a possible starting point for increasing
planning and controlling responsibilities of rank-andfile employees.

An unrealized potential for representation

thus appears to have existed in this area.

The plans

could have provided a base for this sort of participation
had they been so utilized.
Conflict resolution.

While the operating employees did

obtain a degree of participation in certain decisions and
while greater identification with the company resulted,
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interviews indicate that conflict did in fact still exist
within these organizations.

And as was pointed out in the

previous chapter, a healthy organization is one in which
conflict is present.

It is the way in which an organization

deals with conflict that determines whether it is func
tional or dysfunctional to organization climate.

Likert

has stated that open conflict which is resolved can be an
asset to an organization while bitter, unresolved conflict
can be damaging.

72

Certainly the plans provided a means by which
employees could make known those complaints and requests
which they felt should be voiced.

Previous discussion of

the use of these channels indicated that the employees
felt free to use them and apparently did so quite fre
quently.

Prior to the representation plans there was no

effective way for employees to reach management in the
eight companies surveyed.
Each interviewee was asked if employees felt free
to raise any question without fear of management displea
sure or retaliation.
the affirmative.

In every instance the reply was in

Differences of opinion were also said

to be common features of the representation meetings.

No

instances of reprisals were reported by either management
or non-management personnel.

As was indicated in Chapter

III, the companies were apparently very sensitive to the
^ 2Likert, o p . c i t ., p. 117.
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possibility of charges of employer domination, and did
therefore take great care not to penalize individuals for
statements made in the representation meetings.
It appears that while management and employee
representatives did not always agree upon an issue, the
meetings did allow and encourage a free exchange of views
upon subjects considered.

While management had the power

to settle any issue in its own favor, the many instances
Of rulings favorable to employees indicate that initial
grievances and requests resulted in gains for the workers.
Even in instances in which management ruled against the
employees, each side had a chance to listen and to under
stand the other's point of view.

This situation was

certainly preferable to the pre-plan relationships.
Supervisory leadership style.

One of the factors contrib

uting to unresolved conflict in the days before the
representation plans was the relationship between the
supervisor and his subordinates.

In every company sur

veyed, many instances of inept supervision were reported
73
with regard to treatment of subordinates.

Of course not

all supervisors were thought to be unqualified in this
^ T h o s e who commented on this topic included:
Hillman, o p . c i t .; Arlin, o p . cit.; Confidential communi
cation, Westinghouse, op. c i t .; Garvey, o p . c i t .; Damon,
o p . c i t .; Richards, o p . c i t ., Confidential communication,
International Harvester, op. c i t .; Confidential communi
cation, American Telephone and Telegraph, op. cit.; Sexton,
op. c i t .; Confidential communication, Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company, o p . c i t .; Trumbauer, o p . cit.; Confidential
communication, Standard Oil of Indiana, op. c i t .
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area, but there were enough such instances to make them
fairly common.
For example, at Dennison Manufacturing Company
supervisory willingness to treat employees fairly and con
sistently was found to vary greatly from department to
department.

Often, the attitude taken by the supervisor

was reported to have been, "Do as I say or get out."

74

With the institution of the representation plan,
the powers of the supervisor in Dennison and in other
companies were significantly limited.

Earlier discussion

pointed out that the contacts made under the representation
plan largely bypassed the supervisor.

Only in the griev

ance procedure of six of the eight firms was he included a
a formal step.

He did not normally take part in the pro

ceedings of the representation meetings.
In addition to employees’ ability to reach higher
levels of management without the supervisors’ approval,
the plans also provided for a greater rationalization and
standardization of personnel policies.

As a result of the

representation p l a n s , personnel departments were created
in two of the eight firms, and in five of the remaining
six firms their duties were significantly enlarged.

In

each case the new duties of the personnel department were
taken at least in part from the supervisor.

The super

v i s o r ’s power to hire, fire, and transfer was typically
"^Garvey, op. c i t .
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reduced, and his right to discipline indiscriminately was
limited by the grievance procedure.
While these limitations were imposed without the
supervisors’ consent, the results in most instances were
improved supervisory-subordinate relationships.

In six of

the eight firms those interviewed commented on this topic.
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In five of these six firms those who were interviewed
indicated that relationships between the supervisors and
their subordinates generally improved after the plans were
7R
introduced.
The management of these five firms apparently made
it quite clear to the supervisors that the new regulations
developed as a result of the plan were company policy
and that they would be carried o u t .

For example, in

Dennison Manufacturing Company the supervisors attended a
series of instructional meetings conducted by the company
at the time of the p l a n ’s introduction.

If they did not

comply with company policy in this area, they were told
that they would not remain in their supervisory positions.
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In the Bethlehem Steel Company a similar situation
existed.

The supervisory work force was clearly instructed

75
J. R. Sexton of Armco Steel and the respondent
from Standard Oil of Indiana had no knowledge of this sub
ject.
^®The respondent from American Telephone and Tele
graph saw no significant improvement in this area.
"^Curtis, op. c i t .
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by management that the new personnel policies established
by the company were to be followed and that the supervisor
could expect disciplinary action if he chose not to do so.
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Although supervisors were required to carry out the
new policies under threat of discipline from higher levels
of management, those interviewed in the five firms expressed
the opinion that the majority of the supervisors accepted
the changes without any noticeable hostility toward
superiors or subordinates.

Some supervisors did find it

difficult to adjust to the new relationships, but for the
most part the transition was seen as relatively trouble
free.
As an example of this transition, the supervisory
force at Westinghouse was reported to have accepted the
new relationship without a great deal of difficulty.
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}

Certain supervisors resented the restrictions upon their
freedom of action, but these individuals were forced to
adjust or give up their positions.
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The supervisors’

ability to deal effectively with subordinates improved as
the years passed due to their greater adjustment to the
limitations upon their powers and to the effectiveness of
81
supervisory training programs.
78
Trumbauer, op. c i t .
Confidential communication, Westinghouse, o p . c i t .

8^Hillman, op. c i t .
^Confidential communication, Westinghouse, op. cit.
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The data collected in five of the eight companies
point, therefore, to the conclusion that supervisorsubordinate relationships improved with the introduction
and operation of the representation plans.

In one firm

there was apparently no effect, and in two others no con
clusions could be drawn.
Turnover and absenteeism.

A final measure of organization

climate was the effect of the plans upon absenteeism and
turnover in the eight companies.

In none of these firms

were records available for absenteeism and turnover during
the years of the representation plans' existence.

Con

sequently, reliance was placed upon personal interviews to
determine any influence by the plans in these a r e a s .
None of those interviewed believed that there was
a relationship between turnover and absenteeism and
employee representation.

In three of the firms the

respondents indicated no knowledge of any influence of the
plans in these areas.
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Those interviewed from the other

five companies expressed serious doubts that any relation
ship existed.
Summary.

It appears that in terms of four of the five

variables used to measure organization climate, all but
one of the firms registered some gains after the intro
duction of employee representation.
82

These firms were:
Indiana, Goodyear.

The information does

Armco, Standard Oil of
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not prove that representation caused the improvements.
There are, however, strong indications that the plans
encouraged these better working relationships.
Representations Influence Upon Unionization
Although employees in seven of the eight firms
surveyed were generally satisfied with the workings of
their representation systems, federal law resulted in
their disestablishment in 193 7 or within a few years there
after.

The question here is whether representation had

any effect on employees’ attitudes toward eventual union
ization.

Again, primary reliance was placed upon personal

interviews to determine the effect of the plans in this
area.
In two of the firms those interviewed saw no
relationship between employees' attitudes toward union
ization and the previous operation of the representation
plans.
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In each of the other six some effect was noted.
In three of these six firms, the employees formed

unaffiliated or independent unions.

Their motivations

were said to be the desire to belong to an organization as
much like their former representation plans as the law
would allow.
At Standard Oil of Indiana, the employees were
said to be disappointed at the removal of their represen
tation plan.

During the spring and summer of 1937, the

33These firms were Bethlehem Steel and International
Harvester.
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employees of the company's six refineries organized unaffiliated unions.

Although the International Oil Field,

Gas Well, and Refinery Workers of America, CIO, tried to
organize the company's refinery workers during this period,
they were unsuccessful in any of the six plants.
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In the Armco Steel Company, a similar situation
existed.

Although the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee,

which later became the United Steel Workers' Union,
attempted to organize the company's employees in 1937, the
workers rejected them in favor of unaffiliated unions in
85
each of the Armco plants.
This company was the only major steel producing
firm which was not organized by the S.W.O.C.

The lack of

success at Armco was attributed to the highest wage rates
and most generous fringe benefits in the industry coupled
with an entirely satisfactory communication system between
86

management and the working force.

No national union attempted to organize the
Dennison Manufacturing Company during this period.

The

employees were reported to have maintained their former
ph

Confidential communication, Standard Oil of
Indiana, op. c i t . ; Giddings, o p . c i t ., p. 568.
85

Sexton, op. c i t .

^ ^I b i d . The company could not supply information
concerning wages and benefits during this period.
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relationships with management by operating an independent
union.

This organization still exists in the firm today.
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Three firms which affiliated with national unions
were reported to have been influenced in this action by
their former representation p l a n s .

American Telephone and

Telegraph employees were said to be so disappointed with
their plan's operation that they welcomed the chance to
join a union.88

Accordingly, after the plan was disbanded

in 1940 the employees affiliated with the National Feder-.
ation of Telephone Workers.

This union changed its name

in 1947 to the Communication Workers of America.

The

company's long-lines employees are presently a part of
this union which is a member of the AFL-CIO.88
Westinghouse employees were also thought to be
more receptive to union organization during the late 1930's,
not because of the failure of their representation plan,
but because they had become accustomed to dealing with
management on a collective basis.
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A number of the elected

p7
Garvey, o p . c i t .; Curtis, o p . c i t .; Damon, o p .
cit.; Richards, op. c i t . The Firm's union was in 19 69
ruled by the National Labor Relations Board to be a companydominated union under the provisions of the Labor Management
Relations Act.
The Board's decision was upheld by the U.S.
Court of Appeals.
See NLRB v. Dennison Manufacturing
Company, et a l ., No. 7 304 CA 1 (December 10, 19 69), 72 LRRM
2972 (1969).

88Ericson, o p . c i t .
88American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Labor
Relations History (New York:
American Telephone and
Telegraph, August 15, 19 64), pp. 1-2.
8^Confidential communication, Westinghouse, o p . cit.
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representatives were said to have been the nucleus of union
organizing efforts with the result that these former
employee representatives became union officers after unionization occurred.

91

The employees affiliated with the

United Electrical and Radio Workers of America in 1938.
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In the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company a similar
experience took place.

The employees had voted in 193 5 to

maintain their representation plan in favor of any outside
labor organization.

93

Nevertheless, when the plan was

disbanded in 193 7, the employees affiliated with the United
Rubber Workers shortly thereafter.

gif

The company’s

Industrial Assembly plan was believed to be a definite
factor in influencing the workers toward dealing with
management on a collective basis.

Again, many of the

former employee representatives became local union officers
after affiliation with the national union.

The past

experience they had in dealing with management was valuable
in the negotiating process which followed.

95

In summary, the employees of six of the eight
firms surveyed were believed to be influenced in their
attitudes toward unionization by their experiences under
^ H i l l m a n , op. c i t .
92Taft, o p . c i t ., p. 52 6.
93Allen, o p . c i t . , p. 347.
94Ibid.
^Sexton,

op. c i t .
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employee representation.

In three of these companies the

employees organized unaffiliated unions which were similar
to their former representation pl a n s .

The employees of the

three other firms joined national unions.

In one of these

firms the employees were so dissatisfied with their repre
sentation plan, they gladly affiliated with a labor
organization.

The employees of the remaining two companies

were not anxious to see their plans dissolved.

They were,

however, accustomed to dealing with management on a
collective basis, and this was believed to have increased
their willingness to affiliate with some sort of labor
organization.
The Representation Plans of the Eight Firms in Summary
An analysis of eight plans of employee represen
tation has revealed a number of significant contributions
to the development of personnel management in this country.
While findings in each of these companies were not entirely
uniform, they do point out that representation plans
generally were helpful to both the employees and the
management of the companies involved.

In only one of the

companies was a largely negative impression found.
Representation plans were found to open new
channels of communication between workers and management
and to encourage their usage.

Some changes in the atti

tudes of both sides resulted from the usage of these
channels.

Both economic gains and the favorable disposition
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of grievances were also granted to employees through the
plans.
The personnel departments of seven of these firms
were in some cases created by the plans and in other in
stances enlarged in importance.

In every instance a

greater standardization of personnel policies and practices
resulted from management’s intention to make good the
promises of the p l a n s .
Organization climate was also found to improve
through greater and more candid communication among manage
ment and the workers, through greater employee partici
pation, through the opportunity to resolve conflict more
effectively, and through more effective supervisorsubordinate relationships.
Employees in six of the eight firms were influenced
in their attitudes toward unionization as a result of
their experiences with employee representation.

In three

of the six companies unaffiliated unions were formed which
paralleled the former representation plans but which met
the requirements of national labor legislation.

In the

other three firms the employees joined national unions.
Their previous experiences with their firms’ represen
tation plans were factors leading to this affiliation.
A comparison of these findings with those of the
previous chapter largely verifies the conclusions concern
ing Standard Oil of New Jersey's employee representation
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plan.

While the Standard of New Jersey plan was in many

ways a part of an ideal working relationships the major
areas of contribution found to exist there were for the
most part found to exist in the plans surveyed in this
chapter.
It seems reasonable to conclude that employee
representation in American industry did make significant
contributions to the development of more effective
management-worker relationships in many of the companies
in which it was utilized.

Variations in effectiveness

among firms no doubt existed.

This variation was illus

trated in the limited sample of eight companies analyzed
in this chapter.

Nevertheless, the plans were a signifi

cant step away from the authoritarian methods of management
which predominated at the turn of the twentieth century.
They can correctly be viewed as a part of the movement in
this century toward more efficient techniques of managing
the human resources of the enterprise.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Employee representation was a phenomenon which
existed for approximately two decades in this country— from
1919 until 1937.

History remembers representation as a

means by which employers sought to discourage unionism
among employees, but little else has been written about
this form of collective relationship.

While there is no

question that the fear of unionism motivated the establish
ment of many of these plans, such an explanation is
incomplete.
It has been the basic hypothesis of this study that
employee representation made a number of contributions to
the improvement of management-employee relations within
companies in which it was used.

These contributions have

never been extensively explored with a resultant gap in our
existing knowledge of labor-management history.

This study

was undertaken to fill this gap in historical research.
Summary of Results
Although results were not uniform in each of the
nine firms surveyed, a number of findings were consistent
from company to company.

These results will be dealt with

in terms of each of the areas of investigation.
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Communication channels.

The plans' effects upon the estab

lishment and usage of communication channels between
management and operating personnel were first examined.

In

every one of the nine companies studied, the creation of a
representation plan resulted in a new communication channel
between top management and the rank-and-file employees of
the firm.

Through the medium of the plan, top management

had the opportunity to present their point of view to the
employees on a wide variety of topics and vice versa.
Management was in each of the nine firms quite
willing to utilize the new channel in an attempt to both in
form and persuade the employees of the wisdom of the com
pany's action.

In no case was there a paucity of information

generated by management.
Through their elected representatives employees were
equally willing to communicate with management on matters of
individual grievances and on demands for improvements in
w a g e s , hours, and working conditions.

The companies surveyed

had for the first time given their operating employees a
means to reach top and middle levels of management without
first obtaining the approval of the first line supervisor.
Evidence suggests that the working force of these firms were
for the most part eager to communicate with management and
readily did so.
While the existence and frequent usage of the new
form of contact between the operating employees and manage
rial personnel did not in itself insure that benefits would
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accrue to either side, the lack of such contact in the past
virtually guaranteed that some misunderstandings would occur.
The availability of an effective means of contact was thus
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for improving
management-worker relations in these firms.

The effective

ness of these points of contact was measured in other
portions of the investigation.
Economic benefits and grievances.

The influence of employ

ees upon the economic benefits obtained from management and
upon grievance processing was a significant measure of the
impact which the plan had upon overall working relation
ships .

Equally important was management’s ability to

persuade the work force of the wisdom of its decisions
when a request or grievance was denied.

This topic was

therefore explored in detail.
In all but one of the nine firms surveyed the
employees and their elected representatives were found to
have influenced the disposition of economic benefits.
Although the managements of these companies often granted a
benefit unilaterally and then gave the plans the credit for
obtaining it, the available evidence indicates that the
representatives influenced the timing and composition of
changes in the benefit package.
Employees were quite willing to use the grievance
procedure which was created by the plans.

Especially in

the early years of the plans’ existence, there were a large
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number of individual requests and complaints.

Published

data indicated that these grievances were frequently
decided in favor of the employees.

The majority of those

interviewed agreed with this observation.
Management in eight of the nine firms was generally
effective in persuading the employees of the wisdom of
decisions which denied a request or grievance.

Certainly,

there were disagreements between the two sides, and not all
of these disputes were resolved to the satisfaction of all
concerned.

However, when compared to the relationships in

pre-plan days, the companies were much more successful
after the introduction of employee representation in
obtaining employee support for their decisions.
Personnel department formation.

The effect of the plans

upon the formation or expansion of the companies’ personnel
departments was found to be significant in eight of the
nine companies in the study.

In three of these eight firms

the personnel department was formed at the time that the
representation plans were introduced.

In the other five

firms the duties of the department were significantly
enlarged.

In each instance there was a recognition of the

need to standardize and rationalize the companies’ person
nel policies, many of which had previously been individually
determined by departmental supervisors.
The firms had committed themselves to fair and
equal treatment of employees through representation.
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The personnel departments were given the duty of seeing
that the promises made under the plan were kept.

Thus

while the nature of employee representation did not require
a personnel department, it definitely caused the creation
or encouraged the expansion of such a department in the
firms studied.

Duties were commonly assigned to the

personnel department in the areas of selection and place
ment, transfer, discipline and discharge, benefit adminis
tration, and grievance processing.
Organization climate.

Although the organization climate

within any firm is illusive and difficult to measure, an
attempt was made to do this in each of the nine firms.

A

number of variables were selected which were believed to
adequately reflect the state of an organization's health.
These variables included:
1.

The effectiveness of the organization's commun
ication system.

2.

The extent of the employees' participation in
solving problems which affected them.

3.

The way in which the organization dealt with
conflict.

4-.

Leadership styles of supervisory personnel.

5,

The level and'trend of turnover and absenteeism
in the organization.

Each of these variables was investigated before and after
the introduction of the representation plan.
The measurement of these factors resulted in the
following improvements after employee representation was
introduced:
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1.

Communication improved both in quantity and
effectiveness in eight of the nine firms.

2.

Employees in eight of the companies were allowed
to participate to a limited extent in a number
of economic decisions affecting them.

3.

Conflict was dealt with more openly and more
constructively in eight of the organizations.

4.

In five of the nine firms supervisor-subordinate
relationships improved.

5.

In one company a reduction in turnover and
absenteeism was linked to the operation of the
plan.

While the information obtained does not prove conclusively
that representation was the cause of these changes, there
are strong indications that at least a partial causal
relationship did exist.
Unionization.

The effect of the plans upon eventual union

ization in the nine firms was mixed.

In four of the firms,

independent or unaffiliated unions were formed.

The

employees of these companies were found to have been satis
fied with their representation plans and thus formed unions
which were as much like them as the National Labor Relations
Act would allow.'1' Union officers in these firms-were
-^-These firms included:
Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey; Standard Oil Company of Indiana; Armco Steel Company;
Dennison Manufacturing Company (a paper products producer).
These four firms have maintained their independent unions
to the present time. Their industries, however, are largely
organized by national unions.
The percent of the workers
in each industry organized by national unions follows:
Oil,
7 8%; Steel, 83%; Paper products, 100% (est.).
United States
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory
of National and International Labor Unions in the United
States (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office,
1967), p. 84.
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typically former employee representatives.

In the other

five firms in the survey, the employees affiliated with
national unions.

Although general worker satisfaction with

the plans appeared to exist in all but one of these com
panies, they nevertheless, aligned with national unions as
their plans were declared illegal and as union organizing
drives picked up momentum in the late 19 3 0's.
In every company surveyed both management and
operative employees agreed that the experience they had
had under employee representation made the transition to a
unionized.relationship less traumatic.

In each firm it had

become the custom for management to deal with the employees
on a collective basis.

Bargaining and contract adminis

tration were therefore not entirely foreign to either side.
Conclusions of the Study
The historical importance of employee representation
rests largely in the motivational insights and experience
which developed from its usage.

It has been noted through

out this study that after World War I many companies
realized the need for an improvement in their personnel
policies.

Employee representation offered a possible

vehicle for this improvement while at the same time dis
couraging the organization of the firm's employees by a
labor union.

These were the basic motivations for estab

lishing the p l a n s .
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It appears that in most instances these firms were
not quite sure where representation would lead them in
terms of their relationships with their working force.

The

plans were thus experiments during the time when personnel
management and motivation theory were in their infancy.
In a period in which employees were viewed by many
as primarily economic men who responded almost exclusively,
to monetary incentives, the ideas behind representation
were indeed radical.

To say that employees had the right

to help determine the conditions under which they would
work and the wages which they would earn was considered
heresy by many businessmen of the early 1900's.
Employee representation thus was a move away from
the traditional autocratic management of the times toward
a more democratic and humanistic orientation.

In more

specific terms the plans did allow the worker a greater
chance to move up the needs hierarchy that Abraham Maslow
was to write about in later years.

Satisfaction of

economic, social, status, and self-actualization needs of
employees were more fully achieved under representation
than in the pre-plan period.
The workers did in many companies induce management
to make concessions in the areas of wages, hours, and
working conditions.

While it has been observed that

management had the strongest hand in the determination of
these benefits, employees nevertheless had some influence.
The physiological and security needs which Maslow was to
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cite as the most basic for man were thus more adequately
satisfied after the introduction and operation of represen
tation .
The plans further sought to achieve a greater unity
of interests and identification with management among the
work force.

Changes in organization climate after the

introduction of the plans suggest that this goal was largely
accomplished in the majority of the firms studied.
Likert has suggested that the most effective work
team is one in which there is a high level of group co
hesiveness and identification with the formal organization's
goals.

2

Representation appears to have been a significant

factor in accomplishing this identification.

While labor

unions work for cohesiveness among their membership, they
do not encourage identification with management and the
firm.
Further, representation did allow the worker a
chance to satisfy to some extent his egoistic need for
status and recognition.

While the plans did not and could

not result in promotions for the working force, they did
add to the satisfaction of the need for status in two ways.
First, they allowed a number of rank-and-file employees to
hold leadership positions in the representation plans and
thus satisfy in part their need for recognition.

Although

holding such a position added nothing to their pay checks,

York:

^Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1961), p . 99.
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employees who were not upwardly mobile obtained a measure
of importance that they otherwise would not have possessed.
More broadly, every employee working under a welladministered plan had some chance for individual recognition
through his right to contact management representatives
with his requests and grievances.

While this right offered

only limited satisfaction of the egoistic need, it was
nevertheless a gain over pre-plan days.
Through the performance of their duties, the
employee representatives were often given the chance to
utilize more fully the abilities they possessed.

To a

limited extent the self-actualization needs of these indi
viduals were also satisfied as a result of employee repre
sentation.
Thus from a historical viewpoint it can be observed
that employee representation provided a step forward in the
satisfaction of a number of psychological needs of the
worker long before their significance was widely understood
by most members of management.

Perhaps unknowingly, the

firms which had experimented successfully with represen
tation were a part of the human relations movement which
Elton Mayo popularized in the 1 9 3 0 ’s and 1 9 4 0 's.

They were

thus pioneers in the utilization of new and more effective
means of dealing with employees.
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Implications of the Study
Beyond the historical significance of the study,
what implications does this research have for current-day
management-worker relations?

Regardless of the success of

many of these early p l a n s , they cannot be utilized in their
original form today.

These representation systems were

classified as company dominated labor organizations by the
National Labor Relations Act of 193 5 and were declared
illegal.

As explained earlier, this was the reason for

their abandonment in the late 19 30's and early 1 9 4 0 's.
Any contributions which the findings concerning represen
tation can make to current labor-management relations can
not therefore be in the form of revived representation
plans.

The lessons learned through representation can,

however, be of value to today's management.
A prerequisite to the satisfaction of employee
demands is the need for effective contact between management
and the employees.

The lesson learned by a number of firms

over fifty years ago was that if employees cannot get
management's attention through formalized methods, they
will utilize other means such as strikes and unionization.
A parallel of this situation can be drawn with the
white collar and professional workers of today.

The grow

ing militance of these employees poses new problems for
management and offers opportunities for union leaders.
Both in private industry and government service, these
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employees have grown increasingly restive and more sympa3
thetic to the appeals of unions.
To fully analyze the problems of professional and
white collar workers is beyond the scope of this study.
Remedies for these problems are therefore also beyond its
scope.

Nevertheless, some suggestions for strengthening

the traditional ties between management and these employee
groups can be made by drawing upon the lessons of represen
tation.

These suggestions will center around the. improve

ment of communication methods in the organization.
Without the necessity of a formal representation
plan or of a union, management might establish a formal
appeal channel for any employee or group of employees in
the firm.

This channel could be used to process grievances

and for the direction of requests and suggestions to upper
levels of management.

Far from being a duplicate of the

rather unsuccessful open-door .policy of the past, this
technique could be established as a path outside the formal
chain of command with succeeding appeal steps culminating
with consideration of the question by the president.
See, for example, A. Kleingartner, "Professionalism
and Engineering Unionism," Industrial Relations, VIII (May,
1969), 224-235; A. A. Sloan” "Prospects for the Unionization
of White Collar Employees," Personnel Journal, XLVIII
(December, 1969), 964-971.
Approximately ten percent of the labor force classi
fied as white collar are members of unions. United States
Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States (Washington, D.C.l
United States Government Printing
Office, 1969), p. 236.
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While an arrangement such as this could certainly
fail, its primary chance of success would rest upon the
exercise of good faith on both sides.

As was the case

with employee representation, each group would have the
opportunity to better understand the other, and problems
would have a greater chance of being resolved in their
early stages.
Such a non-union appeal system is not an entirely
new idea.

It has been successfully used in a few companies

for some time.*4

Nevertheless, there are relatively few

firms that are not unionized which use such systems.

The

assumption is often made that the formal chain of command
is sufficient to pass information upward to top management.
5
This is often not the case.
Whether done intentionally
or not, screening of information can and often does occur
before it reaches the top levels of the organization.
Especially with regard to problems of motivation and m o r a l e ,
top management may not know that a problem exists until
after it has become serious.
Beyond the advantage of giving management an early
warning system for employee discontent, such a channel of
communication could also be used to allow the employees to
4,'Bo s s and Worker:
Better Communications Between
Them Boosts Output, Companies Find," Wall Street Journal,
October 13, 1955.

^Charles E. Redfield, Communication in Management
(Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1958 ), p. 181.
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participate in the solution of problems raised by both
sides.

Especially among professional employees who typi

cally have some latitude in the way their job is performed,
there is a strong desire to participate in decisions which
affect them and their work.

Hence, an opportunity to

participate with management in solving problems which
affect the work force logically should aid the white-collar
and professional employee in the satisfaction of his higher
level needs through greater participation and identifi
cation with the organization.
Although the above remarks concerning the need for
better understanding between current-day management and
employees could have been stated without an investigation
of employee representation, the study nevertheless provides
useful verification.

Investigation of the surveyed firms

demonstrated that effective contact did a great deal to
improve understanding and promote labor peace.

A Final Note
The above observations apply with equal force to
the non-private sector of our economy.

Within the past

few years unrest among government employees has been grow
ing.

In the first few months of 197 0 the nation witnessed

the first postal strike in this country's history.

The

strike has been attributed in part to the inability of
rank-and-file workers to effectively register their
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grievances with the Post Office Department and with Con6
gress.

Disruptions in many of our major universities also
point to the need for effective appeal channels.

Our

country’s labor history has shown clearly that when sub
ordinates have no method for registering complaints and
requests with their organization's top management, they
will often resort to disruptive behavior.
The creation of the means of contact.is, of course,
only the first step, whether in industry, government ser
vice, or in the university.

Its success will depend upon

the willingness of both sides to use it effectively to
promote their mutual interests.

g

"Untangling the Mess in the Post Office," Business
Week, March 28, 1970, p. 7 8-98.
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Box 20110
University Station
Baton Rouge, La.
70803

Gentlemen:
I am beginning research for a doctoral dissertation
in business administration at Louisiana State University.
My proposed topic is in the area of management history,
specifically relating to the employee representation
plans that were popular in many firms in the 1920's and
1930's .
In a survey of the existing literature on the sub
ject I have found your company's name mentioned several
t i m e s . I am wondering if information concerning such
factors as the motivation for the beginning of the plan,
its method of operation, and reasons for its dis
continuance are still in your files and if I might
obtain copies of this material.
I will be happy to pay
the copying cost if this material is available.
I would
also like the names of present or retired employees who
had experience with the plan so that I could interview
them on this subject.
The purpose of this dissertation is to shed more
light on what I believe to be an important contribution
to employer^-employee relations in our country.
If your
company is able and willing to be a part of this research,
I would appreciate hearing from you.
Thank you very
much.
Sincerely,

C. Ray Gullett
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QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION
1.

Position(s) held in the company during the time of the
operation of the plan.

2.

Were you a representative of either management or the
workers on one of the shop committees of the company at
any time— during the operation of employee represen
tation?

3.

A.

Position held.

B.

Length of time held.

C.

Duties performed.

What, in your opinion, were the primary motivations of
management for installing the plan?

246
4.

The following questions involve the functioning of the
plan in terms of its formal design.
A.

What was the procedure for- electing employee repre
sentatives?

B.

What was the procedure for choosing management
representatives?

C.

What was the procedure for raising issues to be
discussed?

D.

Did either or both sides (management and worker
representatives) have the right to meet separately
in addition to joint meetings?
If not, why not?
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E.

How frequently were meetings held?

F.

How were issues raised at the meetings resolved
(majority v o t e 3 for example)?

G.

How many representatives did each side select?

H.

How was an unresolved question decided?

I.

J.

K.

(1)

Appeal to top management.

(2)

Impartial arbitrator.

(3)

Other individuals.

How much formal legislative power did the
management-worker committee have?
(1)

Resolution of questions without referring
them to top management (assuming worker and
management representatives agreed.)

(2)

Resolutions subject to top management approval.

(3)

No legislative power; purely informational in
order to acquaint each side with the o t h e r 's
views.

(4)

Other relationship.

How did employees become members of the represen
tation- plan?
(1)

Automatic membership.

(2)

Could decide to either join or not become a
member.

Were there any membership dues?
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L.

Was the plan financed by the employer, the employ
ees , or some sharing arrangement?

M.

Did the employees have the right to strike under the
plan?

N.

Did a strike in fact ever occur during the oper
ation of the plan?

0.

(1)

What were the issues involved?

(2)

What part, if any did the employee represen
tation plan play in the strike’s occurrence
and/or its resolution?

Did the plan provide for a formal collective
bargaining contract for a specified time period?
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P.

5.

Was there any procedure for amending the plan
itself?
(1)

For example, could the powers of employees or
of the employer under the plan be changed?

(2)

Was such a change negotiable or in the hands
of the employer?

The following questions involve the plan's actual
,operation.
A.

To your knowledge, were there any deviations from
the formal methods of plan operation in actual
practice?
Please specify.

(1)

For example, were election procedures followed
as outlined in the plans?

(2)

Were employees completely free to raise any
issue without fear of management displeasure?

B.

Was the plan itself ever amended?
(1)

Employer initiation?

(2)

Employee initiation?

(3) Government initiation?
C.

What, if any, was the nature of change in the plan?

What effect, if any did the installation of the plan
have upon the flow of communications between management
and labor?
A.

Did management use the plan as a vehicle for expla
nation of its objectives, policies, and procedures?

(1)

State the specific manner in which this was
accomplished.

(2)

Was there evidence that such communication
increased the wo r k e r ’s understanding of
management’s goals?
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B.

7.

Did the plan stimulate worker initiation of commun
ication with management?
(1)

Did the number of grievances increase as
compared with pre-plan days?

(2)

Was there any increase of suggestions for cost
savings by workers?

(3)

Was there any increase in requests for wage
increases (group and/or individual), improve
ment in working conditions, fringe benefits,
e t c .?

Did the plan have any significant effect upon the
benefits g r a n t e d to workers (tangible and intangible)?
A.

Effect upon wages and'hours?

B.

Effect upon physical working conditions?
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8.

C.

Effect upon fringe benefits?

D.

Would these benefits, in your opinion, have been
likely to have been granted if the plan had not
been in existence?

E.

Was there, in your opinion, any noticeable change
in the philosophy of management toward the working
force during the operation of the plan?

(1)

What evidence can be cited to support this
view?

(2)

What specifically did the change involve?

Was turnover and absenteeism noticeably affected by
the operation of the plan?

A.

What was the effect?
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B.

9.

10.

I

Could any other* forces have been involved?

Was productivity significantly affected by the plan?
A.

To what extent?

B.

What concerning the plan affected productivity?

Did the plan's operation in your opinion make the
employees more ready to join a union at a later date,
increase their resistance to unionism, or have no
effect?
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11.

12.

Did the plan have any significant effect upon job con
tent of workers?
A.

Was there an enlargement of duties of any signif
icant number of non-management jobs as a result of
the plans?

B.

Did employees obtain more responsibility (such as
in the area of planning) as a result of employee
representation?

What was the effect, if any, of employee representation
upon the firm’s personnel department (assuming the
existence of one)?
A.

Formation.

B.

Increase in duties or elaboration of existing ones.

C.

Overall significance and importance of the depart
ment .
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13.

What part, if any did foremen (or supervisory personnel)
play in the representation plan?

14.

In your opinion was management's labor policy clearly
stated by management and clearly understood by the
workers in the days before a representation plan
existed?
Please explain your answer.

15.

How effective was the supervisor (or foreman) in inter
preting management’s labor policy (assuming one existed)
prior to the installation of the plan?

16.

Were the supervisors encouraged to communicate with
subordinates about the company’s labor policy when the
company had no representation plan? Please explain.

17.

How widespread in your opinion was the reading of the
minutes of the representation meetings by rank-and-file
workers?
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18.

Did the plan remain popular with the workers throughout
its existence as a means of making requests and
suggestions to management? Please explain.

19.

In your opinion, did management better understand the
feelings of the workforce as the result of the repre
sentation plan?

20.

Was employee participation in company affairs affected
to any extent by the plan?
In what ways?

21.

Did supervisory personnel lose any of their authority
or power as a result of the representation plan?
If
y e s , in what way were their authority and power affected?

22.

Did the supervisory personnel appear to resent any above
mentioned loss of power and authority?
If yes, did this
resentment affect their relationships with subordinates?
If y e s , in what way?
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